Principios Constitucionales que protegen a la persona

There are a number of common factors and characteristics that are often argued, by the proponents of conventional security governance, to form the core of the concept - important to take note of here before a more critical assessment of the concept can be made in due course. Employing Webber et al.’s (2004; 8) straightforward definition of security governance, scholars such as Ehrhart et al (2014) have, more recently, developed useful and insightful typologies of the concept’s key features, bringing together broadly the approaches of other authors and typically encompassing the following elements: (i) the prerequisites of security governance, (ii) the structures of security governance and (iii) the consequences of security governance (see Table 1). Each of these will now be discussed briefly in turn.

Prerequisites. First, adherents to the concept of security governance typically provide a number of prerequisite categories related to the term (Ehrhart et al, 2014; 148). In light of the decline of central, hierarchical forms of authority, the coordination and regulation of security arrangements can, conventionally no longer be mandated and enforced from above. Consequentially, security governance demands the existence of a “basic consensus regarding the problems to be tackled, the need for a cooperative solution, and the general principles guiding common action” (Ehrhart, et al 2014; 148). In this sense, security governance first requires a common, compatible set of interests and goals in order for actors to consider engaging in costly and potentially risky governance efforts initially. Furthermore, this implies a degree of overlap between certain actors’ norms and ideas in order to provide a common ideational basis for that cooperation to be durable (Krahmann, 2003; Webber et al, 2004; Ehrhart et al, 2014). Simply, security governance arrangements initially require that there exists a degree of common interest amongst their

actors; a shared understanding of goals, interests, norms and ideas, in order to encourage cooperative actor participation in security governance arrangements in the first instance. Subsequently, this prerequisite category of security governance is presented by its proponents as pertaining to the actual policy- and decision-making sources associated with security governance arrangements and thus, relates most clearly to the various forces of such, underlying the conceptualisation, development and implementation of policies deemed to be examples of security governance in practice.

Structures. Second, security governance literature typically details the structures of security governance; those being the organisational nature of the multiple actors involved, the forms of cooperation that their interactions take, and the various compliance mechanisms ensuring that such coordination endures over time (Ehrhart et al, 2014; 149). Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004; 151-52) for example, establish the essence of such ‘structural’ elements, stating that they tend to entail pluralistic coordination between both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements whereby hierarchy is less important (although not necessarily absent altogether), and cooperative processes and mechanisms amongst actors and subjects - rather than the deployment of conventional command-and-control structures. Hence, simply put, structures of security governance denote the multiplicity of actors, the heterarchic forms of cooperation and the voluntary compliance mechanisms that are presumed to organise and sustain security governance arrangements after their inception.

Consequences. Finally, security governance adherents also attribute a strong normative dimension to the concept’s application, thus predicting a set of desired consequences.

While security governance on one hand is clearly about a collection of features describing how security coordination actually works, on the other, it is also linked to notions about how such coordination should work to produce specific outputs (Ehrhart et al, 2014; 149). Two main desirable consequences of security governance arrangements are typically given by proponents of conventional forms of the concept; first, the

effectiveness of security governance, and second, its legitimacy. The significance of the former is born out of the assumption that ‘governance is always effective’ as it would otherwise degenerate into ‘anarchy or chaos’, thus ceasing to be an arrangement of

‘governance’ as such (Rosenau, 1992; 5). The latter moreover, complementing this understanding of effectiveness, relates best to the notion that in order for governance to be both effective and efficient, there must first be a degree of support and consensus amongst those it actually seeks to govern (Ehrhart et al 2014; 149). In more simplistic terms therefore; security governance denotes a series of desired consequences - an effectiveness that emerges almost naturally and a sense of legitimacy that foreshadows it - establishing shared consensus and support for the arrangement amongst those it seeks to govern.

Table 1: Conventional Security Governance: Core Characteristics

Security Governance: Typology Term Conventional Security Governance: Core Characteristics

Prerequisites Common interests and goals, Shared

norms and ideas

Structures Pluralistic constellations of actors,

Heterarchical modes of cooperation, Voluntary compliance mechanisms

Consequences Effectiveness and Legitimacy

Table adapted from Ehrhart et al (2014; 150)

All-in-all, security governance conceptually attempts (and often succeeds) in capturing many of the key features and dynamics of security policies in the 21st century (Ehrhart et al, 2014; Dandashly, 2014). From collective security arrangements such as NATO at the international level - to neighbourhood watch collectives on a much smaller, local and individual scale - the core characteristics of security governance detailed above encapsulate many aspects of today’s security arrangements, despite their often stark differences in reality. The utility of the concept in this manner - and the succinct nature of the conventional typology framework used by security governance scholars to date - has

clearly been one of the concept’s key sources of attraction amongst security scholars specifically. As such, many studies have been able to identify and map the key trends of security governance arrangements in a relatively simple, procedural manner - taking account of the informal, collective, decentralised forms of coordination now increasingly prevalent in many of today’s security policies, as a result of the decline in conventional modes and authorities of security management such as military action and the state. Given the general adherence amongst conventional security governance scholars to the above typologies, their assumptions and general conclusions are therefore often rather congruent - security governance arrangements are typically presented to have emerged in a ‘natural’, almost ‘organic’ manner as responses to common problems of multi-actor coordination in a security setting - similarities, generalisations and commonalities among conclusions therefore, tend to be apt inferences for such scholarly research to make in the end. Although this ‘utility’ and the relative ‘ease-of-access’ of the concept clearly has a number of merits when accounting for and researching cases within an increasingly overly-complex and convoluted security-studies field, it is this same ‘simplification’ of the concept that has led to a number of criticisms being raised by other academics more recently. Before turning our attention to some of the significant shortcomings of conventional security governance approaches in this regard however - and thus introducing an alternative approach given the research question guiding the present thesis - it seems necessary at this stage to contextualise the central focus of this thesis - the ENP - in light of the above theoretical and conceptual discussions above detailing security governance in its conventional form. Indeed, can the ENP even be considered an example of security governance in practice? Consequently, can studies of the ENP benefit from applications of conventional security governance approaches conceptually?