Principios de la categorización lingüística

Combat command and control in the operation was supported by reliable and organized communications. The preservation of the daily communications operating system and existing fleet documentation was the guiding principle in this effort. The main

communications nodes were served by several redundant channels of communication and by various types of equipment.

The communications plan and necessary implementing documents for the operation were prepared only for the operation’s first phase, the period of the conduct of the amphibious landing on the coastline of Maattivuono Bay and the breakthrough of German defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula. The organization of

communications and orders for the subsequent period of the operation was developed during its course.

Wire communications were set up for the most part using existing permanent telephone and telegraph lines. The communications plan is shown in figures 26 and 27. The communications plan developed by fleet staff before the operation was approved on 11 September. It took into account the establishment of the fleet commander’s auxiliary command post on Sredniy Peninsula. The need for this facility was identified

immediately prior to the start of the operation. But, despite this, the fleet staff chief of communications, Captain Second Rank Polozok, who was on Sredniy Peninsula to supervise the preparation of the communications system, was able to create a

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supplementary communications center for support of command and control from the fleet auxiliary command post using spare equipment consisting of a mobile transmitter and 100 kilometers of cable. Special attention was given to providing radio

communications for coordination with 14th Army in the organization of fleet staff communications and the orders generated before the operation.

[Figure 26. Organization of radio communications.]

[Figure 27. Organization of communications for the amphibious landing.]

Three radio nets (one reserve) were assigned to Northern Defensive Region for this purpose. The station “Prima” was assigned to the defensive region’s chief of communications for work in one of these nets.

When units approached each other on the battlefield, they were to use “coordination (regiment−battalion) radio communications for converging units” to establish their identity and coordinate their combat actions.

Encode/decode tables and message formats were developed for telephone and telegraph messages. The work of liaison officers was not discussed in the instructions that were developed, and the chief of communications did not even know who the liaison officers were and to where they would be sent. Thus must be acknowledged as a substantive shortcoming in the working out of communications issues for the operation.

In addition to schematics, tables of coded signals were developed for Northern Defensive Region coordination between units, with ships, and with Fleet Air Forces. These tables contained a list of the signals in use, coded signals for use on the radio or telephone, for signal rockets and lights, and who was to initiate the signal. A callsign table was also developed for the officer component.

Appropriate communications schematics and instructions were also developed in organizing Fleet Air Forces communications, in the naval gunfire support detachment, and for the amphibious landing force commander. In addition, the amphibious landing commander had a table of 43 coded signals prepared for his use.

Communications support for combat command and control during the operation was at all times so good that there were never any concerns. As the operation proceeded, communications were provided at those positions designated by the fleet commander. Thus, for example, when the commander moved to the Pummanki area after the

breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula, there was a need to provide communications at the new location. The radio sets of two observation and communications posts and Torpedo Cutter Brigade were used, and telephone lines were run to the command post.

Communications for support of the amphibious assault on Liinakhamari were

prepared in the following manner. The fleet chief of staff assembled the communications chiefs of the landing units in Pummanki, and gave them instructions on their work during the landing, designated the radio frequency already in use by Captain Barchenko’s composite reconnaissance detachment, specified radio callsigns, and distributed the available equipment.

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Following this, he also confirmed their understanding of the organization of

communications that had been established and clarified all questions that arose. He did not issue any written instructions. Communications were organized so that during the landing in Liinakhamari, the torpedo boats could talk openly using VHF, and the fleet commander could monitor the traffic. He could also hear the explosions of shells and shore battery fires.

After the occupation of Liinakhamari port, the escort vessel Uragan was brought to Liinakhamari and used to provide communications for the fleet commander. Its radio transmitter exchanged traffic with Northern Defensive Region’s main transmitter, and they could also patch through using the observation and communications service net. Dispatches traveled by telephone and telegraph from these locations to fleet headquarters in Polyarnoye.

The following data from tables showing the quantity and quality of coded message traffic from 7−31 October gives a representative indication of the work of

communications assets during the operation. The distribution of messages prepared by fleet headquarters communications center, by priority, was as follows: IMMEDIATE- 6.7 percent, URGENT-25.1 percent, PRIORITY-26 percent, and ROUTINE-42.2 percent.

Communications assets were heavily utilized during the operation, reaching their greatest peak on the day of the breakthrough of the defenses and the amphibious

landings. The number of URGENT messages grew significantly during this period, from the normal 14 or 15 percent to 25 percent. The average time for the processing of a message through the communications center was satisfactory. A reduction in the

processing time for reconnaissance summaries and combat reports from formations was achieved by transmitting them in clear text, encoding only unit designations using telegraph and telephone callsigns, and their locations using a coded map.

Mutual Recognition

Mutual recognition of ships between each other, with Fleet Air Forces, and with observation and communications service posts was accomplished using fleet operating instructions. Ground troops marked their positions for aviation by signaling, “Here is our forward trace” and “We are your troops.” Much use was made of rocket flares and firing of tracer rounds for purposes of recognition. In addition to recognition signals, a five- round semaphore signal of the following colors was established to identify specific vessel types at sea: white for torpedo boats, green for small submarine chasers, and red for large submarine chasers.

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