Los temas nominales

A. Concerning unit actions during the breakthrough of the defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula and pursuit of the enemy

1. 12th Red Banner Naval Infantry Brigade accomplished its assigned mission and broke through the enemy’s well-prepared and deeply echeloned defenses. The secrecy of the preparation and suddenness of the attack, and as well 63rd NIB’s amphibious landing, made possible the rapid capture of the strongpoints on the left flank of the enemy’s defenses. The development of the success that was achieved during the breakthrough led to the enemy’s expulsion from the defensive zone, but not to his encirclement with subsequent capture or destruction of the strongpoint garrisons.

2. The pursuit of the retreating enemy was not sufficiently energetic. This is explained by the low degree of maneuverability of naval infantry units and their indecisive actions during periods of darkness.

Pursuit of the enemy also was not rigorously undertaken after the naval infantry brigades reached Titovka-Porovaara Road. They delayed there, rather than quickly moving forward to the west and preventing the enemy from withdrawing his units. This must be acknowledged as the principal deficiency in the actions of the naval infantry units. The training of the soldiers for orientation on unfamiliar terrain during the

transition to night conditions was weak, as a consequence of which night movement was curtailed. This enabled the enemy to break contact rapidly.

Only the reconnaissance detachments of Northern Defensive Region and

headquarters, Northern Fleet, which executed the successful march to Cape Krestovyy in extremely difficult terrain conditions, were well-prepared for night operations.

3. The actions of Northern Defensive Region engineer units did not support the construction of improved routes from the breakthrough area to Hill 146 and beyond toward Lake Tie-yarvi, as a consequence of which tanks and artillery units were forced to conduct a march by a longer route through Kutovaya, Titovka, and Hill 388.9. The slow clearing of mines and the restoration of the road from Kutovaya to Hill 388.9 and Porovaara caused a lengthy delay in the movement of artillery and their supply vehicles, and their falling behind infantry units.

B. During the amphibious landings

1. The amphibious landing on the coastline of Maattivuono Bay was conducted successfully and, thanks to tactical surprise, was a significant contribution to the breakthrough of the defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula.

The success of the landing was a result of transport of the landing force on fast moving and shallow draft vessels, and strong artillery and air support. These made it very difficult for enemy shore batteries to fire upon the landing force during their activities.

The landing site was well chosen. The absence of coastal roads prevented the enemy from rapidly bringing up the forces necessary to counter the landing. In addition, skillful

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and energetic actions by the boat and landed unit commanders enabled our units to capture a beachhead in a short time.

A deficiency of the landing was that the commander did not have any reserve landing craft, and during the transit large subchasers considerably lengthened the formation. They also engaged in unnecessary radio conversation, and near the shore intermingled with the detachment in front of them, frequently disrupting the landing plan.

2. The success of the amphibious landing in Liinakhamari was achieved by its unexpectedness to the Germans, the momentum of the boats in breaking into

Petsamovuono Inlet, and the coordinated and tactically sound employment of smoke screens. The actions of the amphibious landing force ashore were also energetic and decisive, which led to their success in overcoming more than one enemy counterattack. 3. The landings of assault forces on the southern coastline of Varangerfjord, which coincided with the forward advance of Karelian Front units in Pechenga Oblast toward the Norwegian border, were accomplished successfully. The landing areas were chosen with consideration for occupying sectors of the coastline on the enemy’s flank and rear, thus more effectively supporting attacking 14th Army units. The good training of the troops and vessel crews, which they received in earlier landings, benefited them here.

Northern Fleet Air Forces successfully accomplished all missions assigned to them for direct support of the attacking forces’ actions. Their operations were correctly focused on suppression and destruction of artillery and mortar batteries, strongpoints, and on enemy troops and vehicles on Titovka-Porovaara Road.

C. Concerning actions on the enemy’s sea lines of communication

1. Northern Fleet ships and aviation made a significant contribution to the success of Karelian Front’s offensive and the amphibious landings by uninterrupted activities on the enemy’s sea lines of communication in the area from Hammerfest to Varangerfjord. As a result of these operations at sea, the enemy was deprived of the ability to use his vital paths of communication in a planned manner, and suffered enormous losses in ships, men, supplies, and equipment.

2. Operational coordination was achieved by all participating forces in the course of the battle on the sea lanes. Air strikes on enemy convoys were complemented by torpedo boat and submarine attacks. The majority of submarine attacks were carried out on the basis of air reconnaissance. Several convoys were successively attacked by air strikes and then submarines. Such examples are indicative of the efficacy and genuine

opportunity not only of operational, but also of tactical coordination of submarines and aviation, which the operations plan had not foreseen.

3. Radar equipment, present on type-V submarine acquired in England, was not

employed during night search activities. No doubt this reduced the effectiveness of these vessels’ actions.

4. The countless instances of failure of torpedoes to launch from the tubes of Type-V submarines attests to the fact that by the time of the conduct of this operation, the crews

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of these submarines had not fully mastered their new equipment. This negatively influenced the success of their attacks.

5. Northern Fleet Air Forces were sufficiently active on enemy sea lines of

communication, and inflicted losses on the enemy. The most effective air assets were fighter-bombers, which employed the mast-top bombing technique. The attack bomber strikes were also successful in a majority of cases.

Among the shortcomings of air activities were the absence of necessary coordination between tactical groups, and the violation of established time intervals between attacking groups. This led to a concentration of the convoys’ antiaircraft fires on each group separately, and subsequent significant losses.

In addition, the weak determination and inability of some group leaders to arrive precisely at the target were revealed. The attacks of torpedo bombers, which in some cases launched their torpedoes against convoys from great distances and without aiming, were shown to be of little effect.

6. The following causal factors contributed to the success of the operation:

• air superiority of our air forces, which prevented the enemy air forces from interfering with the concentration of forces or with their actions during the accomplishment of their missions;

• _{precise work of political organs in support of the operation, as a result of} which the enlisted ranks displayed unexampled bravery, a high degree of fighting spirit, and determination in the execution of their assigned missions; • the good work of rear service units in providing logistic support and materiel,

and in rendering medical treatment.

D. Concerning command and control and the accomplishment of coordination

1. The organization of command and control and the work of staffs during the conduct of the operation fully supported combat command and control by the fleet major

commands, in conditions of a rapidly changing situation. The fact that the fleet

commander, Fleet Air Forces commander, Northern Defensive Region commander, and Torpedo Cutter Brigade commander were located at command posts positioned quite close to each other and to the area of combat activities, to facilitate combat command and control, was a great contributor to this success. This gave them the ability to react quickly to changes in the situation and influence the course of battle in a timely manner with appropriate instructions.

2. The success gained in the operation was a result of well organized and rationally executed coordination of all participating forces, united in a single effort for the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The appropriately organized coordination between forces of Karelian Front and Northern Fleet, and within the latter between its individual formations, permitted them to carry out their combat actions in a manner coordinated as to time and place.

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3. The successful accomplishment of coordination in the operation was achieved by close mutual communications between staffs and the correct assigning of liaison officers. The quality of coordination greatly facilitated systematic staff control over the actions of subordinate formations and units, and as well the understanding of the fleet commander’s plan and intent by all formation commanders. Each individual responsible staff leader clearly assumed his proper role in the operation.

4. The accomplishment of coordination was possible only because of continuously operating communications. Communications worked well in the course of this operation. To a large degree, this was a result of the fact that the communications organization and written instructions for the operation were based on fleet standing operating procedures.

Along with this was revealed the necessity to have a mobile, adequately equipped communications center at the disposal of the fleet chief of communications. Such a center was required for providing service to the fleet commander’s auxiliary command post, which was deployed in the area of combat activities.

During the conduct of the operation, ships and units of the amphibious landing force used the method of unciphered radio traffic for combat command and control while landing and consolidating ashore. It was possible to use uncoded radio messages during offensive actions in conditions of rapidly unfolding events, which demanded particularly rapid information concerning the situation and the issuing of urgent instructions. In these conditions, the enemy ordinarily was unable to interfere with the intentions of the

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