155 156 157 158 159 160
The 'three modes' Prophetic hadith appears to specify 'correcting' wrong in a reverse intuitive order: Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in
Islamic Thought (2001), 32.
The famous and oft-quoted hadith: Abu'l Hussain Muslim, Al Jami'us Sahih vol 1
(1972), 33; Abu'l Hussain Muslim, Al jami'us Sahih r>ol 3 (1972), 1032.; Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam (2003), 28. states:
A Muslim should correct a wrong with his hand (or in some versions, sword), or else with his tongue or else at least be opposed to it in his heart (but that this is the weakest faith)
See hadith at n 26, 46.
Though Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought
(2001), 599. does not appear to accept this view. Qur'an 4:75:
wa ma lakum la tuqatiluna fisabillah ^ ^ ^ ^63 U j _ And why
should ye not fight in the cause of God.
L Ali Khan, A Theory of International Terrorism : Understanding Islamic Militancy
(2006), at 9. Where the author argues that those engaged in armed conflict are encouraged by Islam to settle their differences peacefully.
There is no legal obligation on Muslims in 'exile' (interpreted here as those living as minorities) to assist Muslim majorities, until help is sought. As mentioned in the discussion of ribat, this is to prevent further escalation of problems or acting in a way to make their condition even worse.
Qur'an 8:72 (emphasis added):
As to those who believed but came not into exile ye owe no duty of protection to them until they seek your aid in religion it is your duty to help them except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance: and (remember) God sees all that ye do.
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the assassination of then Egyptian President Sadat and whose work is described as possessing 'remarkable influence',161 has admitted in line with a Prophetic hadith th a t7a spoken w ord of truth162 to a tyrant is the best djihad7.163 Faraj qualified his quote from the Prophet adding that this 'm ust not be an excuse for cowardice7 or arguably even as a form of appeasement to the oppressors in power.164This view of 'best djihad' may not accord with his general overall practical approach to djihad or that of al-Qa'eda who favour armed djihad. At minimum however, Faraj concedes that peaceful means may not be excluded from the options available in a djihad.
6 'Those w h o suppress faith'
Those who suppress (in practice the Muslim faith, although not the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision) may, subject to pre-conditions now discussed, also be fought.165 Most jurists agree that there is binding
obligation on each Muslim to defend the Muslim faith when attacked,166 even absent the imam's authorisation. While defence can take many forms, they m ust all be intra vires. This is arguably why al-Qa'eda characterises an attack on itself as an attack on Islam thereby, and are able to draw the support of such Muslims as are persuaded by its rhetoric, into the conflict, in al-Qa'eda's defence. It has been noted that the West has greatly aided al- Q a'eda's task uncritically by accepting Al-Qa'eda as Islamic and its
struggle as a djihad and thus ipso facto legitimate, although both Presidents
161 162 163 164 165 166
R L Euben and M Q Zaman (eds), Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought (2009), 321. Note that 'speaking' or using one's tongue is the second option in the three modes
hadith. See n 155,125, and shows that the order of the recommended action does not carry a particular significance.
R L Euben and M Q Zaman (eds), Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought (2009), 330 para. 51 (emphasis added).
Ibid, 330.
Qur'an 2:191. The reason for this interpolation is that the Qur'an states that 'faith' in God's eye is Islam: Qur'an 5:3, but Islam in its broader sense also means 'submission to God's will' (and covers the faith of believing Scriptuaries: Qur'an 2:62.) The former interpretation however, is less ambiguous.
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (1955), 95. It is unclear in the circumstances what 'attack' means but it must mean a physical attack because otherwise any criticism of Islam can be deemed an attack. This is not the precedent of the Prophet when Islam was verbally attacked responded with patient
exposition and almost always gentle rebuttal. This precedent can be set up in contrast with some contemporary Muslims reacting violently to criticisms (sometimes vile and unwarranted criticisms but verbal criticisms nonetheless) against Islam.
C hapter 3 —127
Bush and Obama have clearly and usefully made the distinction that the Coalition is fighting al-Qa'eda and not Islam. 167
In this regard, President Bush's allusion to a 'Crusade' 168 initially helped al-Qa'eda and his withdrawal of the term to describe the Coalition's war against al-Qa'eda, while helpful in reducing the tensions between the Coalition and Muslims, still left an unnecessary residual ambiguity and animosity in the minds of many Muslims, which has been ably exploited by Islamists. Some Muslims in the West who understand its political process, concede that our leaders do make mistakes, at times inadvertently using inappropriate language, and understand that some individuals are more prone to such slips. On the other hand, the Arab or Muslim street is generally told of the superiority7 of the West and therefore, take such slips as expressions of a calculated and considered policy. Unfortunately, a major slip is akin to opening Pandora's Box.169
A small but steady flow of young men to al-Qa'eda shows that its strategy has had and continues to enjoy, some success although on the other hand arguably no civilisation has had difficulty in enticing eager young preconditioned men seeking adventure into fighting wars on the broadest of emotive terms such as 'for God, Queen and country' or 'the mother-fatherland' or 'for your faith' among many other such euphemistic and emotive catch cries.
This enemy 'that suppresses faith' is similar although not identical to those who oppress.170 'Those who oppress' constitutes a broader category. This is because 'suppress' is qualified by 'faith' while help is not
Clayton Jones, 'On eve of 9/11 anniversary, Obama defends Bush strategy of fighting terror, not Islam', Christian Science Monitor (New York), 10 September 2010. Bin Laden refers to the call for a 'crusade' by former President Bush, on 16
September 2001, on the lawns of the White House, Washington D.C. as
demonstrating the religious character of the struggle in the light of the expression's historical significance.
In fact it is arguably because so much thought is given to the naming of Wars' for 'political spin' that the use of the word 'crusade' was considered inadvertent (although perhaps a Freudian slip) by many Muslims. For a journalist's view for the naming of naming wars see: Rob Sharp, 'War of Words, Why the Naming of Conflicts is a Serious Business: Them's Fighting Words', Canberra Times (Canberra), 26 February 2010, Times 2 page 5.
Chapter 3 —128
limited to, (other than in some cases by construction by Islamists171), against only those who oppress Muslims. The better meaning here would also be for Muslims to protect all faiths, although in this context it probably opens the door for more carnage and is a political, but perhaps not legal justification for narrowing the scope of its meaning.
On the other hand, Islamophobia or gratuitous anti-Islamic rhetoric, at one level, could be interpreted as an attempt to demonise or suppress the faith. At an individual level, Islamophobia (or expressed in a less emotive way, anti-Islamic views) can be passed over as bigotry or considered part of free expression which while arguably discriminatory under legislation in some jurisdictions, is difficult to eradicate. Nor should people be prevented from exercising free will. The Prophet was called a madman, a person possessed and other unflattering names which are enshrined in the Q ur'an for posterity.172 While he tirelessly carried out his ministry, he did not attem pt to silence his critics,173 whom he sought to convert to Islam.
Some politicians however, have opportunistically exploited the freedom in the system and have succeeded in using Islamophobia in small vulnerable pockets but have not generally been successful in convincing the majority or even a large minority of the broader Western population of the value of their alarmist policies. The Netherlands is perhaps an
exception in this regard, where an openly anti-Islamic person such as Mr Geert Wilders was elected by a significant percentage of a country traditionally considered tolerant.174 Ironically however, Mr Wilders is a powerful voice fo r Muslims (in Muslim states) who are trying to convince the West of an identical message: which is 'leave us to our culture and law, and when you are amongst us, respect and follow our laws'. The rise of Mr Wilders bodes well for pluralism on the international plane, because if a significant minority in a powerful, liberal and tolerant State is convinced of his arguably not unreasonable message (of respect for the rule of law as
See discussion at page 122.
Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Commentary (1980), esp n 5063 at Qur'an 52:30.
There is also no evidence that his close Companions sought to silence the Prophet's opponents (or, against themselves, during their own rule).
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defined within a cultural context) the identical argument made by the 'other', in this case Muslims in Muslim majority States, is also strengthened.
However, when some elements of Islamophobia are
institutionalised or coupled with specific legislative prohibitions on
Muslim and other faiths' religious practices, there must come a point when such action becomes a systematic impediment to the free practice
amounting to its suppression. This is a threshold legal question and some examples of such impediments are now examined. The legal question is whether impediments to faith where present in various countries (both Muslim and non-Muslim), constitute a suppression of faith. And, if so, is it liable to be fought? And again, if this is the case, it is then necessary to identify a point or an objective test where peaceful opposition can reasonably escalate openly into to armed action. These tests can then be applied in retrospect when such cases are brought before a judicial committee or court.
The WIF and al-Qa'eda have, for example, cited the banning of the
hedjab (headscarf) among French public schoolgirls,173 in some institutions in Turkey176 and Singapore,177 the use of usury in Saudi banks, tire
declaration of a crusade by the US-Coalition178 and the publication of some
174 175
176
177
178
Mark Davis, 'Mr-Controversial1 in Dateline Special Broadcasting Service, 29 August 2010.
Human Rights Watch, Vinterdiction du port du foulard viole la liberte de religion (27 fevrier) (2004 ) <http:/ /hrw .org/french/docs/2004/02/26/france7670_txt.htm > at
15 Januar)' 2005.
Please refer to Leyla Sahin v Turkey (2004) ECHR 44774/98.; Gareth Jones and Hidir Goktas, Turkish parliament lifts university headscarf ban (2008)
<http:/ / www .reuters.com / article / worldNews / idUSL0967026720080209?feedTy p e=RSS&feedName=worldNews> at 18 February 2008. Legislation passed in 2008 in the Turkish Parliament should remove this impediment to free practice and thus negate this ground for the djihad.
John Burton, 'Singapore headscarves ban angers Muslims', The Financial Times
(London), 14 Februar)7 2002; BBC, 'Tudung or not tudung?' The Nation (Bangkok), 13 Februar)7 2002. Tudung is the Malay word for the headscarf/ hedjab:
Bin Laden refers to the call for a 'crusade' by former President Bush, on 16 September 2001, on the lawns of the White House, Washington D.C. as
demonstrating the religious character of the struggle in the light of the expression's historical significance. Such pronouncements from a leader notorious for his choice of inappropriate language should not be considered conclusive as to Australian motives by Muslims particularly when so many Muslim and other innocent lives are at stake.
Chapter 3 —130
uncomplimentary cartoons of the Prophet,179 as 'evidence' of provocation and the suppression of faith.180 The objects of these allegations (ie the States responsible) do not, however, appear to match the 'successful targets' of al- Q a'eda's attacks, the USA, UK, Spain etc, although it is possible that some secretly planned attacks against Singapore, France or Turkey could have failed, other attacks called off for prevailing conditions and other planned attacks still in tire 'pipeline'.
Al-Qa'eda's call for attacks in Australia and on Australians by (Australian) Muslims is now examined. Such attacks by al-Qa'eda members must however be legitimate (idjma, consensus, being a useful yardstick here) under the shari'a and two broad cases with respect to this issue are now considered. In principle this analysis can, mutatis mutandis, be applied to most other non-Muslim jurisdictions.