Qur'anic injunctions.
206 207 208 209 210 211and indiscriminate violence can - while undoubtedly true in some cases — be counterproductive. For example when Western news programmes, in this case, Di Martin, Tackling Indonesian terror1 in Background Briefing ABC, 23 September 2007. depicts 'Islamists' such as Nasir Abas, a reformed convicted 'senior member of an extreme and secretive organisation' as:
Belying every stereotype of a terrorist, Nasir Abas is charming, funny and unfailingly polite [..]
The reason for this assertion is that even a shallow analysis would indicate that Abas did not become charming, funny etc because he stopped being a 'terrorist'. What extremist and militant organisations have been able successfully to do, is to tap into existing discontent inter alia among otherwise charming, funny etc people. It is not Western propaganda that 'turns' these people around, but in (in this case: ibid.) and many cases, is a deeper understanding of and a realisation of the scope of the armed djihad. This is not to minimise the effect of financial incentives and bribes in also turning terrorists and in gathering intelligence.
Bruce Lawrence (ed) Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden (2005), xvii. See also Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia (2004), 49.
Qur'an 13:11.
This concept prima facie provides a legal basis, and with development and 'refinement' can arguably provide for a basis for 'democratic' rule in the
contemporary sense not discussed here as it is not an issue that contributes directly to the argument in this paper.
Qur'an 13:11.
Some groups such as JI in Indonesia State that cleaning up corruption (e.g. pubs, bars, brothels etc) will help Muslims by not tempting them: Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia (2004), 10. This seems, however, to defeat the purpose of God's 'testing' people so they might individually choose to obey as opposed to not doing something for the absence of opportunity. The Taliban, al-Qa'eda: at, 10, take a similar view to JI.
See the discussion Universalising Islam through the Greater Djihad, 47. The Prophet was also instructed in Q ur'an 11:12 and 6:66, not to 'manage peoples' affairs'.
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In addition, the Qur'an only permits fighting against those who 'fight you [Muslims]' which is clear permission to fight in defence.212 Therefore, correction of one's self or those 'near u s'213 is the better way of effecting 'genuine change' because this 'internal' change is not susceptible to oppression or external control. The shari'a emphasis for the Muslim undoubtedly is to concentrate on the greater djihad 214
Thus, Islamically, political leaders, whether elected or otherwise, are always a reflection of the community they lead210 and hence bin Laden's view that, like their subjects, Muslim leaders are given to hedonism.216 In Algeria, le Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) too considered civilians a reflection of the corrupt leadership and therefore legitimate targets.217 Thus the view of many Islamists appears to be that unjust or bad leaders reflect the inner dispositions of the populace, who are quite content for leaders to do their 'dirty work' and m ust therefore share responsibility thus becoming 'legitimate' military targets.
However, notwithstanding this perhaps not unreasonable reading of the text of the Q ur'an and surma, an Omnipotent God — undoubtedly cognisant of such an interpretation — nonetheless still carries tire Qur'anic confirmation that such acquiescence or quiescence will be punished only in the hereafter 218 This reading is reinforced by the Prophet, who in Islam reflected God's will on earth, who explicitly forbade tire killing of non- combatants and other protected categories in armed combat.219 He could otherwise explicitly have instructed that those who acquiesce are legitimate targets. The GIA and al-Qa'eda's reading therefore, with respect to the
212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 Qur'an 22:39-40.
See also the discussion on fighting the 'near' enemy. The concept applies to the greater djihad as a person's animal soul is the 'nearest' and it is important to fight/struggle against its crude instincts, because it is a soul which is unjust to itself: Qur'an 43:76. This internal rectification of character faults and flaws is part of the greater djihad is also known as djihad al-nafs (the djihad against the soul).
See text accompanying n 24, 45.
Quran 13:11; Muhammad Al-Mughirah al-Bukhari, The Translations of the Meaning of Sahih al-Bukhari vol 1 (1976), 80.
Quran 13:11. Ibid.
Center for Policing Terrorism, Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) Dossier, 9. Qur'an 14:21.
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Muslim or non-Muslim populations' acquiescence to their leaderships' misdeeds, m ust not be given any shari'a weight.
On the question of selecting / electing leaders, contemporary scholars such as M awdudi (M aududi/ Maudodi), who played a major role in revival movements,220 consider democracy problematic because it translates to majority rule whereas M aududi said that the leader had to be a pious and knowledgeable Muslim man or Muslim w om an.221 Others such as Rachid Rida, have examined this issue of leadership within the broader Western 'liberal modernist ways' with tire aim of reviving Islam's 'golden age', but nevertheless, his ideas have not been widely accepted 222
Nonetheless, legitimate Muslim leadership remains a central issue with respect to the use of force because it is fundamental to the lawfulness of a command. At present, there is not a universally-recognised political or spiritual leader who represents all, a majority or arguably even a significant minority of Muslims, thus making the codification of the legitimate means of combat under the shari'a by jurists even more urgent.
Contemporary Islamist Leadership
The practical effect of an absence of a broadly recognised leadership however, is that each Islamic group works under its own 'local' leadership. This leadership can then choose to arrogate for itself the 'right
independently to declare hostilities', the 'm eans' it will employ in conducting these hostilities and independently making its own
determination about what constitutes 'necessity'. The plethora of non-State groups thus results in as many 'leaders' with competing aims and
programmes.223 There appears however to be a strategic underlying understanding of 'tire need' to re-establish the umma particularly among al-
Charles Adams, ’Mawdudi and the Islamic State1 in J L Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, (1983) 99.
Roy Jackson, Fifty Key Figures in Islam (2006), 192.
Ibid; Ashk P Dahlen, Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in Contemporary Iran (2002), 220; Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani (2003), 206; Ali Rahnema (ed) Pioneers of Islamic Revival. Studies in Islamic Society (revised ed, 2005 ed, 2005), 26.
The absence of a single recognised leader as the head of 'the umma', however, does not pose a practical legal problem. This is because in an international system that in the main recognises States as the key international legal entities, a concept accepted by all UN member states (which includes all Muslim countries).
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