Principios del proceso de selección de personal

Introduction

Preference intensity is often a crucial bargaining resource in

intergovernmental negotiations (for example Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999), with the case of the SGP being no exception. A state with a low preference intensity for concluding a supranational agreement, compared to the status quo policy option, is likely to be more successful at influencing any supranational agreement that is concluded, than a state with a high preference intensity for reaching agreement, compared to the status quo (for example Lax and Sebenius, 1985; Sebenius, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998). However, the relevance of this resource is mediated by the context surrounding negotiations, and where the breakdown of negotiations would leave member states with existing domestic policy arrangements, as in ‘uploading’ negotiations, a low preference intensity is indeed essential for achieving negotiation success, though this is not the case in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, where a breakdown would leave all parties with the existing EU-level policy they had set out to reform.

In other words, during ‘uploading’ negotiations, the member state(s) with the lowest preference intensity can determine the range of possible negotiated outcomes, because anything outside this range will prompt that state to exit negotiations, satisfied with the status quo. In contrast to this, because the status quo arrangement in ‘reuploading’ is to maintain the policy states have set out to reform, the utility of preference intensity for

influencing negotiations, which depends on a credible threat of exit, should be minimal in this context. With these points in mind, I set out the following hypotheses regarding preference intensity:

H1: The lower the preference intensity of a member state, the more successful that state will be in negotiations.

H1A: A low preference intensity is more important for negotiation success in the absence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘uploading’, than in the presence of established EU-level policy, as is the case in ‘reuploading’.

Thus, the expectation is that the state with the lowest preference intensity will be the most successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP,

while the state with the lowest preference intensity in ‘reuploading’ negotiations, will not necessarily achieve negotiation success.

7.1 Predicting Member State Performance in ‘uploading’ Negotiations

In ‘uploading’ negotiations over the SGP, the four member states under consideration receive the following values for preference intensity:

Germany - 13 France - 11 Netherlands - 7 Belgium - 5

Drawing on H1, which states that The lower the preference intensity of a

member state, the more successful that state will be in negotiations, these

values for preference intensity lead to the following predictions:

1.) Germany will be the most successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations

2.) France will be less successful than Germany, though more successful than Belgium and the Netherlands in ‘uploading’ negotiations

3.) The Netherlands will be less successful than Germany and France, though more successful than Belgium in ‘uploading’ negotiations

4.) Belgium will be the least successful state in ‘uploading’ negotiations

As discussed previously, the reality of negotiations, with a host of complex issues, having differential importance to distinct delegations, and with states’ positions often containing multiple dimensions, as seen in chapter 6, renders it difficult to bundle together state successes over individual issues, to conclude as to the most successful state. However, taking into consideration the total number, and, crucially, the importance of issues over which they negotiated successfully, it is possible to accept prediction one, that Germany was the most successful state in ‘uploading’. Specifically, the German delegation achieved an outcome agreement that was closest to their position over important questions related to the imposition of sanctions under the EDP, including the question of how to calculate sanctions and whether there should be an annual or total cap on sanctions applied to any member state.

With regard to clarifying application of the EDP, the German delegation achieved an important success over the question of whether to define the terms ‘exceptional and temporary’, which formed an integral part of how the corrective arm of the SGP would work in practice. The German delegation also negotiated successfully over a number of issues that were identified as particularly important to the general process of negotiations, including such questions as whether and if so how, to define the term ‘serious recession’ as applied to ‘exceptional circumstances’ under the EDP, as well as what the quantitative definition of a ‘serious recession’ is, once the decision was taken to define this quantitatively (interviews, British treasury, Commission a and Commission b; Monetary Committee of the European Community, 1996).

Finally, the German delegation wielded significant influence, and some success, over the issue identified as most important to the Germans, which was the question of whether fines for breaching the 3% deficit ceiling would be automatic (interview, German finance ministry a); this issue came to encompass a whole range of additional questions, surrounding application of the EDP. While the outcome did not reflect the German position exactly, in that fines would not be automatic, this was largely because of legal constraints arising from the early decision to fit the pact within the confines of the Maastricht Treaty, which precluded full automaticity (Stark, 2001). Further to that, even the limited success of the German delegation over this issue becomes more significant, given that, as well as being most important to the Germans, this issue was identified as one of the most important questions to the negotiations generally, and was also identified as one of the most important issues to the French and Dutch (for example interviews, French finance ministry, Dutch finance ministry, Dutch finance ministry b, British treasury, Commission a and Commission b; Stark, 2001; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010).

In terms of the specific mechanisms linking a low preference intensity with negotiation success, the data confirms the posited causal process in the case of German success in these negotiations, to a large extent. The German delegation saw their low preference intensity, particularly bound up with their pivotal role in the project’s completion, as an important source of influence in these negotiations. This is illustrated by the statement

of a German finance ministry representative that “Germany had leverage in these negotiations, because they [the Germans] said that without something like this [the SGP], there will be no monetary union” (interview, German finance ministry a). Further to that, given the need to “sell failure to achieve automaticity” to the German public, it was essential for the Germans to achieve “rules [that were] clear and watertight”, which led to the focus on a strict definition for ‘severe recession’, over which Germany threatened to abandon talks, in response to opposition from other states (interview, German finance ministry a; Helm, 1996; Palmer, 1996). Thus, it is

documented that the German delegation threatened to exit negotiations (for example Helm, 1996, Traynor, 1996), though an important question, regarding the posited causal process linking preference intensity with negotiation success, is whether others deemed this threat to be credible.

While there is widespread acknowledgment that this was a potential source of influence for the Germans, there is also evidence of doubt that Germany would exit negotiations (interviews, Commission b and British treasury; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), indicating that the threat was not deemed to be entirely credible, which calls into question the posited process linking a low preference intensity with negotiation success. For example, Heipertz and Verdun (2010) raise the possibility that, while the Germans could have terminated negotiations over the SGP, they were unable, legally, to derail progress to the single currency, having committed to this in signing the Maastricht Treaty.

On this point, it is pertinent that German representatives also specifically threatened to exit negotiations over the pact as they stood, and instead wait for EMU membership to be chosen in 1998, before

recommencing negotiations with only those chosen members (Barber, 1996a). While this is not equivalent to a threat to derail the EMU project entirely, it would have had the same implications for the host of states, including Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium, among others, that needed a political interpretation of the Maastricht criteria in order to gain first round membership in EMU, which would have been unlikely in the absence of a strict stability pact agreement (interview, British treasury; Elliot, 1996; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Further to that, absent political interpretation of

the criteria, it was not clear that France would qualify for first round

membership (Financial Times, 1996a), and given that French participation in EMU was deemed essential to the success of the singly currency (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), this threat by the Germans can be seen as a politically acceptable way, in light of their commitment to full EMU under the Maastricht Treaty, to threaten to derail the project.

Aside from the legal question, the political commitment on the part of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in particular, to see monetary union

succeed, also raised doubts about the credibility of the German threat to exit SGP negotiations, with a British treasury participant describing the dynamic as “[T]hey [the Germans] looked to be in a strong position in some ways, because they could say ‘unless we agree, you’re not gonna get it [a single currency]’, but I suspect the negotiators in Buba [the Bundesbank] and [the] finance ministry were also looking over their shoulder at Chancellor Kohl”, who had invested a great deal of political capital in the single currency project (interview, British treasury). Revealingly, though, this participant also qualified his opinion, acknowledging that, the “French knew they had to move, [the] Germans knew they could give something, but if the French pushed them too far, then it could have all collapsed” (interview, British treasury). Along similar lines, a Commission official who participated in these negotiations stated that “[T]hroughout the negotiations, there was the issue that you couldn’t push the Germans too far” (interview, Commission a). Thus, the message emerging from this commentary on whether the German threat to exit was deemed credible, and one echoed in additional interviews, as well as media and secondary reports, is that, while the political costs surrounding exit would have been considerable, there was clear

awareness that the Germans were giving up the most stable currency, and their demands for a commitment to budgetary discipline, in return, should be heeded (for example Heipertz and Verdun, 2004; 2010; Financial Times, 1996b).

In terms of Germany influencing the outcome of a concrete definition for ‘severe recession’, this is a clear example of an issue over which the German delegation threatened to exit negotiations, and over which others conceded, despite the majority opposed to setting a concrete, numerical

definition (Ulbrich, 1996). However, the German delegation did not secure the exact numerical definition they were seeking on this point, which raises some questions surrounding the process through which preference intensity is posited to impact on negotiation performance. Nonetheless, as noted in chapter 6, compromising minimally on the specific number, whilst securing a concrete definition, remains a sizable achievement, reflective of considerable influence from the Germans in this case.

Turning to the remaining predictions of member state negotiation performance in light of H1, the prediction that France will be less successful than Germany, though more successful than Belgium and the Netherlands, is confirmed. Specifically, the French wielded influence and achieved some success over the question of division of labor between the Commission and Council, in applying the EDP, and the question of how to quantify a severe recession, the latter of which represented one of the most important issues to the negotiations overall (interviews, French finance ministry, Commission a and Commission b; Stark, 2001). Related to this, the French were successful in limiting the extent to which fines would be applied automatically, which was fundamental to the outcome of negotiations. As described by a finance ministry participant, “[O]n the French side, the finance ministry was somewhat sympathetic to the idea of automatic sanctions, but [we] were under instruction from the Elysee not to accept this”, and, under the French system “the President is [the] key player and all government align[ed] with positions taken at that level” (interview, French finance ministry).

Though, as previously stated, the French delegation does not achieve the highest measure of deliberate success over the specific question of automatic fines, given that the French position is aided here by the legal constraint against automaticity in the form of the Maastricht Treaty, the French nonetheless wielded important influence in limiting automaticity, even within legal confines. Specifically, while the French did not explicitly threaten to exit negotiations over the question of setting a concrete definition for a ‘severe recession’, the French delegation held out on this point, refusing to compromise, with the result that this was one of very few issues that had to be decided by the Heads of State and Government in the European Council. Further to that, French refusal to accept a concrete definition of a

severe recession along the lines demanded by the Germans, ultimately led to an important compromise on that point, envisioning room for interpretation when recessions were not so severe as to meet the German limit of a 1.5% annual drop in GDP, but were at the level of a .75% annual fall.

Rather than being a position that either the French or Germans favored, this outcome represented a middle way, so that neither state was forced to concede entirely, and, as described by a French negotiator, “[the] Germans could go home saying that there was a system for sanctions that was almost automatic and [the] French could go home saying there was no automaticity because at the end of the day, it’s a political decision”

(interview, French finance ministry). This is indicative of a wider feature of ‘uploading’ negotiations, namely that reaching compromise in a situation where some parties are refusing to cross certain lines, often requires sacrificing clarity of content in said compromise, with implications for the effectiveness of resultant policy, in the long-term. The concluding chapter of the thesis elaborates on this point, and on its relevance regarding the

difficulties in the Eurozone today. Returning to the question of preference intensity specifically, while it is not possible to confirm the posited causal process in this case, given the absence of a threat to exit by the French, it is clear that France, like Germany, pivotal to the success of these negotiations, served as an effective counterweight to German influence, with the result that much creativity was required to bring the two sides together here, a point discussed at length in chapter 10, on process expertise.

Another example of French influence, which does support the posited role of preference intensity, can be seen in the question of whether to add a resolution on growth and employment, which the French identified as one of the most important issues to the delegation (interview, French finance ministry). Two points are particularly substantial here, regarding the content of the outcome and the mechanisms for influence. The first is that the French socialist party promised, in their election campaign, to renegotiate the pact to make it more growth friendly (Wolf, 1997), and the newly appointed

socialist Finance Minister, Dominique Strauss-Khan, made clear to his colleagues in Ecofin that the delegation would not commit to the pact, absent some concession in this regard (interviews, Dutch finance ministry a and

Dutch finance ministry b; Barber, 1997a). A Dutch finance ministry participant recalls that “[T]he change of government in France toward the end was really a challenge. The French position was that they had to show to their electorate that ‘the world had changed’ and there was new emphasis on growth, stimulating the economy, etc.” (interview, Dutch finance ministry b). Thus, Strauss-Khan’s counterparts in the Ecofin Council were highly

concerned about what the new socialist minister would demand, aware that the whole project was in jeopardy if the French could not be kept onboard (for example interviews, Dutch finance ministry a, Dutch finance ministry b and British treasury; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010).

The second, related point, is that Strauss-Khan did not actually ask for a particularly bold resolution on growth and employment, but explained to colleagues in Ecofin that he simply required something on the subject to sell to the French electorate, which affected the need for a resolution, rather than the specific content of any resolution (interview, Dutch finance ministry a). In response to this approach by Strauss-Khan, fellow member states ranged from supportive of the request, in the case of the Belgian delegation, to relieved and less hostile than they had expected to be, in the case of the Dutch delegation (for example interviews, Council secretariat a and Dutch finance ministry a; Agence France Presse, 1997). Thus, the socialists had set the stage for bold demands by tying their hands in the form of campaign promises, with the effect that other delegations were prepared to make concessions to keep the French onboard.

This example is supportive of the causal process posited regarding preference intensity as a bargaining resource, insofar as the French

effectively threatened exit in the absence of concessions, with the Financial

Times quoting the following statement by Strauss-Khan: “ ‘I am not saying I

want to renegotiate the pact, but I am not saying I can accept it [in its present form]’’ (Barber, 1997a). This threat was deemed credible, and worrying, by others, not least because it came from a new government whose true

intentions were not entirely known to other negotiators, and despite German Finance Minister Waigel’s statements to the contrary (see Deutsche Presse-

Agentur, 1997), the stage was set for some concession to be offered to the

were not able to secure major changes to the pact, managing only to achieve inclusion of a limited ‘resolution on growth and employment’. The crucial point, though, is that the French secured a concession on this point with recourse to a low preference intensity for agreement, an integral component of which low preference intensity, was France’s pivotal role in the success of a single currency. Further to this, that Strauss-Khan did not ultimately

demand significant concessions, reportedly stating, “ ‘I need something, I need a name, I need something about employment’ ’’ (interview, Dutch finance ministry a), indicates that the perceived French failure to secure something of substance on growth and employment, was not necessarily out of line with the goals of French negotiators in this case.

Turning to the third prediction advanced in line with H1, that the Netherlands, having a higher preference intensity than France and Germany but lower than Belgium, would be less successful than France and Germany but more successful than Belgium, is confirmed by the data, though only insofar as the Dutch enjoyed more accidental success than the Belgians, in ‘uploading’. In terms of success achieved through deliberate influence, there is no meaningful distinction between the success of the Dutch and Belgian delegations in the ‘uploading’ negotiations, with the majority of issues over which these states secured an outcome nearest to their positions, being due to accidental rather than deliberate success. For example, on the question of whether the Commission or Council would take decisions regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances, this was a concession by the Germans, to the French, bound up with the overarching compromise