ECUACIONES LITERALES O EN VARIAS VARIABLES
PROBLEMAS EN LA ACTIVIDAD ECONÓMICA Y EN EL TRABAJO
‘Institutions’ are usually understood as semi-persistent ‘formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’ (Haggart, 2014, pp. 34-35, 46). Institutions generally provide a defined framework of rules, regulations, norms and standards for human behaviour and interactions. A related term ‘formalisation’ refers to the extent to which ‘rules governing behaviour are precisely and explicitly formulated and … roles and role relations are prescribed independently of the personal attributes of individuals occupying positions in the structure’ (Guthrie, 1999, p. 43; Scott, 1987, p. 33). For the purpose of this chapter, I broadly define both
institutionalisation and formalisation as the progressive establishment of formal rules or norms, or the standard operating procedures and structures that govern the operations and behaviour of bureaucratic organisations and their relationships with external actors.
The motivation and logic behind the institutional formalisation of an organisation shape the outcome of the process and what new rules are adopted. Institutions may reduce personal influence in the organisation structure and its operations, or create greater regulation, routinisation, objectivity, stability and transparency of decision-making. Scholars have provided various characterisations of such a process. From a rationalist perspective (Elster & Hylland, 1985; Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 944-946; Shepsle & Weingast, 1987, pp. 85-104; Swidler, 1986, pp. 273-286), formalisation is a rationalisation process enacted by the
management or leadership of the organisation to simplify internal relationships, and increase efficiency, predictability, and profitability. As informality and personal factors (variable personal traits, hierarchy, and factions) often cause organisational inefficiency and volatility, many new rules and principles (formalised organisational processes) are intentionally developed to reduce the influence of these personal and informal elements.
The institutionalist perspective, on the other side, posits that organisations exist in institutional environments, and often adopt institutions for reasons of legitimacy rather than because of the demands of efficiency and productivity. In other words, the new institutional forms, practices and procedures adopted by modern organisations are cultural-specific. Even the most seemingly bureaucratic practices are shaped by ideas about what they mean in a specific cultural or normative environment. The goal is to enhance the social legitimacy of these organisations or their participants, and respond to normative pressures, political mandates, or
economic certainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 1-40; Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; Edelman, 1990; Guthrie, 1999, p. 44; Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 340-363). As social factors and cultural practices shape institutional outcomes, such institutional structures may be more symbolic than practical (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 946-950; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 340-363; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, pp. 1-40). Campbell described the distinction as a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ in contrast to a ‘logic of instrumentality’ (Campbell, 1995, p. 8). For example, Soysal illustrates that the policies toward immigrants adopted by many states in Europe were pursued, not because they were most functional for the nation, but because the evolving conceptions of human rights promulgated by international regimes made such policies seem appropriate and others illegitimate in the eyes of national authorities (Soysal, 1994, pp. 141-142).
So how does this discussion apply to China? Guthrie’s work (Guthrie, 1999, pp. 42-44) on formal rational bureaucracies in Chinese firms clearly fits more with the social institutional perspective than with rationalist theories. His research shows that the formalisation of organisations during economic transition is often not a consequence of a rational calculation to maximise profits. While Chinese firms may be embracing Western-style structures with the long-term goal of efficiency, they are adopting these specific institutional structures because they are perceived as being efficient based on the success of Western companies. As such they respond to normative pressures, and imitate the practices of other successful organisations, which represent a type of legitimacy in line with the ideals and organisational models hailed as exemplary in the economic transition.
In the cases illustrated by Guthrie (1999), formalisation has, to a certain extent, reduced the importance of informal behaviour and personal relationships in an organisational structure. For instance, company managers allow connections and networks to factor significantly into labour market decisions and practices. Thus, the effect is more than symbolic. However, social, normative, and economic factors, such as the background, professionalism and economic conception of general manager, firm location, and foreign investment partnership, all play an important role in the institutional decisions.
The institutionalist perspective appears to explain the reasons behind the Chinese
government’s institutionalisation better than rationalist theories. In facing pressure from the public to improve its efficiency and behaviour, the government needs to constantly adjust its practices, review its relationships with social organisations, and establish new structures and rules, to respond to changes of values and norms in society (Sha, Yuan, Jian, & Wang, 2009, p. 233). While the CPC has been in a protracted state of ‘atrophy’ (Shambaugh, 2008a, 2008b), it has undertaken a number of pragmatic, incremental and adaptive measures aimed at
reinventing itself and strengthening its rule to retain its grip on power in an effort to
strengthen the regime itself. Its institutional adjustments are deliberately established in order to deal with social pressures, adapt to the socialist market economy system, and create new bases for the social and political legitimacy of the CPC’s authority (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; Zheng, 2010, p. 43).
In the early reform period, informal practices prevailed in every Chinese organisation at every level, but were particularly intense at the highest level of the state. Personal judgement was crucial, demand for quick decisions was great, and secrecy was imperative (Pye, 1992, pp. 171- 179). Since 1978, the Chinese government has started to establish a range of self-restraining rules and formal policies to increase accountability, regulate its internal organisations, and reduce informal, personal practices (X. Liu, 2007, p. 10; K. Yu, 2008, pp. 8-12). The 15th National Party Congress in September 1997 indicated that the Chinese government began its official process of management legalisation and formal institutionalisation (zhengshi zhidu 正式制度). At the 17th National Party Congress and 11th National People’s Congress, the government reports presented by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao respectively covered detailed analysis of the institutionalisation of the administrative system. According to Hu’s report, the areas for institutional reform included: moving the central government’s functional role away from ‘centralised control’ to ‘supervision and services provision’; linking
accountability to individual officials’ power; improving the government’s overall responsibility system; improving scientific decision-making (kexue juece 科学决策); regulating administrative behaviour; regulating administrative approval procedures (xingzheng shenpi 行政审批); improving the coordination of central organs; as well as reducing the official ranks within the administrative hierarchy (xingzheng cengci 行政层次) (Jintao Hu, 2007).Again, reports from the 18th Party Congress in October 2014 also indicated reform in the same direction
(Xinhuanet, 2014a).116
To demonstrate the progress of governmental institutionalisation during early 1979August 2008, the State Council issued 1,110 internal administrative regulations or organisational policies, including regulations on administrative policy formulation and decision-making proceedings, administrative agency establishment and staffing, as well as a civil servants act and administrative supervision and review law. Between September 2001 and October 2007, the State Council also cancelled or improved 1,992 administrative approval items to reduce
116 While Hu/Wen tenures promoted rules and institutions, Xi’s first term suggests a return to autocratic rule and
concentration of power in the elites. It remains unknown whether there will be a decline of institutions, and how it will impact on universities.
bureaucratic procedures for administrative examination and approval and black-box
operations. A government staff legal training system was gradually established at many central organs (Q. Huang, 2008, pp. 46-47).
With the need to make informed decisions, the state also increased consultations and deliberations in policy processes, especially with experts, to facilitate the drafting of policies. The development of think tanks and decision-making consultations became an agenda for the first time in a CPC document in 2013.117 A former vice president of the Party School Li Junru said (Y. Chen, 2014):
In an effort to improve deliberative, consultative democracy, the CPC is in the process of developing new rules and regulations to define which significant national issues have to be deliberated before decisions are made … In the future process of decision-making, think tanks can play a role. The reports by important think tanks may even directly become the basis for decisions.
Is it appropriate to assume that such a lengthy process of institutionalisation has direct (and indirect) consequences on government organisations, universities, as well as individuals? The existence of such new institutional arrangements does not, on its own, constitute evidence of a dramatic shift away from the enduring practices of the pre-reform system. As Guthrie suggests, if the new institutional, rational-legal structures adopted at the state level are having little impact on decisions and practices on the ground, this indicates that, even in the reform era, elements of the past communist system, such as personalised patron-client authority relations, would endure (Guthrie, 1999, p. 72). So have the pragmatic adjustments and
adaptive measures adopted at the central level to enhance legitimacy significantly changed the traditional structures of authority relations and the norms of informality in the system or on the ground? Have they altered the interactions between the government and universities?