The governance framework depicted in Figure 5-1 below can be considered in terms of three interlocking processes. First, local governance is based on the commune councils which, subject to their place within the Ministry of Interior, have decentralised responsibilities to engage with their rural constituency in the democratic formulation of policies for the welfare, or human security, of their constituents. Commune councils are also empowered to establish local bodies with paid workers or officials to deliver certain services to the commune or to particular groups within it.25 In addition, they are entitled to establish local revenue collection systems, subject to specific conditions. Local governance is also closely associated with the people and civil society and private sector organizations.
Participatory approaches to council affairs and “good governance” principles are built into the legislative and regulatory frameworks in the form of mandatory processes which must be followed in matters such as development planning, private sector contracting and financial management.26 This assumes that participation and “good governance” can be achieved through tightly defined administrative processes. However, this is somewhat contrary to the experience in developed countries, such as Australia, where public sector governance reforms reduced reliance on mandated procedures. Instead, greater attention was given to the culture of organisations and the responsibility of officers to make appropriate management decisions rather than simply follow procedures. This will be discussed below.
25 Description of some services which have been developed such as sanitation and road
maintenance are referred to in Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod, "Commune Councils and Civil Society: Promoting Decentralisation through Partnerships," (Phnom Penh: Pact Cambodia, 2004).
26 Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative
Management."; Royal Government of Cambodia, "Inter-Ministerial Prakas on Commune/Sangkat Development Planning."
The second governance process has its origins in the international sphere. In this context, international development organisations with global agendas conduct their activities in direct contact with what may be called their constituents (or clients). While these organizations are grouped together in Figure 5-1 under “donors”, they represent a mix of types including the WTO, World Bank, UNDP and other UN agencies, official bilateral donor countries and international NGOs. All have governing arrangements whereby their primary policy objectives, such as a common commitment to promoting human rights, “good governance” and poverty reduction, as well as neo-liberal economic reforms, are formulated in consultation with their own constituencies outside Cambodia.27 They each promote, with varying degrees of forcefulness, their own programmes within Cambodia – directly with the government, within state institutions and with civil society and the private sector. These agencies comprise forms of international governance and are able to have their policies and programmes adopted by the Cambodian governments. They also have the capacity to project policies and programmes directly to the population of Cambodia through their support for decentralisation and for the many local NGOs which promote international development approaches and undertake advocacy, as they see it, on behalf of the people. While this would appear to support the commonly held view that international governance reduces the power of the state, it must be recognised that while the Cambodian government largely accepts international development approaches, it retains a firm political control over the country and its decentralised administration.
Interlocking with the international and local governance processes are the institutions of national governance. The key national institutions in this third process are the government, which makes policy decisions for the nation, the ministries which manage and implement government policies and programmes, other institutions of state, such as the commune councils and, finally the private sector and civil society. Here, a very different picture of governance emerges from that promoted internationally as “good governance.”
27 The major critique of global governance institutions is that they are undemocratic and
represent the interests of already wealthy and powerful states when they assert an international consensus on matters such as good governance, democracy, participation, human rights and development.
Figure 5-1 Governance framework: international – national – local
Democracy is tenuous, human rights not respected, law and order compromised, corruption and nepotism abound and the government’s commitment to “good governance” is illusory. While the blame is regularly attributed to the Cambodians and internal factors, the nature of international development assistance must not escape attention. Development assistance has led to “capacity destruction” within state institutions as a result of aid projects delivering services rather than working within and improving the capacity of national institutions to do so.28
That approach is prominent in Cambodia, where donors have supported discrete projects within ministries but managed separately from the mainstream ministry bureaucratic processes to shield them from perceived poor governance and corruption. This highlights the complexity of governance within Cambodia where the combined international and domestic approaches—the latter with its roots firmly in Cambodia’s society and past history—produce uncertain outcomes in service delivery to rural Cambodia. Thus, the international donors also attempt to use a decentralisation approach to reach the rural population and to engineer social change
28 Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First
by engaging the people in specific regulated processes associated with democracy and “good governance.” There is an expectation that these processes and associated training will lead to the embedding of new concepts and values as well as empowering people to participate, not only in local commune council governance, but also in national democratic governance.29
That the political processes in Cambodia are not democratic is due in part to the nature of Cambodian government, but also in part to the dominant policy role played by the major international institutions. Using their vast capacity for defining and “knowing” the populations of developing countries in statistical terms, the donors are able to determine what they perceive as a country’s development needs, influence government policy and pressure countries to adopt “universal” solutions without reference to domestic political debate. While attempting to “embed” norms, however, the process simply bypasses the Cambodian population politically since they have no opportunity to access the information and analysis, or to debate the policy proposals and their social impact.30 This becomes even more evident in considering the operation of Cambodian government line departments, and the level of centralised control over their provincial functions.
The line departments do not operate unencumbered to the local level. Instead there is a small Provincial administration in the form of Executive Committees and Provincial Rural Development Committees (PRDC) which are intended to coordinate the line department functions within the provinces. The line departments are formally structured within the central ministries, although funding is transferred to the provincial line department offices through the provincial finance department. Most line departments also have district offices within the provinces. Overall, the linkage between the different levels is not straight forward, a fact that is highlighted by national and donor discussions on proposed deconcentration reforms. These propose to devolve line department responsibility to the provincial authorities and to give the provincial governors greater autonomy (as well as subjecting them, in theory at least, to greater public scrutiny).31
29 Zanotti, "Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime," 471.
30 This reflects the process of the “anti-politics machine” discussed by Ferguson. See James
Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
31 See for example UNDP Cambodia, "US$34.8 Million to Support Cambodian
Provincial governors are currently appointed by the Prime Minister and, attesting the mutual suspicions and potential political and material benefits to be had, a deputy from an alternative political party is also appointed by the Prime Minister.32 The governor’s position is organisationally located under the Ministry of Interior—as too are the commune councils. The provincial governor also has direct responsibility for the police and military within the province, adding to the complex relations of power. Currently there is no open and effective mechanism for the people and civil society to put policy proposals, political concerns and social and economic demands to provincial governing authorities.
Despite significant international involvement, government plans to produce new organic law for deconcentration have been put off until after the 2008 national election. The deconcentration debate has, however, raised significant issues concerning the nature of the governorship and whether it should be an appointed or elected position, the extent of political freedom to be given to the provinces and their role in policy and strategic control over provincial development, the processes for civil society inputs, and provincial budgetary allocations and controls. Much of the debate concerns the future levels of power (particularly budgetary control) to be exercised by politicians and senior civil servants at central and provincial levels. It also concerns the basis for determining priorities and allocating resources to national versus provincial programmes and projects.
Currently, the confused state of governance inherent in the administrative arrangements, as well as the lack of resources and financial control at provincial level, severely limit the ability of provincial governors to develop and implement policies and programmes designed specifically to address infrastructure needs and to promote agricultural development, create new industries and trade and tourism opportunities. In the case of Battambang, for example, the province has been unable to develop significant long-term plans and projections for employment creation, especially to meet the needs of the young educated and computer literate who flock
Adenauer Foundation organised a major seminar for the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Drafting of the Organic Laws. See Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, "Decentralisation and Deconcentration in Cambodia," Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Cambodia Office,
www.kas.de/proj/home/events/2/year-2006/month-6/veranstaltung_id20950/index.html
accessed on 7 November 2007.
32 This may change now that the CPP has a clear government majority following the 2008
to the towns for employment.33 The Battambang Plans are not documents to guide investment and the development of the province and its people into the future. Nor has a decade of international aid and development assistance focused on regional economic development and local needs. At the same time, the international emphasis on “good governance” principles and practices has achieved little for the human security of Cambodia’s rural population.