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The argumentation skills investigated by Kuhn (1991) may be seen as joint contributors to a more general ability, “the ability to contemplate whether what one believes is true, in contrast simply to knowing that it is true” (p. 264, emphasis in original). Hence, a relevant factor in developing and using argumentation skills may be people’s general stance towards the process of knowing. Kuhn investigated the relationship between argumentation skills and epistemological theories that people hold, that is, their views on the nature of knowledge, beliefs, and evidence. Such theories constitute meta-level knowledge that drives belief formation, evaluation, and revision. Table 16 shows the four different levels of epistemological understanding.

Table 16

Levels of epistemic understanding

Level Assertions Reality Knowledge Critical thinking

Realist Assertions are copies of

an external reality. Reality is directly knowable. Knowledge comes from an external source and is certain. Critical thinking is unnecessary.

Absolutist Assertions are facts that

are correct or incorrect in their representation of reality (possibility of false belief). Reality is directly knowable. Knowledge comes from an external source and is certain. Critical thinking is a vehicle for comparing assertions to reality and determining their truth or falsehood.

Multiplist Assertions are opinions

freely chosen by and accountable only to their owners. Reality is not directly knowable. Knowledge is generated by human minds and is uncertain.

Critical thinking is irrelevant.

Evaluativist Assertions are judgments that can be evaluated and compared according to criteria of argument and evidence. Reality is not directly knowable. Knowledge is generated by human minds and is uncertain.

Critical thinking is valued as a vehicle that promotes sound assertions and enhances understanding.

Note: Adapted from Kuhn et al. (2000).

As described in Kuhn et al. (2000), the epistemological theories people hold may be seen as the result of a developmental process, in which a balance is sought between the two dimensions of knowing: objectivity and subjectivity. Typically until the age four, children hold the realist view. At this level, knowledge is seen as an exact copy of the external world and therefore certain and unarguable. When children begin to

realize that people have different, sometimes wrong beliefs about the world, they are about to enter the absolutist level. They still assume that an absolute, objective truth exists. So, the reason for different beliefs must be that some people are lacking information or simply misunderstand the world. During the transition from the absolutist to the multiplist level, people increasingly gain the insight that knowledge is the product of the human intellect. Every individual has her own history and made her own experiences, so it is not surprising that people interpret the world differently and arrive at different legitimate views and opinions. While this perspective marks an important advancement from the absolutist level, it also entails an indifferent and uncritical attitude towards opinions. Every opinion is essentially equally right, no matter how substantial the reasons speaking against it are. Finally, some people may reach the highest level of epistemological understanding, the evaluativist view, in which standards of objectivity reenter the picture. There are criteria to evaluate and compare opposing theories in an objective and reasonable way. While absolute certainty is an unattainable goal, it is nonetheless possible to judge whether theories are logically consistent, whether some theories are more likely than others in the light of given evidence, or whether the empirical basis is simply too weak to give a reliable judgment.

Kuhn (1991) classified the participants according to the last three levels (the first level is irrelevant since typically only small children hold that view). People who expressed that experts have, or principally can gain, incontestable knowledge about a question were classified as absolutists. Persons who denied this possibility and furthermore claimed that they personally know better or equally well as experts about the topic in question were classified as multiplists. Finally, persons who denied absolute expert certainty while conceding that experts can judge the given question with greater certainty as they can have been classified as evaluativists. The study results indicated that evaluativists, who comprised only a relatively small portion of all participants, indeed exhibited superior argumentation skills in comparison to both absolutists and multiplists. Similar results have been reported by Mason and Scirica (2006).

Epistemological beliefs may be one factor contributing to a person’s thinking

disposition. The concept of thinking dispositions (Perkins et al. 1993; Perkins et al.

2000) is motivated by the observation that a poor performance, particularly in informal reasoning tasks, is not necessarily caused by a lack of ability. Rather, participants may be principally able to successfully engage in some desired form of thinking but do not do so for other reasons. Perkins et al. (2000) present evidence in favor of a three-component model of thinking dispositions. First, a person must be

able to carry out a certain behavior (ability). Second, a person must recognize opportunities to make use of this ability (sensitivity). Third, a person must decide to take the opportunity to make use of the ability (inclination). Motivational factors play a role with respect to inclination, but also considerations of whether investing one’s intelligence into some issue is worth the effort. Perkins et al. (2000) found in a study that in more than 86% of all cases, a lack of sensitivity prevented people from engaging in forms of thinking they are principally able to carry out. Inclination accounted for about 55% of situations in which subjects did not make use of thinking abilities they have. People who do not hold an evaluativist view can be expected to see less value in critical thinking. In consequence, they may be less sensitive to critical thinking opportunities and less inclined to engage in critical thinking activities. This may not only affect the observable performance but also hamper learning and development since opportunities to practice critical thinking skills are missed. Vice versa, holding an evaluativist view may directly contribute to the development of critical thinking and argumentation skills, which is in line with the results of Kuhn (1991).