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This section discusses research on cognitive skills relevant to the production, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments. While some relevant results regarding formal reasoning skills are discussed, the bulk of this section is devoted to research on informal reasoning, which is focused on the forms of argumentation employed to address complex real-world problems. Specific argumentation skills and empirical results that indicate widespread deficiencies in using these skills are presented.

Results from cognitive psychology indicate that many people have limited abilities in formal deductive reasoning and probabilistic judgment. Table 15 shows formal-logical inferences and corresponding fallacies investigated in cognitive psychology studies. Marcus and Rips (1979) found that almost all subjects were able to correctly make modus ponens inferences. However, only about half of them correctly draw modus tollens inferences. Moreover, many subjects committed formal fallacies of the types affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. Byrne (1989) found that the context can have a strong effect on the making of correct and incorrect inferences. For instance, providing multiple if-then statements with the same conclusion helps subjects realize that the if-part only gives a sufficient but not a necessary condition. Other studies show problems in making probabilistic judgments. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) used a task in which subjects estimated the probability that a person has a certain occupation based on a description of that person. In addition, information regarding the base-rate frequencies of different occupations was provided. Even if the description was completely uninformative, subjects ignored the provided base-rate frequencies in their estimates (base-rate fallacy). If no additional descriptions were provided, subjects correctly used the given prior probabilities in their estimates. A possible

explanation for formal and probabilistic reasoning errors is that in many everyday situations, simpler but fallible reasoning strategies are sufficient for current purposes and more economic, since they require less thinking time and mental efforts (bounded rationality; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Kahneman 2011; Simon 1955).

Table 15

Formal inferences and fallacies used in cognitive psychology studies on formal reasoning

Inference

type Reasoning pattern Example

Modus ponens (formally valid inference) If P then Q. P. Therefore, Q.

“If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.” “She has an essay to write.”

“Therefore, she will study late in the library.”

Modus tollens (formally valid inference) If P then Q. Not Q. Therefore, not P.

“If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.” “She will not study late in the library.”

“Therefore, she does not have an essay to write.”

Affirming the consequent (formal fallacy) If P then Q. Q. Therefore, P.

“If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.” “She will study late in the library.”

“Therefore, she has an essay to write.”

Denying the antecedent (formal fallacy) If P then Q. Not P. Therefore, not Q.

“If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library.” “She does not have an essay to write.”

“Therefore, she will not study late in the library.”

Note: Examples taken from Byrne (1989).

While formal reasoning problems can be characterized as “well-structured, familiar, and compatible with existing knowledge,” informal reasoning problems are generally “open-ended, debatable, complex, or ill-structured” (Means and Voss 1996). They typically involve the generation or evaluation of evidence and reasons vis-à-vis one or more claims in question. Argumentation is thus central to informal reasoning. A pioneering empirical study on informal reasoning is presented by Kuhn (1991). The study focused particularly on argumentation skills, which Kuhn considers pivotal to human thinking as such. Thinking often takes the form as arguing with oneself, e.g., to form beliefs, to make judgments, and to make decisions. The study investigated whether common people (i.e., non-experts) are able to rationally justify their beliefs

about controversial topics of general interest. While the study investigated individual reasoning, the results also provide some insights with respect to collaborative argumentation. Following Kuhn, collaborative argumentation employs essentially the same set of elementary argumentation skills (plus some additional ones, e.g., socially-oriented skills).

The study consisted of research interviews with individual participants about three social problems (e.g., "What causes prisoners to return to crime after they're released?"). In the course of the interview, participants were asked a number of questions to assess specific argumentation skills. In particular, participants were asked to do the following things (in parentheses the specific skill addressed):

1. present their own causal theories on these issues (theory)

2. justify their causal theories and give supporting evidence, if possible (evidence)

3. generate possible counter-positions (alternative theories)

4. devise counterarguments against their own causal theory (counterarguments)

5. rebut possible counterarguments (rebuttals)

6. evaluate evidence presented by the interviewer (evaluation of evidence) With respect to (1), the study showed that people have coherent causal theories about questions of general interest, although the complexity of the presented theories varied (single-cause and multi-cause theories at different levels of elaboration). With respect to (2), three broad categories were distinguished: genuine evidence, pseudo-

evidence, and no evidence. In contrast to genuine evidence, pseudo-evidence only

illustrates or elaborates on the causal mechanism, that is, how the cause brings about the effect. Pseudo-evidence may make a theory clearer, more interesting, or more plausible, but does not give any indication of its correctness. Therefore pseudo- evidence may be considered as no evidence at all but rather as a part of the theory itself. The study showed that exactly such pseudo-evidence was the prevalent form of evidence used. With respect to (3), the majority of participants were able to generate alternative theories. Interestingly, those who were able to do so were also more likely to generate genuine evidence. Being aware of the existence of alternative theories is an important prerequisite to understanding that one’s own theory might be wrong. In the light of multiple opposing theories, the importance of genuine evidence, as a criterion to determine which theory is preferable, becomes most

apparent. With respect to (4), many participants were not (fully) successful in generating counterarguments. While some offered at least an alternative theory when prompted for a counterargument (considered by Kuhn as a partial success), others failed or declined to produce a counterargument. Anticipating possible counterarguments is important to identify weak spots of one’s own theory. Apparently, many participants were not able or willing to critically reflect on their own position, a skill central to argumentation. With respect to (5), three main sorts of rebuttals were distinguished: (a) rebuttals that try to undermine the force of the counterargument (showing that the counterargument is of no or only limited use to attack the original argument), (b) rebuttals that try to establish that one’s own theory (or a slightly adjusted version of it) is nonetheless more correct than alternative theories, and (c) rebuttals that simply argue against the alternative theory without referring to one’s own theory. The study showed that many participants did not successfully generate rebuttals. When rebuttals were successfully generated, they were often of the last mentioned type: simple rebuttals. Such rebuttals are solely focused on the alternative theory, and thus, can be generated without critically reflecting possible deficiencies of one’s own theory. With respect to (6), participants were presented with under-determined evidence (in particular: a description of a single instance of a phenomenon with only minimal cues regarding possible causes) and over-determined evidence (in particular: a description of three studies each clearly indicating a different causal explanation). The responses showed that many participants did not make a clear distinction between their own theory and the presented external evidence. Rather, the presented evidence was perceived and interpreted (sometimes misinterpreted) through the lens of their own theory. In the case of under-determined evidence, participants often explained the presented phenomenon in terms of their own theories. In the case of over-determined evidence, participants typically focused on the parts that corresponded with their theory while ignoring other parts that may disprove their theory.

In summary, the results indicate clear deficiencies of many participants with respect to important argumentation skills, such as generating genuine evidence, anticipating and rebutting possible counterarguments, and critically and objectively interpreting external evidence. As noted by Kuhn (1991, p. 282), these results are consistent with other investigations of informal reasoning skills that identified a

myside bias (i.e., focusing on evidence and reasons that support one’s own beliefs

while ignoring disconfirming information; Perkins et al. 1983) and a make sense

that superficially makes sense without further critical reflection on it; Perkins 1985) in people’s reasoning.