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Discursive social psychology is the study of how people construct and perform

psychological phenomena, „mental states‟, in social interaction (Edwards & Potter,

1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Traditionally, social psychology views the display of

attitudes or expression of emotions as cognitive processes which reside within the

individual and drive behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971).

Discursive psychologists, by contrast, see these psychological phenomena as

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construct a neutral attitude in order to avoid the attribution of being seen as a racist

(Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Psychological phenomena, then, for discursive psychology,

are constructed in response to how we want others to view us.

Discursive psychology represents a reworking of the view traditionally taken by

psychologists that language expresses cognitive processes of the mind (Edley, 2001a;

Horton-Salway, 2001). Rather, for discursive psychology, it is through language that

individuals perform social actions such as making justifications, expressing views, and

attributing blame (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Therefore,

discursive social psychology is very much concerned with the „action orientation‟ (Heritage, 1984) of discourse. The view of language taken by discursive social

psychologists thus sharply diverges from that taken by other social psychologists.

As indicated, traditional social psychological research often uses questionnaires

and surveys to uncover individual‟s „underlying mental states‟ (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). Within this research tradition, a researcher may for

example „elicit attitudes‟ by having participants select a documented attitude from a set

number of choices—categories elicited by the researcher. This is problematic from a

discursive social psychologist‟s perspective because it sees a neat correspondence between categories constructed by the researcher and the participants‟ indicated

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underlying mental entities, especially if these are seen as fixed and stable. In contrast,

discursive social psychology sees the display of attitudes, evaluations, emotions, and

remembering as constructed for specific interactional contexts and thus „action oriented‟

(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, an individual may

„remember‟ an event in a certain way to construct a „self-presentation‟ (see section 2.1.4) as a „responsible person‟. Discursive social psychologists have thus

reconceptualized the conventional social psychological view of language as an

expressive medium of stable, underlying states to a flexible resource individuals draw

on to perform actions. Reported attitudes, memories, descriptions, and the like are seen

as „accounts‟. Because discursive accounts are „action oriented‟ versus static, discursive

psychologists use qualitative interviews (one-to-one and focus groups) in lieu of

questionnaires or surveys (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

In contrast to the view that researchers can access participants‟ attitudes and

underlying mental states and indeed that there are underlying mental states, discursive

psychology is anti-cognitivist (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Within cognitive psychology, individuals‟ accounts are viewed as representations of their mental states (Bubenzer & West, 1993; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Duck, 1993).

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factual accuracy of a memory) or elicitation of attitudes but how „knowledge‟ and

„attitudes‟ are used in interaction.

Edwards (1994, 1995) illustrates how, for discursive social psychology,

cognitive entities (descriptions of mental life) are strategically deployed with his

concept of „script formulations‟. Script formulations are used by a speaker to construct

an event or a speaker‟s disposition as following a predictable pattern or „script‟ which helps bolster the description and protect against refutation. This assumes that

description is what is happening. Similar to a „rhetorical commonplace‟ (Billig 1987), it

is „rhetorically self-sufficient‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and „stands alone‟ to explain a particular phenomena, e.g. „present generations cannot be blamed for the mistakes of past generations‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 177). The rhetorical effect of script

formulations is that the account is constructed as unmotivated by a speaker‟s „stake‟ or

„interest‟ and is thus unbiased. Script formulations are an example of what Potter (1996) calls an „externalizing device‟ where an action or event is constructed as occurring independent from the describer. Through distancing oneself from the event or action, the

account is given more corroboration because it is constructed as „neutral‟ and not

motivated by the describer‟s own interests. For example, a participant in a marriage counseling session produced a description of her husband as „jealous‟ (Edwards, 1995).

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The woman constructed her husband‟s „dispositional jealousy‟ as the reason why he

misconstrued her „sociability‟ as „flirtatiousness‟. By producing a description of his

actions as following a predictable script, the speaker was able to blame her husband for

various marital difficulties while at the same time present her own conduct as blameless.

This example of script formulation illustrates how an emotion such as jealousy is not

seen simply as a mental entity, but is discursively constructed in order to perform a

particular function such as the attribution of blame. This non-cognitivist stance is

consistent with an „action oriented‟ (Heritage, 1984) conceptualization of discourse. The theoretical roots of discursive psychology can be traced back to the 1980s

with the publication of Potter and Wetherell‟s (1987) seminal work, Discourse and

Social Psychology, which foregrounds discourse as the topic of study. Potter and

Wetherell (1987) directly challenged social psychological research on attitudes.

Whereas attitudes researchers had attested to a high degree of coherence within

individual‟s questionnaire responses (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; Zimmerman & Pollner,

1971), Wetherell and Potter (1992), in their interviews with Pakeha (white) New

Zealanders, demonstrated that variability was normative within and across individuals.

This variation directly challenges (but does not disprove) attitudes researchers‟ claims

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In order to study „mental‟ phenomena, Potter and Wetherell (1987) outline a

form of discourse analysis which draws variously on the tools of „conversation analysis‟

(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Sacks, 1995), „membership categorization devices‟ (Sacks,

1995; see section 5.3), and the concept of „interpretative repertoires‟ (Potter & Wetherell,

1987). Conversation Analysis (CA) is concerned with the local-organization of

conversations and has developed terminology to explicate this. Researchers who adhere

to the principles of CA are more concerned with micro-oriented analysis, e.g. the

salience of a pause. Those researchers who draw on the concept of interpretative

repertoires, culturally specific ways of discussing certain topics, are however also

interested in macro-level analysis, i.e. the relevance of a particular social context on the

interaction. Accordingly, the field has split into those scholars who remain faithful to the

principles of CA and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1995; Sacks,

Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and those who follow a more post-structuralist influenced

branch and draw on the concept of interpretative repertoires (Edley, 2001a; Edley and

Wetherell, 2008) and discourses. These two branches of discursive social psychology

are explored in greater depth below.

The field of discursive social psychology has been heavily influenced by

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commonplaces‟, e.g. culturally specific terms or phrases that construct something as beyond question. When invoking them they function as being „rhetorically

self-sufficient‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and thus are effective devices to „manage

accountability‟ (attribute responsibility for an action). For example, the phrase „you

can‟t turn the clock backwards‟ often functions to reduce Pakeha New Zealanders‟ accountability for past injustices inflicted on the Maori people, and may form the basis

for an argument against compensating Maori people for such injustices (Wetherell &

Potter, 1992).

A further contribution to discursive social psychology was Edwards & Potter‟s

(1992) „Discursive Action Model,‟ in which the concepts of „action,‟ „fact and interest‟

and „accountability‟ were introduced. „Action‟ follows Potter and Wetherell (1987) who view „psychological‟ phenomena such as „remembering‟, „describing‟, and so on as

discursive acts which perform actions like denying responsibility or placing blame, as

shown above. „Fact‟ and „interest‟ refer to individuals‟ „stake‟ or personal investment in

making certain claims. If a speaker is seen as having such a „stake‟ or „interest‟, the

account is in part undermined because it is no longer viewed as neutral (Edwards &

Potter, 1992). Accordingly, individuals are often caught in a „dilemma of stake or

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order to manage this dilemma, individuals produce accounts where an attributional

action such as blaming is done implicitly, so as not to undermine their accounts and

reduce their own accountability.

Edwards and Potter (1992) further locate „accountability‟ at two different, yet

interrelated, levels. First, in the process of constructing an account, a speaker is making

claims about who is responsible for certain events or actions. In particular, when the

speaker is a participant in that account, his or her personal and relative responsibility for

certain actions or events is also being constructed: within the „story world‟ of the

account, the speaker is managing his or her own accountability. The speaker‟s accountability in the story world has implications for the type of „self-presentation‟

(Goffman, 1959) she or he is constructing in the current interactional context (e.g.

interview, courtroom testimony). The version of self constructed in the story world

encourages the listener to form a certain impression of the teller, e.g. someone who

believes in racial or gender equality. Speakers design their accounts in accordance with

these two levels of accountability: within the story-world and current interactional

context.

These two seminal works, Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Edwards and Potter

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also formed the basis for the theoretical division that has occurred in the field. Potter

and Wetherell (1987) have heavily influenced post-structuralist or „critical discursive

psychology‟ (hereafter CDP; Edley, 2001a; Edley & Wetherell, 2008); in contrast, the approach advocated by Edwards and Potter (1992) draws on the principles of CA

(hereafter CADP; Antaki, 1988, 1994; Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & Stokoe,

2006; Speer, 2001, 2005). In the next sections, I outline the main principles of and

differences between CADP and CDP.