Similar to the classical philosophers, modern political philosophy struggles with questions concerning equality and rule by the people. What are the criteria for claiming that the people are in charge of the polity? Robert A. Dahl studies popular participation in politics from the point of view that constitutions are dependent on
“beliefs” held by the members of a society.122 He argues that democracy is based on a “Strong Principle of Equality”, a position where the citizens accept to rule and being ruled in turn. He defines his “Strong Principle of Equality” as a belief among members of an association “that all the members of the association are adequately qualified to participate on an equal footing with the other in the process of governing the association”.123 Dahl does not claim that this is a description of democracy since
the principle of equality is not necessarily applied very broadly in the given polity.124
He adds two additional beliefs that are necessary in order for a society to be a democracy, what he calls the “Principle of Equal Consideration of Interest”, viz. that all citizens are taken into consideration in making decisions, and the “Presumption of Personal Autonomy” viz. that every citizen is the best judge of his own interests.125
However, Dahl’s principles do not help distinguishing an oligarchy from a democracy or narrow and broad corporate strategies: the “beliefs” regarding equality among members of a group in Dahl’s argument could still be held by a small minority holding power in society. Thus, with Dahl’s principles, it becomes an empirical question whether enough people are included in the political process for it to be called a democracy, i.e. rule by the people, or an oligarchy, i.e. rule by a few. Dahl’s
concepts are useful, however, because they highlight politics as consisting of beliefs about what is fair and right, and that these beliefs are subject to change. Therefore, a polity may well experience changes from a situation where an inclusive civic body is in charge to a situation where a small élite takes control, and vice versa.
122 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 1989, 30 123 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 1989, 31 124 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 1989, 32 125 Dahl, Democracy and its critics, 1989, 105
Dahl’s focus on beliefs as an important factor in political developments has influenced Ian Morris’ (2000) analysis of the development of democracy in the archaic polis. However, Morris’ view of a belief in equality as a precondition for popular power is criticised by Erich Kistler (2004) for being blind to the differences between the masses and the élite in Greek poleis. The discussion is important, because it highlights problems concerning how to evaluate popular participation in politics and how the community of citizens was defined. How can equality define both the masses and the élite, and still be of use in discussing popular power?
According to Ian Morris, a “Strong Principle of Equality” was important in Greek communities of the archaic period for “the emergence of egalitarian culture within broad male citizen communities”, as a group of metrioi, middling citizens. In his view, the ideological change towards the realisation of this principle had a democratic constitution as one possible outcome.126 In archaic poetry and especially in Hesiod, Morris sees a conflict between what he terms a middling ideology and an élite ideology: the outcome of this conflict was that early polis societies of Greece abandoned élite ideals of personal excellence, and emphasised middling values.127 In the classical polis, this resulted in a middling culture, a strong bond of mutual solidarity between moderate men, the metrioi, who conceived of themselves as being neither rich nor poor.128
Ian Morris argues that an egalitarian culture among males in Greek communities of the archaic period was a necessary condition for the development of Athenian
126 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 111 127 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 161-169 128 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 114-119
democracy.129 This position has been attacked by Erich Kistler, who argues that the ideal of being metrios is in direct opposition to the egalitarian political culture of a democracy.130
Morris’ analysis of a democracy based on being metrios, a middling man of no extravagant tastes, may seem to indicate that the more humble citizens gained an advantage over the élite. However, it is relevant to ask who they were, these metrioi who wished to show distance to the extravagant élite and why they wished to do so. As will be argued below, it seems more likely that the metrioi were not men of moderate wealth, in the sense of commoners, but actually belonged to the élite themselves, the aristoi. Thus, being metrios does not mean to be a commoner, it means to be a moderate member of the élite.
Morris’ argument for the ideological development behind Greek egalitarian political practices has been criticised exactly for coupling the ideal of being metrios with Dahl’s “Strong Principle of Equality”. Erich Kistler argues that the Greek concept of being a middling citizen, a metrios, belong to the élite and is in direct opposition to a “Strong Principle of Equality” that lay behind Athenian democracy.131 This means
that the high degree of popular participation in politics that occurred in democratic Athens cannot be explained by the ideal of being metrios. Kistler’s objection finds support in Aristotle, who defines hoi mesoi, the middling citizens, as those who are
metrios, considered to be a group of citizens who are not rich and not poor, but in the
middle.132 According to Aristotle, as well as the writer known as the “Old Oligarch”,
129 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 109-113
130 Kistler, ”“Kampf der Mentalitäten”: Ian Morris’ ”elitist-” versus ”middling-ideology”?”, 2004, 145-175 131 Kistler, ”“Kampf der Mentalitäten”: Ian Morris’ ”elitist-” versus ”middling-ideology”?”, 2004, 165-167 132 Arist. Pol. 1295a25-1296b2
democracy is not rule by a citizen community of moderate and considerate equals, but rule by the poor over the rich.133 This means that a constitution where hoi mesoi were in power would not be a democracy, and thus, Athenian democracy cannot be explained by the principle of being metrios. Morris anticipates these arguments by claiming that “Aristotle reshaped popular ideas of the middle way for his own ends”.134 However, Morris’ assessment of metrios as belonging to the demos, or
people, is problematic, because we know nothing about how the term metrios was applied outside the élite.
Erich Kistler criticises Ian Morris for ignoring the oligarchic nature of Greek male citizen communities, i.e. poleis. He emphasises the difference between arithmetic and geometric equality, and warns against seeing a connection between aristocratic ideals of geometric equality, which were in fact oligarchic, and a democratic strong
principle of arithmetic equality.135 According to Erich Kistler, Morris’ conflict between middling and élite ideology fits the situation in the archaic polis, but only in the sense of a conflict between moderate and overweening, or hybristic, aristocrats. Thus, the ideal of being metrios, or moderate, which is found in archaic poets, in particular Hesiod, has nothing to do with the later development of radical democracy at Athens.136
Against Morris’ proposed egalitarian ideology among commoners, it can be argued that the sources to the archaic period are all from the élite, and that e.g. the poetic persona of Hesiod as a middling farmer is a fiction far removed from the masses of
133 Arist. Pol. 1290a30ff.; “Old Oligarch” 1.2 134 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 119
135 Kistler, ”“Kampf der Mentalitäten”: Ian Morris’ ”elitist-” versus ”middling-ideology”?”, 2004, 165 136 Kistler, ”“Kampf der Mentalitäten”: Ian Morris’ ”elitist-” versus ”middling-ideology”?”, 2004, 166-167
any Greek polis. When Hesiod presents himself as a peasant farmer who fights against corrupt aristocrats,137 this is not necessarily a source to peasant attitudes, but
may be those of an aristocrat against other, more extravagant aristocrats. This will be discussed further in chapter 3 (3.3.2).
Jonathan Hall is sceptical of Morris’ emphasis on an ideology of equality behind popular power. He emphasises practical inclusion in politics as promoting popular power, rather than ideas of equality. In his view, Athenian democracy was the result of revolutionary action, not ideology.138 I agree with Hall’s assessment of the
importance of inclusion and practical participation for popular power. Most of all, I think it is important to place the archaic ideology of moderation and egalitarianism where it belongs, with the élite, and discuss popular power as practice, rather than ideology.
The problem of equality and democracy is pointed out by Robin Osborne, who argues that Athenian democracy was not popular rule at all, emphasising that the association of equals making out the citizens was a group created by a range of deliberate measures and historical conditions, including chattel slavery.139 I agree that popular
power and Athenian democracy are concepts that must be held separate. However, it should not be ignored that Athenian commoners were allowed more participation in politics than in most Greek poleis. The exclusion of non-citizens from political participation in Athens is beyond the scope of this investigation, as what interests me is how citizens and their subgroups participate in politics. However, it is of note that Athenian democracy was based on several unique conditions, including chattel
137 Hes. Op. 37-39
138 Hall, “Polis, community, and ethnic identity,” 2007, 45-46 139 Osborne, Athens and Athenian democracy, 2010, 30-34
slavery. This should make us suspicious of ideology as a main explanation for the development of Athenian democracy. It should also make us wary of any simplistic juxtaposition of Athenian democracy and popular power in general.
The Greek concept of being metrios can hardly be said to form a basis for popular participation in politics. It refers to moderation in the sense of being equal to others who are metrioi, and not to being equal in the absolute, or arithmetic, sense and thereby part of a broad citizen community. There is a contrast between democracy as defined by Aristotle, where the poor majority is sovereign in the constitution, and the egalitarian ideology of the élite that Morris postulates as the starting point for the development of democracy. It is doubtful whether the “middling culture” in Athens had anything to do with the poor. Morris tries to solve the problem by arguing that many Athenians owned land and therefore could be considered metrioi.140 This seems
rather desperate, and contrasts strangely with the “Old Oligarch” and Aristotle, who portray democratic Athens as mob rule, where the poor hold the rich ransom.141 Why is the dichotomy of rich and poor so central in the sources, if it had no basis in reality? In answer to this, Morris argues that Aristotle as well as the archaic poets wrote from an aristocratic perspective.142 It may well be that the dichotomy of rich and poor in the
polis is overstated by poets and philosophers. However, if the élite sources cannot be
trusted, how many other written sources are there?
It is not obvious to whom Greek poets of the archaic period are referring when they appeal to a “middle” part of the polis. The problem remains even if one does accept that it was a part of élite discourse. Was the “middle” the moderate urban élite or a
140 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 142 141 “Old Oligarch” 1.13; Arist. Pol.1279a32ff 142 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 161
group of well-off farmers? Morris admits the problem, but tries to evade it by claiming that all men could be included in the “middle”, to meson.143 In his view, the
possibility for democracy was an unintended consequence of an aristocratic
egalitarian ideology.144 It is exactly this point that Kistler elaborates on in his criticism
of Morris: there can be no causal link between the “middling culture” of archaic aristocrats and the normative “middling culture” of democratic Athens.145 However,
Kistler does not offer any alternative explanation of the development of democracy. Thus, both Morris and Kistler reach aporetic conclusions: the emergence of Athenian democracy has no direct relation to earlier forms of political organisation in Greece, and thus, the emergence of a high degree of political participation in politics remains as unique and unexpected as ever. This reinforces the tendency to see Athens as the starting point of a unique Western political culture.
The debate between Kistler and Morris in the end leaves Athens as the only
democracy in the ancient world. Their discussion is instructive, however, because it shows the difficulties in recognising popular power in the sources. In my opinion, popular power as a historical phenomenon must be studied from its manifestations in processes where the citizen community reaches decisions and governs itself. For this to be called popular power, however, it must be possible to demonstrate that the citizen community was a large group of people and not an élite few. I turn now to further discussion of popular power and the problem of élite dominance of the decisions taken by the masses.
143 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 162-163 144 Morris, Archaeology as cultural history, 2000, 163