It is possible to leverage socioeconomic inequalities and ethnic discrimination to test the hy- pothesis that predicts a conditional effect of conscription. Figure 5.3 summarises this view. The first argument, “conscription”, just predicts longer conflicts. The second argument, “conscrip- tion reproduces underlying inequalities” predicts particularly longer conflicts when there is high socioeconomic inequality or ethnic discrimination.
If there is high socioeconomic/ethnic inequality within a polity, conscription should exac- erbate the grievances of the disadvantaged and substantially decrease their opportunity cost of rebellion. This should be translated as a higher recruitment capacity for non-state actors. This increase in recruitment capacity, according to the second hypothesis, is a sum of (1) a baseline decrease in opportunity cost, (2) a further decrease in opportunity cost due interplay of grievance and opportunity and (3) increase in grievances. Furthermore, because conscription disfavors discriminated ethnic groups and low socioeconomic classes, it can act as a transfer, (4) insulating members of non-discriminated ethnic groups and the well-off from the cost of conflict (e.g. Peru). On the other hand, the hypothesis 1a only predicts increase in conflict duration through (1) a baseline decrease in opportunity cost. These differences should lead to divergent expectations on conflict duration.
For socioeconomic inequalities, I rely on the Egalitarian Component Index (v2x egal), avail- able in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2016). The index is suitable because it measures socioeconomic inequalities.11. A Higher score refers to a more egal-
itarian polity. It is possible to interactEgalitarian Index (v2x egal) withConscription to test whether the effect of conscription has a higher magnitude when there is higher socioeconomic inequality.
The data on ethnic power relations is well-developed (Vogt et al., 2015; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). We can separate rebel organizations that represent an ethnic identity (ethnic rebellions) from non-ethnic rebellions. Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) further divides ethnic rebellions into two; those who fight on behalf of politically excluded ethnicities and those who fight for included ethnic groups. Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) finds that ethnic rebellions last considerably longer, and this effect is mainly driven by rebel organizations
change the main findings.
11Some indicators in the index are “class and social group equality in respect for civil liberties”, “percent of population with weaker liberties”, “power distribution by socioeconomic position”, and “health and educational equality” (see Coppedge et al., 2016). Some recent articles (Bartuseviˇcius, 2014; Houle, 2016) on the economic inequality and civil conflict nexus rely on the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID; Solt, 2016). Unfortunately, the SWIID is not appropriate for our
CHAPTER 5. CONSCRIPTION & CIVIL CONFLICT 103 representing excluded ethnic groups.
A similar approach is adopted here but I further break down non-ethic rebellions into two, based on whether there is country-level discrimination against any ethnic group or not. An illustrative example would be FARC, which is not linked to any ethnic group. However, there had been country-level discrimination against some ethnic groups in Colombia during most of FARC’s insurgency. The intuition is that because conscription disfavors members of the discriminated ethnic groups, conscripts from discriminated ethnicities can be more likely to be deployed against a non-ethnic rebellion, leading to a transfer of civil conflict costs away from non-discriminated ethnicities. Moreover, the non-ethnic rebellion can find it easier to recruit from discriminated ethnicities because of increasing grievances and decreasing opportunity cost of violence in this category. Discrimination and conscription, therefore, should jointly influence conflict processes by insulating the well-off and by changing recruitment capacities of rebels.
Based on this conjecture, four categories are identified; (1) rebel group represents a discrim- inated ethnic identity (discrimination & ethnic), (2) rebel group represents an ethnic identity that is not discriminated(no-discrimination & ethnic), (3) rebel group does not represent an ethnic identity but there is country-level discrimination(discrimination & non-ethnic), and (4) rebel group does not represent an ethnic identity and there is no country-level discrimination
(no-discrimination & non-ethnic). Each category is further broken down into two based on the MMSS, yielding to eight categories in total.
The theoretical approach always expects conscription to prolong civil conflict, in all of the categories. However, the magnitude is conditional on ethnic discrimination. When there is discrimination, conscription has a combined effect through all four components. When there is no discrimination, the effect of conscription is the baseline decrease in opportunity cost. Therefore we can test whether conscription is conditional on ethnic equality.
In order to create these four main categories, I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data family (Vogt et al., 2015; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). ACD2EPR links non-state actors to ethnic groups in the EPR dataset through claim, recruitment and support variables. If at least two variables take the value 1, the rebellion is considered to be ethnic, and non-ethnic otherwise. Then I turn to the EPR Core dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010) to determine whether these ethnic rebellions represent at least one ethnic group that is coded as discriminated in that year. If none of the linked ethnicities are discriminated, the rebellion falls into the no-discrimination & ethnic category. A similar approach is then taken for non-ethnic rebellions to creatediscrimination & non-ethnic andno-discrimination &
104 CHAPTER 5. CONSCRIPTION & CIVIL CONFLICT
non-ethnic categories.