States: Examining Key Political and Policy Challenges’, The Policy Studies Journal, 35, 2 (2007), pp.227-238. For more on the ‘risk’ factor, see below.
161 See, for example, Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’ – where she stated
that: ‘We developed links with a number of countries in the former Warsaw Pact – once we were satisfied that democracy had taken hold and espionage against us had ceased. Together with our sister service SIS, we provided advice and support for the reorganised and reoriented security services, particularly to help them establish a democratic framework for their work. We also began to exchange information on areas where there were shared concerns – crucially in countering terrorism…’
162 ‘Trust’ has an expansive definition, being deployable as a noun or a verb, engendering a broad
meaning - see, for example, R. Allen (ed.), The Penguin English Dictionary (London: Penguin, 2002), p.960. ‘Trust’ is also highly ‘subjective’, relying heavily on the interpretation of those parties involved in the relationship. ‘Trust’ is in turn generated by the presence of the existence of specific ‘objective’ criteria or ‘conditions’ essentially addressing security and counter-intelligence anxieties – for example, as laid out in a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) and/or a logically named ‘security agreement’ - and their agreed observation by all parties involved during a particular set of circumstances or activities – such as intelligence sharing. ‘Trust’ can instantly be broken, while it takes a longer time period to become gradually established, as the assessment of the degree of ‘risk’ involved through interactions with the other party or parties has to be more clearly tested and ascertained over time. Meanwhile, in the world of business, that also has relevance to the intelligence world: ‘Trust has been defined as the willingness to become vulnerable to the actions of another party... In general, when individuals and organizations have trust in their partners, they become willing to engage in
collaborative action with them despite the presence of risk that is contingent on the other party’s less than fully controllable behaviour. The need for risk-taking and trust are central to all business activities.’ - A.K. Gupta and M. Becerra, ‘Impact of Strategic Context and Inter-Unit Trust on Knowledge Flows within the Multinational Corporation’ chapter 2 in B. McKern (ed.), Managing the Global Network Corporation (London: Routledge, 2003), p.25; see also M. Lubell, ‘Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain’, The Journal of Politics, 69, 1 (February 2007), pp.237– 250; see also see also C. Black, ‘The importance of independence: Trust is crucial in intelligence work - and trust is what the intelligence services have forfeited as a result of the Iraq fiasco’, commentisfree, The Guardian (16 November 2006) - via URL:
<http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/crispin_black/2006/11/post_642.html> (accessed: 06/02/2007); see also ‘Conceptualising Trust’ in I. Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, 4 (December 2006), p.424; for more on the issue of trust, see also, for example, A. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 2005); see also US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing (October 2007), p.10 - where it refers to the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Among other things, the law called for the creation of the ISE [Information Sharing Environment] to enable trusted partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in
order to more effectively detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States.’
163 The term ‘jointery’ is used to describe the joining up of the three UK military services – the army,
air force, and navy – in response to the trend that ‘military power has been increasingly recognised as a unity…’ - see M. Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.51.
164 See, for example, Sqn Ldr S. Gardner, ‘Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Coalition Operations’,
Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 36 (2006), p.30 – particularly where she notes: ‘… the sharing of information is at the centre of the relationship of trust that is needed in a coalition…’
165 M. Herman, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in L. Scott and P.D. Jackson
(eds), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows (London: Routledge, 2004), p.187; see also, for example, under heading ‘Sharing Information with Foreign Partners’ in US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, pp.25-26 - where it states:
‘The strategic objectives for sharing information with foreign partners can be broadly summarized as follows:
• Expanding and facilitating the appropriate and timely sharing of terrorism-related information between the United States and our foreign partners;
• Ensuring that exchanges of information between the United States and foreign governments are accompanied by proper and carefully calibrated security requirements; • Ensuring that information received by Federal agencies from a foreign government
under a sharing arrangement: (1) is provided to appropriate subject matter experts for interpretation, evaluation, and analysis; and (2) can be disseminated and used to advance our Nation’s counterterrorism objectives;
• Refining and drawing upon sets of best practices and common standards in negotiating sharing arrangements with foreign governments; and
• Developing standards and practices to verify that sharing arrangements with foreign governments appropriately consider and protect the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans.’ (p.26).
166 Quoted from opening paragraphs of D. Carment and M. Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence:
New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2006); see also ibid., p.1 - where they state: ‘PKI is fundamental because, for the past five decades, peacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations have represented the predominant international deployment of most armed forces.’; see also the Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, ‘Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI)’ website via URL:
<http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/> (accessed: 05/01/2007); see also A.M. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Linkages between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Intelligence’, Journal of Security Sector
Management, 1, 1 (March 2003); see also R.D. Steele, ‘Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still in Denial’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20, 1 (2007), p.167 – where he states: ‘Bottom-up collective public intelligence is here to stay, and the new standard, defined by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, is Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain
Information Sharing (M4IS). As I note in on the inside flap of my latest book, “Sharing, not secrecy, is the operative principle.”…’; for another argument concerning the importance of standards, and their maintenance generally in the intelligence and security domain, see the evidence to the ISC from the former DG of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, especially where she noted: ‘[Maintaining standards] is incredibly important because people get access to secrets and responsibility and the capacity to make a
major [mistake] very early on…’ - quoted in ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.8; for the importance of standards and their utility across the US intelligence community, see, for example, ODNI, ‘Common Terrorism Information Sharing Standards (CTISS) Program’, Information Sharing Environment Administrative Memoranda (31 October 2007).
167 J. Swannell (ed.), Oxford Modern English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.508; see
also the definition provided in Mooney and Evans (eds), Globalization, pp.123-4.
168 For more information, see the ISO website at URL: <http://www.iso.org/>.
169 See R.D. Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping & the Future of Intelligence: “The United Nations,
Smart Mobs, & the Seven Tribes”’, chapter 13 in B. De Jong, et al. (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003), p.201, p.208; for an updated version of this chapter, see R.D. Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping and the Future of Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 17, 2 (2004), pp.265-285.
170 For further detail on each of these, see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and
theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National Security (forthcoming, 2009).
171 The literature on globalisation is extensive and rapidly continues to grow. Some useful texts
include: R. Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (London:
Continuum, 2002); J. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002); A. Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives (London: Profile, 2002); D. Held and A. McGrew, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002); A. McGrew, ‘Globalization and global politics’, chapter 1 in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2005 [3ed.]), p.19; J.A. Scholte, Globalization: A critical introduction (London: Palgrave, 2005 [2ed – revised & updated]); see also the texts cited in ‘footnote 10’ in F.B. Adamson, ‘Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security’, International Security, 31, 1 (Summer 2006), p.168.
172 McGrew, ‘Globalization and global politics’, p.24.
173 J.A. Scholte, Globalization – a critical introduction (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.46 – quoted in
‘Box 1.2’ in ibid.
174 See also D. Held and A. McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007 [2ed.]).
175 Naturally, these ‘benchmarks’ are not too dissimilar to those found in mainstream foreign policy
analysis studies, see, for example, how Hill has structured his The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.
176 For more on ‘intelligence culture’ see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and
Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004); see also ‘C. People and Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO Advanced Research Workshop – Report’, The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence, St Antony’s College, Oxford (09-10 December 2005), p.3.