exchange, information access, and so forth.
140 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Operation Planning’, Joint Publication 5-0 (26 December 2006),
p.II-7; see also ibid., p.II-8 - where it notes: ‘Continual liaison and sharing of information… will be instrumental in accomplishing US national objectives.’ The Japanese have also recognised the
significance of international intelligence liaison – see, for example, R. Karniol, ‘Japan to set up liaison office in Washington’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (04 October 2006): ‘This will mark Tokyo’s first overseas intelligence presence in the modern era…’; see also ‘Japan launches new spy satellite: Japan has launched a rocket carrying its third spy satellite, increasing its ability to monitor North Korea’, BBC News Online (11 September 2006).
141 See, for example, ‘Transcript: CNN LIVE EVENT/SPECIAL: Hayden Hearing’, CNN.com (18 May
2006) - via URL: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/18/se.01.html> (accessed: 28/05/2007) - particularly where General M. Hayden remarked: ‘To begin, I'd focus significant attention, under the direction of Ambassador Negroponte, the DNI, on the handling of intelligence relationships with foreign partners. As this committee well knows, these relationships are of the utmost importance for our security, especially in the context of the fight against those terrorists who seek to do us harm. These sensitive relationships have to be handled with great care and attention, and I would, if confirmed, regard this responsibility as a top priority. International terrorism cannot be defeated without international cooperation. … For the same reason I'd push for greater information sharing within the United States, among the intelligence community and with other federal, state, local and tribal entities. There are a lot of players out there on this one: the DNI, the program manager for the information sharing environment, the intel community's chief information officer, other agencies like FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. The CIA has an important role to play in ensuring that intelligence information is shared with those who need it. When I was at NSA, I focused my efforts to make sure that all of our customers had the information they needed to make good decisions. In fact, my mantra when I was at Fort Meade was that users should have access to information at the earliest possible moment and in the rawest possible form where value from its sharing could actually be obtained. That's exactly the approach I would use if confirmed at CIA. In my view, both of these initiatives, working with foreign partners and information sharing within the U.S., require that we change our paradigm from one that operates on what I've called a transactional basis of exchange -- they ask; we provide -- in favor of a premise of common knowledge commonly shared, or information access. That would entail opening up more data and more databases to other intel community agencies as well as trusted foreign partners, restricting the use of what I think is an overused originator-
controlled caveat, and fundamentally embracing more of a risk management approach to the sharing of information…’; see also A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Cooperative intelligence’, IISS Strategic Comments, 12, 4 (May 2006); C. Jones, ‘Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 3 (June 2007), pp.384-401.
142 The post that replaced the ‘Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator’ role in the Cabinet Office, in the
wake of the recommendations made by the 2004 Butler Review. The Permanent Secretary
charge of the UK’s Central Intelligence Machinery. Although, by the end of 2007, with the retirement of Sir Richard Mottram from that post, the separation of these two roles has again been undertaken - for further background on these changes, see ‘Security Structures in the Cabinet Office’, CAB/067-07 (25 July 2007) - via URL:
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2007/070725_security.aspx> (accessed: 05/11/2007); for more on the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience role, see, for example, ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.22.
143 Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [c-8]; see also D.I. McKeeby,
‘International Intelligence Exchange Top Priority, Says Hayden’, The Washington File/USINFO (18 May 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror668.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also G. Tenet (with B. Harlow), At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York:
HarperCollins, 2007), p.34 – particularly where he noted: ‘Another big part of the DCI’s [Director of Central Intelligence] role was to maintain contact with the heads of foreign intelligence services. I met with visiting senior security officials from just about every country imaginable. Most countries had multiple intelligence services, and so I would need to be in touch with various sets of people from the same country… [including] the British MI-5 and MI-6…’
144 See below [8.0] for a breakdown of the intelligence liaison phenomenon into its eight components,
of which types and forms, and functions are two.
145 Quoted in Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.322; see also Sir David Omand: ‘…there is no way that you
can have effective secret agencies if you allow their sources and methods to become publicly
known…’, quoted from Presenter: (Professor) Peter Hennessy, ‘Analysis: Secrets and Mysteries’, BBC Radio 4 Current Affairs (Broadcast date: 19/04/2007); see also the essays in P. Hennessy (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism (London: Continuum, 2007); for an example of similar political equality and accountability conundrums faced in other areas of politics, see H. Agné, ‘A Dogma of Democratic Theory and Globalization: Why Politics Need not Include
Everyone it Affects’, European Journal of International Relations, 12, 3 (2006), pp.433-458.
146 For ‘intelligence power’, see former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman’s book
Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
147 For increased US dependence on intelligence liaison, see, for instance, ‘Secretary Rice Interview
with James Rosen of Fox News Channel’, States News Service [information released by the US Department of State] (10 July 2005) - particularly where it is noted: ‘QUESTION: How extensive has North Korea's provision of nuclear technology to Iran been? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can’t really answer that with any precision. I think it’s well known that we have concerns about North Korea’s provision of certainly missile technology broadly across the world, and worries about what else may be transferred. But this is the reason that we need to enhance our intelligence cooperation with others, that we do need to rely on the Proliferation Security Initiative, and that it has been useful to have the A.Q. Khan network wrapped up…’ (Emphasis added).
148 See, for example, D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript (20
149 For more on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, and the importance of ‘soft’ power, see R.O. Keohane and J.S.
Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 5
(September/October 1998); J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, 119, 2 (2004); and J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, 83, 3 (May 2004); J.S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (NY:
PublicAffairs, 2004); see also the definition ‘Hard/Soft Power’ in A. Mooney and B. Evans (eds), Globalization: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge/Key Guides, 2007), p.120. On ‘hard power’, see M. O’Hanlon and K.M. Campbell, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (NY: Basic Books, 2006).
150 For further detail, see the case studies in Chapter 5 below.
151 See Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17; see also Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of
international intelligence cooperation’.
152 See also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.468 – especially where he notes: ‘Nowhere is “trust,
but verify” as important as in intelligence-sharing relationships.’
153 Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, p.23.
154 See the ‘recommendation’ made in the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States of America, 9/11 Commission Report (22/07/2004), p.415 – PDF via URL:
<http://www.9-11commission.gov/> (accessed: 09/2005); for intelligence gathering efforts see, for example, K. O’Brien and J. Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence gathering on asymmetric threats – PART ONE’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 October 2000) and ‘Intelligence collection for asymmetric threats – PART TWO’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 November 2000), particularly the sub-sections titled ‘Co- operative intelligence’ and ‘A joint effort’; see also under the heading ‘Counter-HUMINT’ in
Counterintelligence Capabilities (c. 1 March 1978) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP83M00171R000200070003-6 (2005/03/30) – especially where it notes: ‘Foreign liaison – exploitation of friendly services to support our operations.’
155 ‘Blowback’ can be readily defined:
The word ‘blowback’ originally stems from poison gas warfare, covering the times when, for example, there was a sudden unforeseen change in the uncontrollable wind direction that would blow back the poison gas onto the side that had deployed the gas in the first place. Had the decision-makers foreseen the fuller scope, extent and (at least in some cases) enduring nature of the negative consequences, and had a better understanding of, or had taken into account more fully, the action’s highly complex operating context and its controllable and uncontrollable parameters, all these factors might have helped change their mind as to whether or not to pursue or continue pursuing the action.
‘Blowback’ includes the unforeseen, certainly unintended, even opposite to what was intended, negative consequences – at times stemming from earlier actions carried out in a context where detrimentally the operational parameters were little understood or acknowledged - and their return and ‘dividend’, and the negative repercussions and fallout from all these shortcomings and ‘mistakes’, that can now be seen to be being revisited upon those who initiated the action in the first place.
‘Blowback’ is additionally seen as cumulative over time, and in the intelligence liaison context can include episodes of ‘group-think’, when it can be argued that sharing is sometimes detrimentally too complete and unquestioning goes too far. ‘Blowback’ also includes episodes when intelligence from ‘A’ saying ‘x’ is shared with ‘B’, who then shares it with ‘C’, who then in turn shares it back with ‘A’. If ‘A’ is not fully aware of the origin and path of the intelligence saying ‘x’ obtained from ‘C’, ‘A’ might mistakenly think that it
has another collaborating source confirming ‘x’. ‘Blowback’ is most closely associated with the ‘covert action’ element of intelligence generally and the ‘covert action’ characteristic of intelligence liaison.
For more on ‘blowback’ (especially in a foreign policy context), see C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2002); also for the ‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; for more on the importance of knowing history in the intelligence context, see C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking forward’, History & Policy (June 2004); R. Popplewell, ‘“Lacking Intelligence”: Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-Insurgency, 1900-1960’, Intelligence and National Security, 10, 4 (October 1995), pp.336-52.
156 The term ‘groupthink’ dates from 1972 and is attributed to the psychologist Irving Janis. ‘The
“group think” theory of error defines a form of decision making characterised by uncritical acceptance of a prevailing point of view. Contradictory evidence is often discarded and the group’s policies are rationalised collectively…’ – see I. Davis and A. Persbo, ‘After the Butler Report: Time to take on the Group Think in Washington and London’, BASIC Papers: Occasional Papers on International Security Policy, 46 (July 2004) – via URL: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP46.htm> (accessed: 07/04/2006); see also C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), pp.115-116.
157 For more on ‘mirror-imaging’, see, for instance, under sub-heading ‘Averting Strategic Surprise
through Alternative Analysis’ in J. Davis, Sherman Kent Center, ‘Improving CIA Analytic
Performance: Strategic Warning’, Occasional Papers, 1, 1 (The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, September 2002), particularly where the article notes: ‘One of the main cognitive traps analysts must overcome is mirror-imaging—estimating the risk-benefit calculations of a foreign government or non-state group based on what would make sense in a US or Western Europe context…’ - via URL: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/strategic_warning_kent.htm> (accessed:
02/03/2007); see also as characterised by former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal in his Intelligence, p.8.
158 See, for example, the concerns raised in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Electronic Warfare’, Joint
Publication 3-13.1 (25 January 2007), p.V-2 - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/> (accessed: 14/06/2007).
159 On ‘intelligence failure’, see, for example, ‘Think Point 14.1: Intelligence failure or policy failure?’
in Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, p.256 – especially where he notes: ‘The phrase “intelligence failure” is widely used but minimally understood. One of the frustrating facts of life faced by intelligence agencies in any country is that they are, in one sense, always in a “lose-lose” situation. The phrase “policy failure” is seldom heard, while the phrase “intelligence failure” is heard with increasing frequency…’; see also ‘What does it all mean? Intelligence analysis and production’, chapter 3 in Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.41-73; see also ‘Analysis’, chapter 6 in