The guarantee of equal protection is no argument for absolute equality, for what it only assures is legal equality. It would hardly be fair nor just that people who are not equally circumstanced be given the same treatment, otherwise, it would be as offensive to the notion as the very idea of unequal treatment among equals. Inherent therefore in the application of the Equal Protection Clause is the need for valid classifications so as to determine who or what could properly be grouped together for particular treatment, and excluding all others. As the Court intoned in Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 490 SCRA 318 (2006), “[t]o begin with, classification by itself is not prohibited,” and then went on to state that “[n]ot all motorized vehicles are created equal.” In this regard, the classification must be related to the very purpose of the law and that there should be substantial distinctions which make for real differences. Gender may be relevant in regard to certain classifications but not in others.
Age, legitimacy, academic performance, courses of study, office and status, and other bases for classification may make for some valid differences at times, but not so under other situations and climes, and so on. And, what may be constitutional when seen from one perspective may not be so from another vantage point.72
As for you taking the Bar exams, consider yourself not just anyone. While you are like your fellow examinees, you are still different from everyone else. And if you’re good enough, you may even end up as a class by yourself.73
1. Pimentel III v. Commission on Elections En Banc Sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, 548 SCRA 169 (2008)
Would there be violation of the equal protection clause if a candidate is not allowed to question the election officials involved in the canvass proceedings in one province even as he is allowed to do so for other provinces or districts? The Court said no. The point of reference should be whether other candidates are allowed to do so while he is not, such that he may validly complain of others being given undue favor, while he is the only one unjustly discriminated against.
2. Santos v. People, 563 SCRA 341 (2008)
If a tax evasion charge against one show business personality is dismissed, should a similar charge against another similar personality be dismissed, too? Of course, not!
See Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004)
72
See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)
73
Recoletos Law Center Bar Review 2012
R B G
A Library Of Liberties vis-à-vis An Arsenal Of Arms
“The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.” Here, the Court said that the petitioner was not able to duly establish to the satisfaction of this Court that she and Velasquez were indeed similarly situated, i.e., that they committed identical acts for which they were charged with the violation of the same provisions of the NIRC, and that they presented similar arguments and evidence in their defense, yet they were treated differently.
“Furthermore, that the Prosecution Attorney dismissed what were supposedly similar charges against Velasquez did not compel Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas to rule the same way on the charges against petitioner. In People v. Dela Piedra, this Court explained that: ‘The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.’” In fine, “While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society * * *. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.”74
3. Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438 (2009)
If foreign troops charged with the commission of crimes in the country are treated differently from other persons similarly charged, is there violation of the equal protection clause? Here, the petitioners argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused foreign soldier to the custody of a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused.
The Court said there is no violation of the equal protection clause “because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.”
4. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009)
At issue here is the constitutionality of the last clause of the 5 paragraph of §10 R.A. No. 8042th (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 199). The 5 paragraph provides: “In case ofth
Earlier, in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 560 SCRA 518 (2008), the Court held: “While the right to equal protection of the
74
law requires that litigants are treated in an equal manner by giving them the same rights under similar circumstances, it may not be perversely used to justify desistance by the authorities from prosecution of a criminal case, just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.”
Recoletos Law Center Bar Review 2012
R B G
A Library Of Liberties vis-à-vis An Arsenal Of Arms
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.” Does this violate the guarantee of equal protection among OFWs? Yes.
The Court noted that “[t]he enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.” The Court further observed that “the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.”
From there, the Court went on to hold: “The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.” So, is there any compelling state interest? “Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.”
Then, on the use of the standards of review, the Court noted: “Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications based on race or gender but not when the classification is drawn along income categories. It is different in the Philippine setting. . . . ‘Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. . . . ‘But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law
Recoletos Law Center Bar Review 2012
R B G
A Library Of Liberties vis-à-vis An Arsenal Of Arms repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines.’”75
5. League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections, 571 SCRA 263 (2008), 608 SCRA 636 (2009), 628 SCRA 819 (2010), 643 SCRA 149 (2011), 648 SCRA 344 (2011), and 652 SCRA 798 (2011)
When the 11 Congress adjourned in June 2001, there were on deck bills to convert 24th 76 municipalities into cities but which were never enacted into law. In the meantime, R.A. 9009 became law, effective on 30 June 2001.This law amended the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of municipalities to cities from P=20 Million to P=100 Million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 Congress adopted Joint Resolutionth No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P=100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 Congress. However, the 12th th77 Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13 Congress, theth 78 House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. The 16 municipalities then filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills, which bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P=100 million income requirement in RA 9009. Both Houses of Congress approved the cityhood bills, which bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. In questioning the validity of their enactment, one of the issues raised is about alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
In the original decision, the Court said the Equal Protection Clause was violated. An exemption based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11 Congressth when RA 9009 was enacted does not constitute a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P=100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhoodth bill in the 11 Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for theth purpose of the income requirement. The classification criterion – mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress – is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscallyth non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Further, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009,th which specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. The exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date – the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 Congress – as against all other municipalities that want to convert into citiesth
Congress seems to have wittingly or unwittingly defied the Supreme Court in enacting R.A. No. 10222 (approved on 8 March
75
2010). Section 7 of the new law, amended §10, ¶5 of R.A. 8042, by writing the same language invalidated in Serrano, viz:
“In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
June 1998 to June 2001.
76
June 2001 to June 2004.
77
June 2004 to June 2007.
78
Recoletos Law Center Bar Review 2012
R B G
A Library Of Liberties vis-à-vis An Arsenal Of Arms
after the effectivity of RA 9009. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Subsequently, the following year, when the Court reconsidered its earlier ruling (which had already become final and and entry of judgment made) the following year, it held, among others, on equal79 protection issue, that this particular constitutional protection extends likewise to natural or artificial persons, but with regard to artificial persons are concerned, they are entitled to protection only in so far as their property is concerned. Accordingly, the petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. “The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.”
On the requisites for valid classification, the Court found that all of them were met. The favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
“Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference.” They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009 but because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Thus, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. The peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification. “A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.”
The Court also found the classification to be germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of
Here, it is interesting how the Court arrived at its basis for lifting the entry of judgment, an excellent lesson in imaginative and
79
creative legal reasoning. It said, inter alia:
“The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that
“the basic issues had already been passed upon” betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be
“the basic issues had already been passed upon” betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be