LA ESPIRAL DE LA GOBERNANZA ECONÓMICA
3. RACIONALIDAD ECONÓMICA Y CONTINUIDAD INSTITUCIO- INSTITUCIO-NAL
Se ee ei in ng g t th he e F Fu ut tu ur r e e i in n t th he e P Pr re e s se en nt t P P a as st t
Siobhan Lyons
Siobhan Lyons perceives the flow of history in perceives the flow of history in terms of organic growth and terms of organic growth and decay decay..
longer take solace in the illusion of immortality that these parks longer take solace in the illusion of immortality that these parks strive to promote when operative. But more than our strive to promote when operative. But more than our engage-ment with our own mortality, again, these ruin
ment with our own mortality, again, these ruins disrupt our stan-s disrupt our stan-dard conventions of time and history. They work
dard conventions of time and history. They work to dislocateto dislocate the relationship between the past and the present, the relationship between the past and the present, incorporat-ing both the past and the future, the dead past existincorporat-ing ing both the past and the future, the dead past existing simulta-neously alongside living architecture. While
neously alongside living architecture. While authors, artists,authors, artists, directors and poets have always attempted to depict the aesthetic directors and poets have always attempted to depict the aesthetic nature of the
nature of the future and the possibilities of apocalypse, modernfuture and the possibilities of apocalypse, modern ruins show that we may already be there. As artist Tong ruins show that we may already be there. As artist Tong LamLam beautifully but simply notes, “In a way, we are already beautifully but simply notes, “In a way, we are already post-apoc-alyptic.” (
alyptic.” ( Abandoned Fut Abandoned Futures ures , 2013). , 2013). Indeed, wIndeed, when we tahen we talk of lk of social destruction, we almost always do so
social destruction, we almost always do so hypothetically, situ-hypothetically, situ-ating the end within the future rather than in the present time;
ating the end within the future rather than in the present time;
but as environmentalist David Suzuki put it in a 2007 interview:
but as environmentalist David Suzuki put it in a 2007 interview:
“The future doesn’t exist. The only thing that exists is now and
“The future doesn’t exist. The only thing that exists is now and our memory of what happened in the past. But because we our memory of what happened in the past. But because we invented the idea of a future, we’re the only animal that realized invented the idea of a future, we’re the only animal that realized we can affect the f
we can affect the future by what we do today.uture by what we do today.” (Canada.com)” (Canada.com)..
Progressing the Idea of Progress Progressing the Idea of Progress If we as a
If we as a global civilisation are already in the midst of our ownglobal civilisation are already in the midst of our own ruin, what does this tell
ruin, what does this tell us about progress? For one, that progressus about progress? For one, that progress is not, as is widely believed, irretrievably linked to the future, is not, as is widely believed, irretrievably linked to the future, or to newness.
or to newness.
According
According to to ‘technological ‘technological determinists’determinists’, , not not only only does does tech- tech-nology supposedly drive history, but what’s new is better than nology supposedly drive history, but what’s new is better than preceding technologies, thus linking newness to progress. By preceding technologies, thus linking newness to progress. By this logic, digital downloads are superior to vinyl
this logic, digital downloads are superior to vinyl records; wordrecords; word processors are better than typewriters; and digital cameras are processors are better than typewriters; and digital cameras are better than film-based analogue ones. Yet although an object better than film-based analogue ones. Yet although an object may be
may be technically technicallyimproved, this is not necessarily an improve-improved, this is not necessarily an improve-ment in terms of its
ment in terms of its creative capabilities creative capabilities . In fact, the more tech-. In fact, the more tech-nologically improved the gadget, the less
nologically improved the gadget, the less effort required on oureffort required on our part to create art, meaning human creativity is often actually part to create art, meaning human creativity is often actually compromised. So what we are seeing is rather newness compromised. So what we are seeing is rather newness mas-querading as progress. Yet typewriter usage – alongside that of querading as progress. Yet typewriter usage – alongside that of vinyl
vinyl and aand analognalogue phue photogrotography aphy – is – is on thon the rie rise, wse, while hile somesome people and organisations never relinquished them, defying the people and organisations never relinquished them, defying the logic of technological progress. While the image of a hipster logic of technological progress. While the image of a hipster sitting with a typewriter in Starbucks might appear sitting with a typewriter in Starbucks might appear
chronolog-ically inaccurate, the fact that many
ically inaccurate, the fact that many people continue to use type-people continue to use type- writer
writers s does does not, not, I I beliebelieve, ve, signal signal a a regreregression, ssion, but but in in fact fact reframes the argument to favour the
reframes the argument to favour the notion ofnotion of intellectual intellectual ratherrather than technological progress, showing that technology and than technological progress, showing that technology and intel-ligence are not one and the same. Yet the
ligence are not one and the same. Yet the general narrative about general narrative about the continued use of
the continued use of typewriters and other supposedly ‘anachro-typewriters and other supposedly ‘anachro-nistic’ technologies is that this is backward, outdated, and nistic’ technologies is that this is backward, outdated, and strange, just like our obsession with
strange, just like our obsession with ruins. But for a number of ruins. But for a number of authors, a typewriter is actually superior to
authors, a typewriter is actually superior to digital technologies.digital technologies.
British author Will Self, for instance, says that the
British author Will Self, for instance, says that the typewritertypewriter forces his mind to slow down and to process thought more forces his mind to slow down and to process thought more effi-ciently, rather than having his thoughts scattered by the PC.
ciently, rather than having his thoughts scattered by the PC. AsAs journalist N
journalist Neil Hallows weil Hallows writes, “thrites, “the computer use computer user does theier does theirr thinking on the screen, and the
thinking on the screen, and the non-computer user is compelled,non-computer user is compelled, because he or she has to retype a whole text, to do a lot more because he or she has to retype a whole text, to do a lot more thinking in the head” (‘Why Typewriters Beat Computers’, thinking in the head” (‘Why Typewriters Beat Computers’, 2008). Such thoughts give credence
2008). Such thoughts give credence to William Faulkner’s ideato William Faulkner’s idea that “the past is not dead; it’s not even
that “the past is not dead; it’s not even past.” Certain memora-past.” Certain memora-bilia can have a present function, defying the logic of linking bilia can have a present function, defying the logic of linking objects to a certain time and place and
objects to a certain time and place and discarding them with thediscarding them with the momentum of history.
momentum of history.
The Organic Nature of History The Organic Nature of History
For many, history follows a linear development: there is to all For many, history follows a linear development: there is to all things a beginning, middle, and end, and we can differentiate things a beginning, middle, and end, and we can differentiate between each period.The plethora of ruins and the widespread between each period.The plethora of ruins and the widespread use of old technology paints a picture of society not use of old technology paints a picture of society not retreat-ing into an antiquated era, but rather, proceedretreat-ing nonlinearly.
ing into an antiquated era, but rather, proceeding nonlinearly.
They show us that progress is not str
They show us that progress is not str aightforward, and can beaightforward, and can be seen less as historical, and more as intellectual.
seen less as historical, and more as intellectual.
Instead of a linear pattern of history, what we
Instead of a linear pattern of history, what we actually see isactually see is that it has what French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-95) calls that it has what French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-95) calls aa rhizomaticrhizomatic (rootlike) structure. With typewriters and decay exist-(rootlike) structure. With typewriters and decay exist-ing alongside digitisation and growth, our understandexist-ing of ing alongside digitisation and growth, our understanding of progress becomes more about intellectual linearity, so that progress becomes more about intellectual linearity, so that ourour ideas define and shape progress, rather than technologies and ideas define and shape progress, rather than technologies and events in sequential time. That is, while we can’t conclusively say events in sequential time. That is, while we can’t conclusively say what
what histhistory ory is, is, we cwe can an at at leasleast st say ay what what histhistory ory is is not: not: that that it it is is not not technological, and not straightforwardly chronological. Or if we technological, and not straightforwardly chronological. Or if we talk about chronology, we need to do so through the lens of talk about chronology, we need to do so through the lens of intel-lectual history rather than the history of objects.
lectual history rather than the history of objects.
December 2017/January 2018
December 2017/January 2018PhilosophyPhilosophyNowNow 3535 Abandoned Dadipark ride
Abandoned Dadipark ride
A A B B A A N N D D O O N N E E D R D R I I D D E © E © P P . . J J . . L L . . L L A A U U R R E E N N S 2 S 2 0 0 0 0 9 9
But as Gertrude Stein points out, if history (not the But as Gertrude Stein points out, if history (not the chrono-logical phenomenon, but our knowledge of that phenomenon) logical phenomenon, but our knowledge of that phenomenon) teaches us anything, it
teaches us anything, it is that, paradoxically, repetition is almost ais that, paradoxically, repetition is almost a necessary aspect of cultural evolution. Of course, this makes it necessary aspect of cultural evolution. Of course, this makes it dif-ficult to tell whether our own woes and complaints about the time ficult to tell whether our own woes and complaints about the timess differ in any meaningful way from those of earlier g
differ in any meaningful way from those of earlier g enerations:enerations:
whether t
whether there is here is more trumore truth to th to our owour own fears n fears for thfor the future future thane than to theirs – especially when we
to theirs – especially when we consider the similarities of discon-consider the similarities of discon-tent across centuries. Perhaps the only constant in the history of tent across centuries. Perhaps the only constant in the history of life is disillusionment with change. As Pyotr Voyd, the central life is disillusionment with change. As Pyotr Voyd, the central
character of Victor Pelevin’s novel
character of Victor Pelevin’s novel Buddha’s Little Finger Buddha’s Little Finger (1999)(1999) says, “we are
says, “we are descendants descendants of the past. The word signifies movement of the past. The word signifies movement downwards, not upwards. We are not
downwards, not upwards. We are not ascendants ascendants ” (1999, p.34).” (1999, p.34).
This s
This seems to eems to be a be a manner manner in whicin which we ch we constanonstantly frtly frame hisame his--tory. For instance, we constantly ask of our society: are
tory. For instance, we constantly ask of our society: are we get-we get-ting stupider? Worried researchers tells us so; but then Socrates ting stupider? Worried researchers tells us so; but then Socrates is said by Plato to have stated 2,400
is said by Plato to have stated 2,400 years ago: “Our youth now years ago: “Our youth now love luxury. They have bad manners, contempt for authority;
love luxury. They have bad manners, contempt for authority;
they show disrespect for their elders and love chatter in place of they show disrespect for their elders and love chatter in place of exercise; they no longer rise when elders enter the room; they exercise; they no longer rise when elders enter the room; they contradict their parents, chatter before company; gobble up contradict their parents, chatter before company; gobble up theirtheir food, and tyrannize their teachers.” We have more or less the food, and tyrannize their teachers.” We have more or less the same concern in the twenty-first century about the younger same concern in the twenty-first century about the younger gen-erations and their poor grammar, flagrant antisocial behaviour, erations and their poor grammar, flagrant antisocial behaviour, and obsessive use of technology. We are also told to prepare for and obsessive use of technology. We are also told to prepare for the book’s demise at the hands of the internet;
the book’s demise at the hands of the internet; but then, Victorbut then, Victor Hugo expressed the same fears for the demise of architecture at Hugo expressed the same fears for the demise of architecture at the hands of the book; while Samuel Taylor Coleridge criticised the hands of the book; while Samuel Taylor Coleridge criticised the novel for impairing memory. As Jill Lepore puts it, “Every the novel for impairing memory. As Jill Lepore puts it, “Every age has a theory of rising and falling, of growth and decay, of age has a theory of rising and falling, of growth and decay, of bloom and wilt: a theory of nature.” (‘The Disruption Machine’, bloom and wilt: a theory of nature.” (‘The Disruption Machine’, The New Yorker
The New Yorker , June 2014)., June 2014).
So is there any particular importance to our own cultural So is there any particular importance to our own cultural anxieties, or are they merely part of an inevitably repeating anxieties, or are they merely part of an inevitably repeating pat-tern? Is it simply that our own fears have been more easily voiced tern? Is it simply that our own fears have been more easily voiced and disseminated via more efficient technologies? Is there any and disseminated via more efficient technologies? Is there any truth to our discontent that separates us from earlier centuries truth to our discontent that separates us from earlier centuries – thereby legitimising our fears – or is it
– thereby legitimising our fears – or is it simply part of one con-simply part of one con-sistent, shared concern that is part of the same evolutionary sistent, shared concern that is part of the same evolutionary matrix, in which history is not a thing divided but a matrix, in which history is not a thing divided but a continu-ous, uninterrupted stream of sameness – in which a distinction ous, uninterrupted stream of sameness – in which a distinction between time periods is all
between time periods is all but illusory?but illusory?
Historical Deleuzion Historical Deleuzion Gilles Deleuze is a particularly useful
Gilles Deleuze is a particularly useful philosopher to employ philosopher to employ here. Deleuze discusses a phenomenon he calls ‘difference here. Deleuze discusses a phenomenon he calls ‘difference within
within repetrepetition’ition’. . For For DeleuDeleuze, ze, “life “life itselitself f is is descridescribed bed as as aa dynamic and active force of repetition producing difference”
dynamic and active force of repetition producing difference”
(Adrian Parr,
(Adrian Parr, Deleuze DictionaryDeleuze Dictionary, 2010, p.225), and in repetition, 2010, p.225), and in repetition there is the ‘possibility of reinvention’, for
there is the ‘possibility of reinvention’, for although we repeat,although we repeat, we do not
we do not uniformlyuniformly repeat. Thus within a cycle of repeat. Thus within a cycle of occurrencesoccurrences we can
we can see subtle see subtle deviations deviations emerging in emerging in a pattern a pattern perhaps miperhaps mis- s-taken as pure monotony. For instance, we still show all our fears taken as pure monotony. For instance, we still show all our fears regarding the state of our intellects – but in slightly different regarding the state of our intellects – but in slightly different ways as o
ways as our concerns ur concerns move from onmove from one technology to e technology to another.another.
Hence we should not worry that many are returning to Hence we should not worry that many are returning to type- writers in lie
writers in lieu of their supposedlu of their supposedl y more sophisticay more sophisticated alterna-ted alterna-tives, because this demonstrates a rebellion against the rigid tives, because this demonstrates a rebellion against the rigid order of time; that is, with the expectations of behaviour and order of time; that is, with the expectations of behaviour and actions supposedly befitting one’s time. Perhaps we should laud actions supposedly befitting one’s time. Perhaps we should laud those who retreat into such ‘anachronistic’ technologies, and those who retreat into such ‘anachronistic’ technologies, and ridicule those who unthinkingly pursue novelty. As Friedrich ridicule those who unthinkingly pursue novelty. As Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out, the philosopher needs to be out of phase Nietzsche pointed out, the philosopher needs to be out of phase and at odds with their own time, and should ideally be “a
and at odds with their own time, and should ideally be “a personperson of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow… his enemy has of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow… his enemy has always been the ideal of today” (
always been the ideal of today” (Beyond Good and Evil Beyond Good and Evil , 1886,, 1886, p.106). For Nietzsche, the philosopher’s task lies in “being the p.106). For Nietzsche, the philosopher’s task lies in “being the bad conscience of their age.” In this sense, the philosopher, the bad conscience of their age.” In this sense, the philosopher, the writer, the
writer, the artist, and artist, and the poet, the poet, are called are called to be to be women and women and menmen outside their time. For Victor Pelevin, there are those who outside their time. For Victor Pelevin, there are those who adapt to change – those who essentially change with the times;
adapt to change – those who essentially change with the times;
adapt to change – those who essentially change with the times;