LA ESPIRAL DE LA GOBERNANZA ECONÓMICA
2. DEL TRATADO DE MAASTRICHT AL TRATADO DE LISBOA: LA PRIMACÍA DEL MERCADO EN LA CONTINUIDAD DE LA
T
he year is 399 BCE. Socrates has just been sentencedhe year is 399 BCE. Socrates has just been sentenced to death by his fellow Athenians for allegedly to death by his fellow Athenians for allegedly cor-rupting the youth of Athens. Sitting in his cell, rupting the youth of Athens. Sitting in his cell, Socrates is asked by his friends to explain why he Socrates is asked by his friends to explain why he remains in prison instead ofremains in prison instead of escaping to exile.escaping to exile.
How should Socrates’ explain it? Should he provide a How should Socrates’ explain it? Should he provide a phys- phys-ical explanation; that is, an account of his
ical explanation; that is, an account of his bodily movements?bodily movements?
Or should he provide a different kind of
Or should he provide a different kind of explanation – one that explanation – one that makes reference not to h
makes reference not to h is physiology, but to his reasons foris physiology, but to his reasons for acting? Let’s have a look at the following passage from Plato’s acting? Let’s have a look at the following passage from Plato’s Phaedo
Phaedo to see Socrates explain the difference between the twoto see Socrates explain the difference between the two kinds of explanation:
kinds of explanation:
“in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, I should say
“in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, I should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can
them and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and be contracted and relaxed and so... makeso... make me able to bend my limbs now, and that
me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sittingis the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent… [But then I] should fail to mention the real here with my legs bent… [But then I] should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to con-demn me, and therefore I have decided that it was best for me demn me, and therefore I have decided that it was best for me to sit to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order.” (98c-e)
they order.” (98c-e)
Or to use another example: Why did Caesar cross the Or to use another example: Why did Caesar cross the Rubi- Rubi-con? Because of his leg movements? Or because he wanted to con? Because of his leg movements? Or because he wanted to assert his authority in Rome over his rivals?
assert his authority in Rome over his rivals?
When
When we we seek seek to to interpret interpret the the actions actions of of Caesar Caesar and and Socrates,Socrates, and ask what reasons they had for acting so, we do not usually and ask what reasons they had for acting so, we do not usually want their actions to be explained as we might explain the rise want their actions to be explained as we might explain the rise of the tides or the motion of the planets; that is, as physical of the tides or the motion of the planets; that is, as physical
Defending
Defending Humanistic Humanistic Reasoning Reasoning
Paul Giladi, Alexis Papazoglou,
Paul Giladi, Alexis Papazoglou, & & Giuseppina D’Oro Giuseppina D’Oro say we need to recognise say we need to recognise that science and the
that science and the humanities are asking and answering different questions. humanities are asking and answering different questions.
Caesar Crossing the Rubicon
Caesar Crossing the Rubiconby Granacci. But why?by Granacci. But why?
beliefs about what is true... Hence, we defer to science” ( beliefs about what is true... Hence, we defer to science” ( Fear Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and
of Knowledge: Against Relativism and ConstructivismConstructivism, 2006). In, 2006). In this view, the task of philosophy is first to assume the this view, the task of philosophy is first to assume the method-ological superiority of natural science, and then to develop ological superiority of natural science, and then to develop posi-tions which do not disagree with or upset certain background tions which do not disagree with or upset certain background assumptions of science. The most important of these assumptions of science. The most important of these back-ground assumptions are
ground assumptions are that: (1) there exists that: (1) there exists a theory-indepen-a theory-indepen-dent, external world; (2) the world
dent, external world; (2) the world investigated by physics is ainvestigated by physics is a knowable world; and (3) the explanations of physics provide knowable world; and (3) the explanations of physics provide complete explanations of reality.
complete explanations of reality.
One reason physicalist forms of scientific naturalism have One reason physicalist forms of scientific naturalism have become so widely accepted is that many philosophers tend to become so widely accepted is that many philosophers tend to find it difficult to make room for complex phenomena such as find it difficult to make room for complex phenomena such as consciousness within the world presented to us by the natural consciousness within the world presented to us by the natural sciences. Because of this, some physicalist philosophers reduce sciences. Because of this, some physicalist philosophers reduce complex psychological phenomena down to their component complex psychological phenomena down to their component material parts – things such neur
material parts – things such neural mechanisms –al mechanisms – or even to theor even to the very co
very componentmponents of s of matter matter itself. itself. They dThey do this o this to easto easily aily accom- ccom-modate complex phenomena within the natural world. To quote modate complex phenomena within the natural world. To quote Thomas Na
Thomas Nagel, wigel, with the th the reductive reductive physicalistphysicalists, “thers, “there is the is thee hope that everything can be accounted for at the most basic hope that everything can be accounted for at the most basic level by the physical sciences, extended to include biology”
level by the physical sciences, extended to include biology”
(( Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materi Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwiniaalist Neo-Darwinian Concep-n Concep-tion Is Almost Certainly False
tion Is Almost Certainly False, 2012)., 2012).
However, more recently, philosophers such as John However, more recently, philosophers such as John McDow-ell, Jennifer Hornsby, Hilary Putnam and Nagel himself have ell, Jennifer Hornsby, Hilary Putnam and Nagel himself have taken a different approach: a
taken a different approach: a non-reductivenon-reductive scientific naturalism.scientific naturalism.
These ph
These philosophilosophers arguers argue that e that while thwhile the mind e mind is indis indeed part eed part of of the world presented to us by the natural sciences, the
the world presented to us by the natural sciences, the complexcomplex mental states involved in consciousness cannot be simply scaled mental states involved in consciousness cannot be simply scaled down to physical processes. To quote Nagel
down to physical processes. To quote Nagel again: “There areagain: “There are doubts about whether the reality of features of our world such doubts about whether the reality of features of our world such as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, purpose, thought, and value
value can bcan be acce accommoommodated dated in a in a univeruniverse cose consistnsisting aing at the t the most most basic level only of
basic level only of physical facts – facts, however sophisticated,physical facts – facts, however sophisticated, of the kind revealed by the
of the kind revealed by the physical sciences.” (physical sciences.” (ibid ibid ).).
Because it is a
Because it is a naturalism, and hence limited to natural phe-naturalism, and hence limited to natural phe-nomena, non-reductive naturalism holds that there is nothing nomena, non-reductive naturalism holds that there is nothing
‘occult’ or ‘spooky’ about consciousness, thoughts, and fee
‘occult’ or ‘spooky’ about consciousness, thoughts, and feelings.lings.
However, there are (at least) two main concerns with this However, there are (at least) two main concerns with this approach. Firstly, if these phenomena are regarded as natural just approach. Firstly, if these phenomena are regarded as natural just because they are not supernatural, what should count as natural because they are not supernatural, what should count as natural and supernatural now? Secondly if we deny that such and supernatural now? Secondly if we deny that such phenom-ena as consciousness are exhaustively accounted for by physical ena as consciousness are exhaustively accounted for by physical science, the problem arises of explaining how they relate to the science, the problem arises of explaining how they relate to the rest of nature – the nature that is
rest of nature – the nature that is fully described by that science.fully described by that science.
But wait. There is a way out of this difficulty: we drop the But wait. There is a way out of this difficulty: we drop the question about how mind and the rest of nature relate, and focus question about how mind and the rest of nature relate, and focus instead on the question of what must be assumed for certain instead on the question of what must be assumed for certain forms of knowledge to be possible. Then once we have forms of knowledge to be possible. Then once we have uncov-ered the background assumptions to our forms of knowledge, ered the background assumptions to our forms of knowledge, we can show ho
we can show how different forms w different forms of explanations can of explanations can co-exist.co-exist.
Investigatin
Investigating g Knowledge Itself Knowledge Itself This
This approach approach has has been been pre-shadowpre-shadowed ed by by certain certain historicahistoricall philosophers we three are researching. Explaining the place of philosophers we three are researching. Explaining the place of mind within nature in this way started with the attempts by mind within nature in this way started with the attempts by Wilhelm
Wilhelm Dilthey Dilthey (1833-1911), (1833-1911), Johann GJohann Gustav Dustav Droysen (roysen (1808-
1808-1884), and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) to
1884), and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) to defend thedefend the independence of the human sciences from the natural sciences.
independence of the human sciences from the natural sciences.
This
This approacapproach is h is also also found found in thin the work e work of Bof British ritish idealistidealists sus suchch as R.G.Collingwood (1889-1943) and Michael Oakeshott as R.G.Collingwood (1889-1943) and Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990). They started with the claim that all knowledge (1901-1990). They started with the claim that all knowledge rests on presuppositions
rests on presuppositions, and defined philosophy as the task , and defined philosophy as the task of of uncovering and making explicit the
uncovering and making explicit the assumptioassumptions which governns which govern all forms of inquiry, from which they then hoped to show the all forms of inquiry, from which they then hoped to show the compatibility of different forms of explanation. It is the task of compatibility of different forms of explanation. It is the task of natural scientists to investigate nature. But it is the task of natural scientists to investigate nature. But it is the task of philosophers
philosophers to investigate what we must assume to make the sci-to investigate what we must assume to make the sci-entific investigation of nature possible
entific investigation of nature possible. Philosophers are not inter-. Philosophers are not inter-ested in starting with the results of natural science, but with ested in starting with the results of natural science, but with their presuppositions. To quote Wilhelm Windelband here:
their presuppositions. To quote Wilhelm Windelband here:
“It is permissible for the other sciences to regard... general
“It is permissible for the other sciences to regard... general perspec-tives and principles as given and established. This assumption is tives and principles as given and established. This assumption is sufficiently reliable for the purposes of specialised research within sufficiently reliable for the purposes of specialised research within the discipline in question. The essential feature of philosophy, the discipline in question. The essential feature of philosophy, how-ever, is the following: its real object of investigation is actually these ever, is the following: its real object of investigation is actually these [general perspectives and
[general perspectives and principlesprinciples] ] themselves.”themselves.”
(( History an
History and Natural Sd Natural Sciencecience, p.169, 1894)., p.169, 1894).
Now this is not to say that scientists themselves cannot Now this is not to say that scientists themselves cannot engage in
engage in reflection on the background assumptions of sciencereflection on the background assumptions of science and the concept of nature. But it is to say that when scientists and the concept of nature. But it is to say that when scientists do so,
do so, they are doing philosophythey are doing philosophy, not science. This is because this, not science. This is because this sort of investigation cannot itself be carried out using the sort of investigation cannot itself be carried out using the meth-ods of natural science.
ods of natural science.
Therefore,
Therefore, this apthis approach proach is comis committed to mitted to two tiertwo tiers of s of inves- inves-tigation: a ‘primary tier’ of empirical investigation, which is the tigation: a ‘primary tier’ of empirical investigation, which is the work
work of of scienscientisttists; s; and and a a ‘sec‘secondaondary ry tier’tier’, , looklooking ing into into the the assuassump- mp-tions behind the empirical investigation, which is the work of tions behind the empirical investigation, which is the work of philosophers. In this context,
philosophers. In this context, the philosopher is whoever engages inthe philosopher is whoever engages in reflection on the background assumptions of primary tier enquiries reflection on the background assumptions of primary tier enquiries ..
Under this view, philosophy is a separate discipline whose Under this view, philosophy is a separate discipline whose dis-tinctive subject-matter is the background assumptions of (say) tinctive subject-matter is the background assumptions of (say) natural scientific inquiry. This is an
natural scientific inquiry. This is an epistemological idealist phi-epistemological idealist
phi-December 2017/January 2018
December 2017/January 2018 PhilosophyPhilosophyNowNow 3333 losophy because it recognises that the
losophy because it recognises that the assumptions made by dif-assumptions made by dif-ferent forms of inquiry reflect human interests and cognitive ferent forms of inquiry reflect human interests and cognitive capacities. But this approach’s distinctive idealist tinge aims not capacities. But this approach’s distinctive idealist tinge aims not to compete with natural science in telling us
to compete with natural science in telling us what exists. Rather,what exists. Rather, it aims to spell out what we must assume for certain forms of it aims to spell out what we must assume for certain forms of knowledge to be possible, and to argue that these assumptions knowledge to be possible, and to argue that these assumptions are a reflection of our cognitive interests and capacities. For are a reflection of our cognitive interests and capacities. For example,
example, physical scientists physical scientists are interested in prediction. Such anare interested in prediction. Such an interest is well served by the formulation of inductive interest is well served by the formulation of inductive generali-sations, which rely on the principle that natural laws apply sations, which rely on the principle that natural laws apply uni-formly so that unobserved cases will resemble previously formly so that unobserved cases will resemble previously observed cases.
observed cases. Cultural anthropologists Cultural anthropologists , on the other hand, are, on the other hand, are interested in uncovering the logic
interested in uncovering the logic behind the apparent random-behind the apparent random-ness or irrationality of human societies and
ness or irrationality of human societies and customs. The assump-customs. The assump-tion of the uniformity of nature which serves the physical tion of the uniformity of nature which serves the physical scien-tist so well in predicting the course of impersonal nature will tist so well in predicting the course of impersonal nature will therefore be of no use
therefore be of no use to the cultural anthropologist, whose goalto the cultural anthropologist, whose goal is rather to unlock the hidden logic
is rather to unlock the hidden logic behind actions which they behind actions which they struggle to comprehend in the light of
struggle to comprehend in the light of their own cultural norms.their own cultural norms.
Understanding philosop
Understanding philosophy as hy as being concerned with being concerned with reflect- reflect-ing on and disclosreflect-ing what we must assume for certain forms ing on and disclosing what we must assume for certain forms of knowledge to be possible enables one to defend the of knowledge to be possible enables one to defend the auton-omy of humanistic explanations better than any attempt to omy of humanistic explanations better than any attempt to defend the distinctiveness of the mental from a naturalistic defend the distinctiveness of the mental from a naturalistic standpoint. Why? Because by carefully unpacking the standpoint. Why? Because by carefully unpacking the back-ground assumptions of the different forms
ground assumptions of the different forms of of inquiry we caninquiry we can lay bare the most important difference between the natural lay bare the most important difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences. For
sciences and the human sciences. For example, natural scienceexample, natural science presupposes a uniform universe governed by universal laws;
presupposes a uniform universe governed by universal laws;
on the other hand, a historian does not approach history in on the other hand, a historian does not approach history in
on the other hand, a historian does not approach history in on the other hand, a historian does not approach history in