The drivers of radicalisation of Islamic groups include both internal and external developments. Although the grievances of Boko Haram are largely local, its ma- jor influences have been foreign. The influential scholar that most shaped the thinking of Mohammed Yusuf, as mentioned earlier, was Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah. The basic message of radical Islam, whether in the Middle East, North Africa, or northern Nigeria, is the same: it is the duty of Muslims to revolt against and change apostate rulers and governments in order to help re-establish a proper Is- lamic state. The main differences among radical groups are in the methods and not the ideals.
Internal factors of Islamic radicalisation in Nigeria go back to the onset of co- lonial rule, when Islam became the focal point of opposition to the British take- over of the Sokoto Caliphate. British occupation of the caliphate began with the sacking of Bida in 1897 and was completed with the occupation of Sokoto in 1902. By 1903 all emirates had been conquered, even though there were still pockets of resistance. For the leadership of the caliphate there was the problem of how to respond to this new anomalous situation – by resistance, collaboration, or emigration – while for the British the problem was the difficulty of administering an Islamic society on the basis of a secular and non-Islamic ideology.
On the debate as to whether to collaborate or emigrate, the Gwandu jurist Ah- mad Ibn Sa’id compared the situation in Sokoto to the Qaramanthian invasion of Mecca in 930 CE and the Mongolian invasion of Baghdad in 1258 CE and con- cluded that an interim compromise with the colonial state was possible as long as they did not interfere openly with practice of the faith. Collaboration with the British, he posited, did not amount to unbelief “as long as the resident does not
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“Nigerian Catholic Church ‘Temporarily’ Withdraws Membership of CAN”, 23 January 2013. www. saharareporters.com/news-page/nigerian-catholic-church-‘temporarily’-withdraws-membership-can (Accessed 23 April 2013).
himself become an unbeliever. It is disobedience if done voluntarily, but permis- sible if done under compulsion” (cited by Al-Hajj 1973: 162; See Adeleye: 1968). Thus, for most of the early colonial period a policy of non-cooperation, known as taqiyya (“dissimulation”), became the main pillar of resistance against colonial rule. After 1906, most emirs who had not been removed had grudgingly accepted their subordination.
In spite of the acquiescence of the emirs, the citizenry still remained sceptical of British intentions, and avoidance remained the preferred policy. This partly accounts for the disdain for Western education. The need to domesticate Islam and administer a Muslim society through indigenous institutions rather than by brute force was the most important consideration in the introduction of the colo- nial policy of indirect rule. The disdain for Western education is as old as the imposition of colonial rule, but the resort to violence to overturn it is entirely new.
The birth of the Wahhabi inspired Izala in 1978 under Sheikh Mahmud Abu- bakar Gumi (1922-92) was a major impetus in the radicalisation of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although not anti-establishment, the Izala became critical of traditional rulers, of corruption in government, and of declining moral values of the society, without calling for a wholesale overthrow of the system.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty and estab- lished an Islamic republic in its place in spite of US resistance, became another major source of Islamic radicalisation. It created the impression and instilled in many Muslim youths the possibility and practicability of using Islam as a vehicle for political and social transformation. The 1980s witnessed a proliferation of Iranian revolutionary literature in Nigeria, which inspired the Islamic Movement of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The revolutionary ideas of the Islamic Movement de- rived from Sayed Qutb’s famous jihadi book Al-Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq, which has been rendered in English under the title of Milestones (1964) and which became a basic primer for its membership. Qutb’s thesis of irreconcilable difference be- tween Islam and jahiliyya (pre-Islamic unbelief) was central to shaping the group’s thought. Many students who were radicalised in the Islamic Movement later on ended up in mainstream Sunni groups.
The introduction of Shariah law, with a full range of criminal law punish- ments, in Zamfara State and its whirlwind adoption by eleven other northern Ni- gerian states since 2000 accelerated the pace of radicalisation. The protagonists of Shariah created the impression that it would lead to a qualitative improvement in the lives of the inhabitants of Shariah states. However, the operation of Shari- ah as an adjunct to, and its subordination to, the secular constitution was anathe- ma to radical Islamists, who now demanded a full complement of Shariah law as against the Zamfara model, which Boko Haram ridiculed and rejected. The ina-
bility of the Shariah states to implement the law in full led to the rejection of the Zamfara model of Shariah by Boko Haram, who insisted on a full Shariah or nothing. The imposition of full Shariah has remained a consistent demand by Boko Haram.
American foreign policy in the Middle East and especially its unalloyed sup- port for Israel, along with the Israeli suppression of Palestinians, are important reasons for the radicalisation of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Nigerian Muslims are conversant with Islamic literature, which continuously condemns these ac- tions. Closely related to this were the 11 September 2001 attacks on US soil and the reactions thereto, which also fed into an existing radicalisation channel. The militants of Kanama and Mohammed Yusuf were all aware of and incensed by the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the declaration of a ‘global war on terror’. These events and the war on terror were perceived as a war on Muslims and their religion – and this further fed into the radicalisation process (Mohammed 2004).
While these external factors fed into the radicalisation of Muslims, and espe- cially those of fringe Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, the main drivers of rad- icalisation leading to violent conflicts are primarily internal. The retreating state and declining economic fortunes of the 1980s consequent upon structural ad- justment programmes had further pauperised Nigerians. These conditions and the mismanagement of the limited resources and crass display of wealth by the ruling class, in the midst of widespread poverty, are all conducive to anger and frustra- tion, which are expressed in religious terms. The poor existential condition of people in the northern states of Nigeria, in both relative and absolute terms, has been documented (Mohammed et al. 2000). These factors, coupled with a large unemployed youthful population, feed into a vicious circle of poverty.
In times of crisis and uncertainty, Muslim societies naturally react in religious terms. Indeed, Mohammed Yusuf’s evangelism began in the form of a Muslim social movement: catering for orphans, widows, and the vulnerable. The exclud- ed, especially the almajirai (itinerant students) who had flocked in large numbers to the urban areas owing to rural destitution, became a ready pool for recruitment and mobilisation. In difficult times, the vulnerable and excluded can be easily mobilised, especially by a movement such as Boko Haram, which preaches the brotherhood of all Muslims while attacking a system that has evidently excluded them as irreligious. This message has a natural appeal.