Sec 44 of RA no. 8189, otherwise known as “The Voter’s Registration Act” states:
No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than 4 years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least 4 years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.
Does it violate the equal protection clause?
Held: The singling out of election officers in order to “ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them form developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment” does not violate the equal protection clause. It can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof.
Election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in the city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out.
ELENA P. DYCAICO vs SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU M TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU University College of Law
Facts: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. –
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. …
Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
Issue: Whether or not Rep. Act 8282 is violative of equal protection and due process claus and the petitioner qualified to the benefits.
Ruling: The classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latter’s retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso “as of the date of his retirement,” which efectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latter’s retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law “to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.” In the petitioner’s case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit
fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In efect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivor’s benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.[29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now,
deserves to receive forthwith the survivor’s pension accruing upon the death of her husband.
JAMES MIRASOL vs DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
The facts:
The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled “Limited Access Highway Act” enacted in 1957:
1. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
2. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
3. And AO1 which limited access highways, AO1 States that it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to: Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);
4. On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU M TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU University College of Law
Issues: WHETHER DO 74 DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000; AND
WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ruling:
First Issue
DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access facilities on 5 April 1993 and 25 June 1998, respectively.
Later, the TRB, under the DPWH, issued the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities. However, on 23 July 1979, long before these department orders and regulations were issued, the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications was divided into two agencies – the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications – by virtue of EO 546. The question is, which of these two agencies is now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.
Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125) and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A), which further reorganized the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the DOTC.
Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void.
On the second issue
DO 123 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause by allowing only motorcycles with at least 400 cubic centimeters engine displacement to use the toll ways. The RTC reasoned that the creation of a distinction within the class of motorcycles was not based on real diferences. The RTC’s Decision dated 10 March 2003 declared DO 123 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause by allowing only motorcycles with at least 400 cubic centimeters engine displacement to use the toll ways. The RTC reasoned that the creation of a distinction within the class of motorcycles was not based on real diferences.
We need not pass upon the constitutionality of the classification of motorcycles under DO 123. As previously discussed, the DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has
devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.
On the other hand, the assailed portion of AO 1 states it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized). They also claim that AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue that AO 1 violates their right to travel.
The SC ruled on the negative. A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles.
Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country.
Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles. Therefore, Only AO 1 is constitutional, the rest otherwise.
2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started
TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU M TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU University College of Law
receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.
Issues: Whether or not there is substantial distinction between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost there Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country.
And whether or not COA ha jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of sec 27 of PD 1638 as amended.
Ruling: The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioner’s money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim. Taking into consideration the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of the branches of government the COA holds no jurisdiction over the case.
On the second issue
The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real diferences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial diference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino
citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real diferences, one class may be treated and regulated diferently from another.
Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot get hi benefits not until he returns to being a Filipino citizen.
ARREST WARRANT