Recursos limitados, cgroups y chroot

308 CRA 575 Facts:

- 1936 –George Tait‘s wife Agata died

- Afterwards lived with Maria Tait to whom he donated on April 2, 1974 parcels of land to - Dec 24, 1977 – George died

- 1982-1983 – Maria Tait sold lots, some of which to the private respondents

- July 24, 1989 – petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait field action to nullify deeds of sale and to recover the lands in their name

o Alleged they are children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata and that Maria sold lands without their consent.

- TC and CA both ruled that petition was without merit

- ISSUE: WON donation was made in violation of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of the Family Code

HELD: NO

- Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.

- Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

- Record doesn‘t‘ show that George married Maria and if marriage took place. If they weren‘t married petitioners shouls show evidence that at time the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law relations

Beatrice Tait‘s testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura vs. de Batocael G.R. No.146683. Nov. 22, 2001 Facts:

- Jan 19, 1956 – Francisco Comille and wife Zosima Montallana were owners of a lot - Oct 3, 1980 – Zosima died leaving the lot to

Francisco

- Jan 24, 1991 – Francisco executed deed of donation intervivos to Cirila, ―a helper-slash- mistress-slash common law wife‖ for her faithful services over the last 10 years - Oct 4, 1991 – Francisco died with no

children

- Feb 18, 1993 – respondents filed petition to nullify the donation since she was only common law wife and thus donation is void under Art 87 of FC

o TC made donation void and was strengthened by CA decision ISSUE: WON Cirila is entitled to the lot HELD: NO

- Sufficiently proved that she was common law wife thus can‘t get lot through donation as found in Art 87

- Cohabitation: repeated sexual intercourse, public assumption of marital relation,

o Conduct saw that they were more than just caregiver and patient. Not given any salary, Francisco told her niece Cirila was his mistress, Cirila used his surname to sign for business permits, health cerficates, and death certificate.

FC 86; NCC 765

Mateo vs Lagua 29 SCRA 864 Facts:

- 1917 – Lagua and wife Alejandra donated to their son and his wife Bonifacia Mateo lots.

o Couple took possession of them but they were still under donor‘s name - 1923 – son Alejandro died. His widow and

child came to live with the in-laws who gave them the owner‘s share of the harvest of the land. However in 1926 Cipriano refused to give them their share so Bonifacia had to obtain it through JPC

- 1941 – Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the land to their son, Gervasio while still

continuing to give Bonifacia the owner‘s share of harvest until stopping on 1956.

o Learned that her brother in law owned land on 1955 and had it declared null and void by the Court of First Instance

- 1957 – Gervasio and his wife Sotera commenced action against Bonifacia for reimbursement of improvements made by them and another case to annul the donations of the two lots since it was prejudicial to not only Cipriano for his own

support and for his forced heir Gervasio Lagua

- Nov 1958 – Cipriano died

- 1960 – court said Gervasio and Sotera were possessors in bad fatih and not entitled to reimbursement. Also, action to anul donation has prescribed since it‘s been over 41 years - Appeal to CA which affirmed the court

decision but with the change that Gervasio is entitled to part of the land since it exceeded what should be given which should be part of Cipriano‘s disposable portion in his will and should thus be given to Gervasio since it would be prejudicial to him as the heir. ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donated lots.

HELD: NO

- proper nuptias has marriage as the motive of the donation alone and are without onerous (heavy obligations) consideration , they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2

- Disposable portion is to computed as such (Art 908 of NCC): net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

o CA just based it on the area and not the value of the properties.

- in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor.

o CA had no evidence to declare lot as inofficious

RESULT: CA decision is set aside.

FC 48; 44; 61 FC75 FC88 FC89 FC 89 par. 2 FC 90; of NCC 484-501 FC91 FC as of NCC 164 FC 93 of NCC 160 FC92;FC95 FC94

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia 30 SCRA 111

Facts:

- Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co executed a surety bond to PNB to guarantee a crop loan for Ladislao

o Same date, Ladislao with Vicente Garcia signed indemnity agreement binding themselves to indemnify Luzon Surety Co against whatever it may incur

- April 1956 – PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao And Luzon Surety Co to recover money

- Aug 1957 – third party complaint was received by Garcia due to the indemnity agreement

- Sept 1958 lower court condemned Garcia and Ladislao to pay PNB

- Aug 1960 – writ of garnishment (A legal procedure by which a creditor can collect

what a debtor owes by reaching the debtor's property when it is in the hands of someone other than the debtor) was issued by Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcias,

- Oct 1960 – spouses Josefa de Garcia and Vicente Garcia filed in Court of First Instance a petition to stop the selling of their sugar from their conjugal partnership as a writ of garnishment issued by Court of First Instance against Vicente since he wasn‘t able to pay part of his indemnity to Luzon Surety Co.

ISSUE: WON conjugal property can be used to pay for Vicente‘s indemnity

HELD: NO

- Art 161 of NCC - only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the

conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family

o liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership

o to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to

defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code - In this case, this is not benefiting his family in

anyway and even if Art 163 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, this is limited to what benefits his family

o benefit was clearly intended for third party, Ladislao Chavez RESULT: conjugal property can‘t be used

Gelano vs CA 103 SCRA 90 Facts:

- Sept 17, 1945 – Insular Sawmill corporation was organized. For it to carry on, it leased the paraphernal property of petitioner-wife Guillermina Gelano. Her husband Carlos received from the corporation cash advances on the rentals

- Carlos Gelano however refused to pay his unpaid balance to Insular Sawmill and Guillermina also refused to pay since the amount was for the personal account of husband and did not benefit their family. This happened again

- TC rendered decision that ordered Carlos Gelano anf Guillermina to pay even after the corporation has ceased to exist

ISSUE: WON obligations by Carlos Gelano were peronsl al obligations and thus as spouses can‘t be held liable

HELD: NO

- Obligation contributed greatly to the benefit of the family thus the conjugal property is liable for his debt (Art 116 of NCC/ paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889).

CA‘s mistake : Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not joint and several as erroneously described by the Court of Appeals, the conjugal partnership being only a single entity.

G-Tractors, Inc., vs CA 135 SCRA 192 -Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He owns

a logginc company

- Feb 1973 – Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasn‘t able to pay

-Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land.

ISSUE: WON land that is owned by both spouses can be sold to pay for Luis‘ debt

HELD: YES

- all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership "do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal

partnership from the husband's transaction", but it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership.

o Debts he accumulated were for the support of his family and thus can‘t be deemed his exclusive and private debts.

- Wife‘s name does not need to be in the information when the conjugal property is the one being contested in trial since she is not the recognized administrator. Only necessary the other way around.

Sec. 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil Code

cf. FC 100 (3), FC 12 1(5) and FC 94(4) FC 90, FC 96 in rel. to NCC 206 FC 96; FC 90

Yu Bun Guan vs Ong 36 SCRA 559 Facts:

- April 1961 – Yu Bun Guan and Elvira Ong got married

- Before separation – Bun Guan asked Elvira Ong to do a simulated sale of property she bought on March 20, 1968 out of her own

personal funds so that she wouldn‘t be involved in the obligation. Promised it would be named to their children after. Never happened

- 1992 – separated and Elvira filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of the land

o Yu Bun Guan contends however that he just used Elvira as a dummy to buy property since he was still a Chinese National that time (declared false by TC and CA) ISSUE: WON Elvira Ong can regain her property HELD: YES

- Provided enough evidence to show it was paraphernal property (woman‘s property that she owned prior to the marriage)

o Evidence: (1) the title had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the "absolute and registered owner"; (4) she had paid the real property taxes - Bu Yun Guan‘s contention that she used her income, salaries and savings, which are conjugal in nature to buy the land made it co- owned by them was disregarded through the evidence.

RESULT: land is with Elvira esp since it was void since it was a simulated sale.

FC96 FC 100(3) FC 101 FC61 FC 96-98 FC 100; cf. FC 239 FC 104 Delizo v. Delizo 69 SCRA 216 facts:

- April 1891 – Dec 1909 – first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Vllasfer who died (18 years)

- Oct 1911 – May 1957 – second marriage to Dorotea de Ocampo until Nicolas Delizo died (46 years)

- Petitioners and respondents are fighting over the land owned by Nicolas whether it belongs to the conjugal property of the first or second marriage

- TC first partitioned the land to the first marriage‘s heirs since there was no liquidation of conjugal property of first marriage thus the co conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage

o but was appealed by petitioners from 2nd marriage

- CA: ruled that Caanawan lands were acquired during the first marriage and the fact that lands were registered under ―Nicolas married to Dorotea‖ is merely descriptive of his civil status.

o Did not agree with the partition of TC held that ½ of conjugal property from first marriage is husband‘s own separate property when he remarried again.

o Also held that since it was at the time of the 2nd marriage that the

land was cultivated, it is is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of the 47 hectares

 Thus ½ that is given to the first marriage‘s heirs must be deducted by the improvements made by the 2nd marriage.

o Declared partition as follows: One- half of the Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villafer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. ½ to Nicolas Delizo descending to his heirs both in the 1st and 2nd marriage.

ISSUE: WON partition of lands made by CA is correct HELD: NO

- Lands acquired in first marriage were from the homestead act and at the time of the 1st marriage, the lands weren‘t owned by Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such lands.

o Act no 926 - the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law

o Thus Caanawan lands weren‘t conjugal property of first marriage due to non-compliance

Thus held that land properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership since to leave the

heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance discord and not promote family solidarity.

Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303 Facts:

- Bosing married Oday on 1927

- In 1946, Alayo Bosing left the conjugal home to live with a certain Josefa.

- In 1949, Alayo purchased land and then in the deed he presented himself as ―married to Josefa‖

- In 1959, the lot was transferred to the name of ―Josefa Bosing married to Alayo Bosing‖ - In 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior

marriage with Oday was still subsisting.

- In 1970 Josefa, the common-law spouse, conveyed to Josephine, her daughter, full ownership of the property

- Juliana then filed for a reconveyance of the land to her and her children

Issues: WON the property in question is the conjugal property of Alayo Bosing and Juliana Oday

Held: Yes

Ratio: Under NCC 160, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. This was not rebutted at all. Moreover, the Family Code cannot apply since there are prior vested rights. Co-ownership is repudiated if both spouses has an impediment to marry.

Jocson v. CA 170 SCRA 333 Facts:

- Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina Jocson- Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.

- Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled

- Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate of his wife. - Moises says that it should be partitioned

between him and Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void. - Defendant Moises says that the first

document was signed through fraud and deceit. Same with the second and third document.

- Moreover, he said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold.

- Trial Court sided with the petitioner. - Ca reversed

Issues: WON the property in question is Conjugal. Held: NO. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that Moises said that Agustina didn‘t have enough funds, but then Agustina is in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more than the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to prove that a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the properties were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of title are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, because it was registered in his name alone.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff