because through cooperation the adult education agency can achieve vital ends that it cannot achieve easily in other ways." Beder (1984, p. 6). TTie ends mentioned include off- setting resource insecurity, increasing programmatic flexibility, and protecting autonomy. A study of how hospitals integrated primary care satellite facilities into their operations found that three mutually reinforcing and rather different strategies were used to per- suade the medical staff to accommodate the change. First w a s to have a distinguished older physician take the lead. Second was to sell the idea that the specialists would bene-
laboration. Because it is so hard to disentangle or to know individuals' motives for action, I have not made a concerted effort to count the num- ber of individuals who were motivated to a large extent by the desire to exploit these opportunities. My impression is that they are numerous. Less numerous, but still very evident, are the bureaucrats who are suffi- ciently stirred by these desires to want to have their agencies contribute agency resources to the collaborative efforts. Without wishing to be invidious by omitting any references, I would offer by way of example the many school principals who have facilitated the presence of Healthy Start and School-Based, the middle managers who started the Coordi- nated Youth Services Council, the executive cadres in Oregon's Depart- ment of Human Resources and Adult and Family Services, most of the agency managers involved in the Vegetation Management Consortium, the California state director of the Bureau of Land Management (with respect to the memorandum of understanding on biodiversity), and the Air Resources Board top management with respect to multimedia enforcement efforts. I include also the great many line workers whose time and energy are not just their own but also their agencies' resources and who are committed contributors to collaborative teams.
Probably more numerous, and very important, are value-creating bureaucrats who, although not offering agency resources, are sufficiently inclined to support an interagency effort that promises to increase public value that they will acquiesce if called on. The practitioner literature on collaboration in the human services areas emphasizes the immense impor- tance of creating and disseminating "a vision," and it is for motivating this sort of audience, I suspect, that this prescription is most relevant.20
Arranging for value-creating reinvestment is a smart practice that can buy support for shifting resources toward an ICC. The state legis- lature's commitment to reinvest welfare savings in Oregon's JOBS programs almost certainly reinforced efforts among the agency part- ners at the district level and in Salem to make the collaborative effort produce substantial results. In the environmental enforcement area, California returns penalties collected from enforcement actions to the participating agencies. According to Gerald Johnston, these may cover
fit from increased referrals. Third w a s an ideological appeal that the change would bene- fit the poor. Shortell and Wickizer (1984).
20. See, for instance, Melaville and Blank (1993, pp. 5-18); Chynoweth and others (1992, pp. 45-46); Mattessich and Monsey (1992, pp. 28-29).
some 80 percent of the costs of the action, although the agencies may have to wait six to twelve months for the monies.
Advocates of preventive integrated services programming in regard to children and families usually argue that savings effected by reducing out-of-home placements could, and should, be reinvested in preventive programming. In Maryland, for instance, the state agencies in this domain have been promised 25 percent of the savings for this purpose, but I have little information about how effective this offer has been in motivating more collaborative effort. More important, Maryland cre- ated a new political constituency for reinvestment dollars, and indi- rectly for collaboration, at the local level, inasmuch as the other 75 per- cent of the savings came back to this level.
Organizational actors are sometimes on the lookout to promote their own particular conception of the public interest, and to do so by trying to influence the directions of their own agencies. A minority within their own agencies, support for the memorandum of understanding on bio- diversity, and for other elements furthering this agenda, came from ecologists in California Fish and Game, the Bureau of Land Manage- ment, the Forest Service, and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.21 Interagency collaboration may be an especially favored technique for minority factions within potential partner agen- cies, because it gives them a legitimate way to engage in political coali- tion building external to their agencies.
Even if a minority viewpoint is limited to a few individuals in an agency, these can serve as strategic points of access for actors from out- side the agency. When Lynn Dwyer was shuttling among regulatory agencies trying to line u p umbrella permits for conservation projects in the Elkhorn Slough, a veteran in the Coastal Zone Commission who was well-connected and well-respected throughout the community of people concerned with the slough, Les Stmad, was able to steer her toward individuals in the agency who "understood their agency's man- date more widely or creatively."
For some actors it is the policy objective and not the agency at all that is the primary object of orientation. As I noted in chapter 3, inter- agency networks of like-minded political activists pushed the services integration agenda in Oregon and the Denver Family Opportunity com- munity mobilization agenda in Denver. In the New York State master
contract case, the Council on Children and Families staff spearheading the effort worked to the degree they could through a network in the concerned agencies of management reformers. For Bill Carter at Cal/EPA the multimedia enforcement effort was probably as much about raising the prominence of enforcement as a regulatory tool—as opposed, say, to consultation, education, financial incentives, and so on—as it was about the multimedia focus. H e was able to rely on enforcement-minded staff in all the state and local agencies he sought to bring into his orbit.
Careerist Purposes
Economists appreciate that the invisible hand of the competitive market can convert the private desire for personal gain into a socially desired mix of goods and services. Albeit with considerably less relia- bility, personal aspirations for career enhancement in bureaucratic and policy settings can sometimes lead to equally desirable results.
PERSONAL RENEWAL. Few people can be as enthusiastic about their
agencies after five, ten, or twenty years as after five, ten, or twenty months. Most will still believe in their agency's mission, its general competence, and the good intentions of their fellow workers. However, most will also have noticed that its mission is often compromised by the necessity to limit political conflict, to serve personal agendas, and to bear a host of procedural and accountability burdens. Many of these individuals therefore will be attracted to the opportunity for personal renewal promised by interagency collaboration on a new programmatic or policy vision. As the state deputy director of School-Based remarked, "The secret of collaboration: When things get tough, just keep focusing on the children. That's what keeps people going." Citing Marilyn Ferguson and John Naisbitt, The Aquarian Conspiracythe deputy direc- tor talked about the many reservoirs of commitment and purpose to be found everywhere. "There is all this energy in little pockets" in the com- munity and in agencies.
This is not to be confused with idealism. Far from it. This is real- ism, but of the special sort that holds the important reality not to be the bureaucracy and its imperatives but the deeper p u r p o s e s for