From the management’s perspective, there was concern about whether a crew’s decision making in relation to OHSM was adequate. This will be detailed below.
Crew’s Decisions Respected
The data showed that communication for the purpose of supervising a ship’s safe operation was dominant in the top-down communication process, which allowed shore management to understand whether work orders or instructions were being properly implemented. The interviews with the management in both companies showed they believed that communication with crews was conducted in a moderately consultative way. For example, a marine engineering manager (C1) explicitly commented that the communication was never a
‘single-way compulsory order’ conducted in ‘a top-down approach’. Instead, the management’s decisions were taken on the basis of ‘understanding the crew’s thoughts and their difficulties’ (ibid). A senior manager further explained:
If there was a typhoon, a strong cold front or a rough sea, our analysis and
judgement might be different from the crew’s observation. This could cause difficulties in implementing (orders). Then we had to telephone or email communication to make it feasible. (Vice General Manager, C2)
A general expression of the management indicated that most major decisions were taken in consultation with ship’s crew, and the crew’s decision-making power was well respected by the management in both companies. A common reason for this given by them was that when a ship was at sea, the crew, as front-line workers, would have the best knowledge of the shipboard work environment. Also, in both companies, a captain-responsibility scheme was implemented as a result of the adoption of a mandated safety management system (IMO, 2002b). Although a company’s management remained responsible for the safety supervision of ships, a captain was still the key person for ensuring his ship’s safety. With his professional knowledge and on-the-spot observation, a captain could make better and more reasonable decisions than could others:
In general, if the company’s order is different from a captain’s decision, the captain’s decision is dominant. After all, the captain is on the spot. He knows (the real situation) much better than us. His decision tends to be more reasonable.
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1)
In a few cases, some shore interviewees, such as a marine engineering manager (C1), commented that senior crew members could make immediate decisions and ‘report to the company at a later stage’. In general, the management would not interfere in a crew’s decisions except when there was a ‘significant deviation’. The emerging data suggested that the management in both companies agreed that a captain’s independent decision-making power should be guaranteed, and not be restrained by any additional terms. A captain’s independent decision making was even encouraged by the shore management:
When I was on board, I often encouraged the captain: whatever happens, you should have your own judgment and should not be affected by other external factors.
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2)
By and large, the shore interview data suggested that a ship leaders’ decision-making power was well respected. A crew’s participation in the major decision-making process was considered important by the management. The shore interviews showed that the practice in both companies was similar to the participative management approach, as widely discussed in the literature (Kearney and Hays, 1994; Kim, 2002). This approach aims to balance the involvement of both management and employees in terms of problem solving, decision making and information processing (Wagner, 1994).
‘Approved’ Crew’s Decisions
Although some data showed that ship leaders’ decision making was well respected and should not be constrained by other factors, as proposed in the preceding paragraphs, in practice, the understanding of the decision-making power was interpreted conditionally.
Some shore interviewees showed rather reserved attitudes in their understanding of ship leaders’ power, particularly a captain’s so-called absolute power, in terms in which it was stated in the safety management system. They stated that it was ambiguous, and should depend on the actual context in which an issue arose. A manager interpreted his understanding of a captain’s power as follows:
Although the ISM Code specified this (absolute) power, understanding this statement would vary when there was conflict between safety production and profit.
The communication technology has improved, and crew’s decisions should be approved by the company. There were a series of adjunctive terms imposed on the use of a captain’s decision-making power. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2) It was stated in section 2.4 that the development of modern communication technology, such as satellite communication, has significantly reduced the ‘distance’ between shore and ships.
As a consequence, a crew’s decision making was more likely to be influenced by the shore management in terms of the balance of the ship’s safe transport and the company’s profit earning. As noted in the quotation above, it frequently happened that a crew’s decision had to be approved by their company before they took further action. Although it was unclear how and to what extent crews’ work had been affected so far, the data highlighted the management’s concern about their company’s core interest. For example, one marine affairs manager said:
We work in the shore office. From our perspective, we cannot say, ‘Captain, you just do it (as you wish)’. We would also consider whether the action is line with the company...the boss’s intent (interest). If a captain insists on his own decision, we would support him. But we could not support him to act against the company.
(Marine Affairs Manager, C2)
‘The boss’s intent’ was an alternative way of interpreting the company’s core interest. In general, the data suggested that shore management had a strong commitment to the so-called company’s core interest in undertaking a supervisory role over ships. In order to satisfy the boss’s core intent, the high level of consistency between what was required by the management and what was actually done on board ships was emphasised. For example, a manager stated:
The company’s order should be implemented on board ships without any compromise and discount. (Marine Affairs Manager, C1)
From the management’s perspective, full compliance with their orders or instructions
implied good OHSM at sea. Some managers clearly expressed the view that if a crew acted according to their requirements, they would not be held responsible for any negative OHS consequences. In practice, the interview data also suggested that the real situation in both companies demonstrated a certain level of satisfaction to the management in terms of a crew’s response to their orders or instructions:
According to my experience, disagreement between shore management and crew was rare. (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C1)
There has been no case where a ship has failed to follow the company’s orders.
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2)
Thus, from the management perspective, they showed their respect for crew’s decisions regarding the operation and management of the ship. However, it might also be understood that the crew did not question the management decisions and simply followed what they were told by the management. They will be further discussed in the following sections.
In order to protect the company’s core interest, any decisions relating to a ship’s operation had to be approved by the shore management, which meant that the ultimate decision making power was in the hands of the shore management of both companies. In section 2.7.2, it was stated that decision making in Chinese organisations tended to be centralised. This study revealed a similar situation in these companies. Although the shore interview data showed little tension and discrepancy in the communication between the shore management and a ship’s crew, the possible extent of the impact of the shore management on a crew’s decisions remained unclear. In the next section, this kind of impact, particularly the impact on senior crew members, such as a captain, will be discussed first.