VIGAS CON 5.8 Kg/m 3 MACROFIBRAS DE POLIPROPILENO

The technical support was usually delivered by technical-based communication or ship-visit interaction. Mostly, it happened on the occasions of the management’s ship visit. This

sub-section examines a crew’s response to the technical support given by the shore management.

Safety Education

Usually, the management’s technical support in both companies was provided by managers, particularly by the superintendents. Their positive role was confirmed by many crew members since they were very familiar with the latest maritime policies, such as the revised Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the oil majors’ inspection syllabus, such as VIQ. They understood well many safety-related problems that had occurred on other ships belonging to their company. Some crew referred to them as ‘elite’ as they had ‘profound expertise’ or ‘unique competence’. For example, a junior officer described the role of a superintendent as follows:

He could be a superintendent, which means he is very professional. Regarding some deficiencies, we might not be able to identify them. He would know once he came.

He would have experienced various inspections many times. He would rely on his experience to tell us. (3O, S1 C1)

In other words, if they were incompetent, they might be guided by others – they could not stay long in this position to manage ships. The role of superintendents in maintaining effective OHSM was also mentioned in Bhattacharya’s study (2009). Their seafaring background was helpful for them to deal with an organisation’s health and safety issues (ibid, p.160).

The role of technical support was seen most clearly during ship visits by managers or superintendents:

He brought some cases to us; these included new safety standards, good safety practices from other ships etc. He would communicate with us and teach us.

Although they would come for an inspection, they would teach us something new.

(CO, S1 C1)

A superintendent’s role in ‘guiding’ a crew was particularly highlighted in the shipment of extremely toxic chemical cargoes, which was observed during my field work on S1 C1. The ship was discharging phenol when I was on board. This chemical is extremely toxic and corrosive; it is also extremely expensive. It would be catastrophic if there were any cargo damage (pollution). The ship had undergone a recent crew change. During the cargo operation, a superintendent visited the ship. He was accompanied by a bosun who had worked on this ship before. My field notes detailed my observation of their work:

The bosun came onboard together with the Guide captain to give assistance to the

ship (particularly cargo) operation. In the evening I shared a cabin with the bosun.

He was very busy the whole evening and could not have a talk with me. He came back to the cabin at 0.30am. At about 6am the next morning somebody knocked at the door and the bosun was out again. Later I had a short talk with him during breakfast time. He said he had worked on this ship for more than one year. He knows this ship very well and the new crew members (bosun and ratings) could not act in the ways he could. Also, because this cargo was extremely toxic, the company asked him to visit the ship and give assistance. He and the Guide captain left the ship later when they saw that everything was working properly. (Field Notes, S1 C1, 3/4 February 2010).

Several days later during the voyage when I interviewed a rating on board and asked how their visit could help, he replied:

We learned some (experience). For example, it is easy for the phenol to be solidified and crystallised. In order to ensure the valve does not freeze, a special adjusting washer needs to be fitted. The warming bypass system should also be checked in advance. If there were a sand hole (in it), it would be catastrophic. (Rating, S1 C1) Some crew members referred to such technical support as ‘safety education’, by which the knowledge and practice could be transferred to the crew during a ship visit. The role of safety education was also highlighted in the literature. In the Chinese construction industry, research has shown that safety education contributes to workplace safety management (Fang et al., 2004). The research conducted by Aksorn and Hadikusumo (2008) revealed that safety education was one of the critical successful factors that influenced safety programme performance in Thai construction projects. Similarly, this study showed the importance of on-site safety education on board ships since many crew members agreed that self-identification of the problems with their work was difficult. Instead, the problems could be more easily identified by a superintendent in the light of their well-established professional knowledge and skills. In this sense, a superintendent’s guidance could have a helpful impact on a crew’s operational practice on board. For example, a junior officer said:

We are used to our own way of working. The problem is that we never think our practice is wrong and never have doubts about it. If he (a superintendent) came, he could point out what was wrong. The problem might be found out by external inspectors if it still existed. Certainly, it is good for us and we can change to the right way. (3O, S1 C1)

Apart from those examples described by officers, a few ratings also offered some similar examples, particularly for those with limited sea experience. During a ship visit, a superintendent would be able to observe a crew’s work in situ, and there would be a chance to improve the crew’s working practices:

In the mooring operation, I used to put a mooring line on a bollard in a clockwise direction, but the superintendent told me to do it in an anti-clockwise direction. (By

doing so), it would cause less tension, and would be less likely to hurt operators. I had never thought about that before. (Boson, S4 C2)

Furthermore, some crew members, though not many, commented that they would consult with a superintendent if they were not clear about some professional knowledge. This was especially true in consideration of a wide range of chemical products to be carried by chemical tankers. In addition, most chemical cargoes have different physical and chemical features, and it is impossible for crew members to be familiar with all of them. In such a case, a superintendent would be the right person to consult:

Last time, the cargo was PX (pxylene). Its solidifying point is 13.3 degrees Celsius, while the environmental temperature was around zero. I was very concerned about the ship’s warming system. I asked the superintendent, and he told me (how to deal with it). (CO, S2 C1)

Regarding daily routines, there were not many doubts about when the superintendent would need to be consulted; however, a superintendent’s role became prominent in dealing with

‘new problems’, ‘extraordinary conditions’, or ‘new regulations’, as illustrated by some crew members. Given this positive role, not all crew members were satisfied, as will be discussed next.

Limited Supporting Role

The study also found that, for some crew members, the communication with the management did not help much in their work. First of all, some crew members thought that ships were very varied; the ‘particularity’ of each ship’s work environment might be unfamiliar to a superintendent. In this sense, it could reduce the management’s supporting role. For example, as one senior engineer put it:

Except in the case of a superintendent having worked on this ship before and being very familiar with this ship … otherwise, he has to listen. In practice, all the work is done by this ship’s crew. (2E, S3 C2)

Some crew members also thought that even if a superintendent’s technical support helped, it could not extend to each position across the shipboard hierarchy. Besides, some senior crew members with some years of sea experience thought they did not need a superintendent’s technical support. For example, a senior engineer said:

If you expect them (superintendents) to solve any particular technical problems, it is useless. Mainly, it depends on our own (knowledge). I have been a chief engineer for six years. It’s very rare that shipboard practical problems have been solved by a superintendent. (CE, S2 C1)

Furthermore, some crew members were very confident about their competence in problem

solving. They thought they could meet the challenges of various technical problems. Thus, they thought the company’s support was of little use, and they would not ‘bother them’ much.

For example, a second engineer said:

For me, they (superintendents) are useless for helping my work. If I can solve (a problem), I do not need their guidance; if I cannot, they would not be able to work it out either. (2E, S1 C1)

It emerged from the data that the crew’s experience and competence could play an important part in shipboard OHSM. In the literature, the crew’s experience and competence were seen as part of their professionalism, which further contributes to the safety culture in a shipping organisation (IMO, 2002b). In this sense, the company’s supporting role was limited given the crew’s professionalism. Meanwhile, some crew members also commented on what kind of support was really ‘useful’:

We need them (superintendents) to harmonise work … the types of spare parts, the information and technical documents ... All these should be provided by them. We do not have any channel to obtain them. I think this is most helpful for us. (2E, S2 C1)

Among the various kinds of support that were thought helpful, the arrangement of technicians for repair work, the provision of safety information, and the supply of materials or spare parts were highlighted by crews. The data presented in this sub-section showed that the role of communication for technical support was limited. Some crew members felt that they were educated by the management of the company, particularly during a ship visit. For some others, the role of the management remained weak. What most crew members emphasised were the various logistic services provided by company’s management. They were termed a crew’s ‘real need’, which will be discussed below.