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RESOLUCIÓN Nº 0306-2017-JNE Expediente Nº J-2016-01398-A01

balance of payments 133 capital account 133 conditionality 142 current account 133 depreciation 139 devaluation 139 Economic and Monetary

Union 154 Eurocurrencies 145

external debt 138 fiscal policy 136 fixed exchange rates 140 floating exchange rates 149 gold exchange standard 141 gold standard 140 Group of 24 147 International Monetary Fund 142 liquidity 144 monetary policy 136 optimum currency area 154 revaluation 139 seigniorage 145 sovereign wealth funds 159 special drawing rights 148 Triffin dilemma 145

NOTES

1. Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary

System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 3; Susan Strange,

“Protectionism and World Politics,” International Organization 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 257.

2. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Future of Money (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 11–12.

3. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 3.

4. Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 29; Benjamin J. Cohen, “Life at the Top: International Currencies in the Twenty-First Century,” Essays in International Economics, no. 221 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, International Economics Section, December 2000), pp. 2–4.

5. The U.S. Federal Reserve’s U.S. dollar holdings are not considered to be international reserves. See Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics:

Theory and Policy, 7th ed. (Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2006), p. 297.

6. Mordechai E. Kreinin, International Economics: A Policy Approach, 6th ed. (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), pp. 123–124; Richard N. Cooper,

The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 13–23, chs. 7–9.

7. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2008, http://www.cia.gov/ library/publication/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2079rank.html.

8. Joseph Quinlan and Marc Chandler, “The U.S. Trade Deficit: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001, pp. 87–97; William R. Cline, “The Impact of U.S. External Adjustment on Japan,” and Kathryn M. Dominguez, “Foreign Exchange Intervention: Did It Work in the 1990s?” in C. Fred Bergsten and John Williamson, eds., Dollar Overvaluation and the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2003), pp. 179, 218. 9. Eric Helleiner, “Political Determinants of International Currencies: What Future

for the U.S. Dollar?,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August 2008), p. 370.

10. Ernest H. Preeg, “Exchange Rate Manipulation to Gain an Unfair Competitive Advantage,” in C. Fred Bergsten and John Williamson, eds., Dollar Overvaluation

and the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,

11. Cohen, The Geography of Money, p. 11; Kathleen R. McNamara, “A Rivalry in the Making? The Euro and International Monetary Power,” Review of International

Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August 2008), pp. 446–448.

12. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the

International Monetary System (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982),

p. 6; Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of

International Monetary Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), ch. 3.

13. Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression,

1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 2, pp. 204–207.

14. Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and

Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 507.

15. Peter A. Gourevitch, “Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 349–373; Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy

During the Interwar Years (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

16. McNamara, “A Rivalry in the Making?,” p. 441.

17. John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed.,

International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 209–214.

18. Eric Helleiner, “From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down,” in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds., Political Economy

and the Changing Global Order (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart, 1994),

p. 164; J. Keith Horsefield, ed., The International Monetary Fund 1945–1965:

Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Vol. 3: Documents

(Washington, DC: IMF, 1969), p. 67.

19. International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund Annual Report—2007 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2007), pp. 60–61.

20. IMF website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm.

21. John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International

Economic Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), p. 69.

22. Marc Williams, International Economic Organizations and the Third World (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 67–68; James Raymond Vreeland,

The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending (New York:

Routledge, 2007), pp. 13–17.

23. International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund Annual Report—2008 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2008), CD-ROM.

24. A group of economists identified the liquidity, confidence, and adjustment problems. See Fritz Machlup and Burton G. Malkiel, eds., International Monetary

Arrangements: The Problem of Choice: Report on the Deliberations of an International Study Group of 32 Economists (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

International Finance Section, 1964), p. 24. 25. Cohen, The Geography of Money, pp. 39–42.

26. Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility, rev. ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).

27. Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC and New York: IMF and Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 179–181.

28. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton

Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 81–100;

Michael C. Webb, The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International

Notes 165 29. Susan Strange, Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International

Currency in Decline (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 209.

30. Strange, Sterling and British Policy, pp. 5, 17.

31. C. Fred Bergsten and C. Randall Henning, Global Economic Leadership and the

Group of Seven (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economic, 1996),

pp. 22–23.

32. Hazel J. Johnson, Global Financial Institutions and Markets (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000), p. 411; Age F. P. Bakker, International Financial Institutions (New York: Longman, 1996), ch. 6.

33. C. Randall Henning, “The Group of Twenty-Four: Two Decades of Monetary and Financial Cooperation Among Developing Countries,” in UNCTAD, International

Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s—Vol. 1 (New York: United Nations,

1992), pp. 137–154.

34. Krugman and Obstfeld, International Economics, pp. 311–313; Marin Bronfenbrenner and Yasukichi Yasuba, “Economic Welfare,” in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, eds., The Political Economy of Japan: The Domestic Transformation, vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 100.

35. John Williamson and C. Randall Henning, “Managing the Monetary System,” in Peter B. Kenen, ed., Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton

Woods (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p. 89.

36. Cohen, “Life at the Top,” pp. 5–6; International Monetary Fund, “Special Drawing Right Allocations,” February 11, 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/ sdrallocfaqs.htm.

37. Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945–1981, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 176–234.

38. On the failed negotiations, see John Williamson, The Failure of World Monetary

Reform, 1971–74 (Sunbury-on-Thames: Nelson, 1977).

39. Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money, p. 115. The IMF permitted Canada to float its currency from 1950 to 1962 because of its “special relationship” with the United States. See Arthur F. W. Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision: Canada

and the World Monetary System, 1944–75 (Toronto, ON: McClelland and

Stewart, 1977).

40. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted July 22, 1944 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1993), Article 4, section 1–iii.

41. See J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffry A. Frieden, “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 2001), pp. 317–343.

42. Yusuke Kashiwagi, “Future of the International Monetary System and the Role of the IMF,” in Bretton Woods Commission, Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future,

Background Papers (Washington, DC: Bretton Woods Committee, 1994), p. C–1.

43. Milton Friedman, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” Essays in Positive

Economics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 203.

44. Benjamin Cohen coined the term Unholy Trinity, which is based on a model developed by Robert Mundell. See Robert Mundell, “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates,” Canadian

Journal of Economics and Political Science 29, no. 4 (November 1963),

pp. 475–485; Benjamin J. Cohen, “The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region,” in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1993), pp. 133–158.

45. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance, pp. 115–116; John Williamson, The Exchange Rate System, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985), pp. 9–10, 39.

46. Michael Devereux and Thomas A. Wilson, “International Co-ordination of Macroeconomic Policies: A Review,” Canadian Public Policy 15 (February 1989), pp. S23–S24.

47. Williamson and Henning, “Managing the Monetary System,” p. 100. On the difficulties in bringing about policy coordination, see Webb, The Political

Economy of Policy Coordination.

48. The Nobel laureate economist Robert Mundell has been a strong (and controversial) defender of fixed exchange rates and the gold standard.

49. Barry Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 5.

50. Barry Eichengreen, “Prerequisites for International Monetary Stability,” in Bretton Woods Commission, Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future, Background Papers (Washington, DC: Bretton Woods Committee, 1994), p. C–50.

51. Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European

Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 10.

52. Malcolm Levitt and Christopher Lord, The Political Economy of Monetary Union (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 29–42.

53. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas, pp. 166–170; Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan, European Monetary and Fiscal Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 4–7.

54. Robert A. Mundell, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” American

Economic Review 51, no. 4 (September 1961), pp. 657–665.

55. “Briefing: The Euro Zone’s Debt Crisis,” The Economist, May 1, 2010, pp. 63–65; Paul Krugman, “The Euro Trap,” New York Times, April 20, 2010.

56. McNamara, “A Rivalry in the Making?,” p. 440; Don Lee, “China Positioning its Currency for a Run at World Supremacy,” Los Angeles Times, April 3, 2009. 57. Helleiner, “Political Determinants of International Currencies,” p. 356; McNamara,

“A Rivalry in the Making?,” p. 444; Cohen, The Geography of Money, pp. 156–161. 58. This section relies extensively on Helleiner, “Political Determinants of International

Currencies,” pp. 357–360.

59. Edward Cody, “No Joint European Strategy on Banks,” Washington Post, October 5, 2008.

60. Jonathan Kirshner, “Dollar Primacy and American Power: What’s at Stake?,”

Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August 2008), pp. 419–420;

McNamara, “A Rivalry in the Making?,” p. 439; Cohen, The Geography of

Money, pp. 12–13.

61. Wolfgang Münchau, “Europe’s Choice Is to Integrate or Disintegrate,” Financial

Times, May 2, 2010.

62. Charles R. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 90–91.

63. Robert J. Samuelson, “China’s Dollar Deception,” Washington Post, April 6, 2009, p. A15.

64. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown, pp. 92–99; Paul Bowles and Baotai Wang, “The Rocky Road Ahead: China, the US and the Future of the Dollar,” Review of

International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August 2008), pp. 335–353; Juliet

Johnson, “Forbidden Fruit: Russia’s Uneasy Relationship with the US Dollar,”

Notes 167 Saori N. Katada, “From a Supporter to a Challenger? Japan’s Currency Leadership in Dollar-Dominated East Asia,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 3 (August 2008), pp. 399–417.

65. Lee Hudson Teslik, “Sovereign Weath Funds,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, January 18, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15251.

66. Stephen Jen, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: What They Are and What’s Happening,”

World Economics 8, no. 4 (October–December 2007), pp. 1–7; “Sovereign Wealth

Funds: From Torrent to Trickle,” The Economist, January 24, 2009, pp. 78–79. 67. “Crisis Comes to the IMF,” Washington Post, October 19, 2007, p. A20.

68. International Monetary Fund Annual Report—2007 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2007), p. 61.

69. The standard rate of corporate income tax in OECD countries fell from 43 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1995, while the average tax rate for workers increased. See “Survey: World Economy,” The Economist, September 20, 1997, p. 33.

70. Stephen Gill and David Law, “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital,” in Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International

Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 108.

71. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International

Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,

1996), p. 27.

72. Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the

State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 6. See also Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance.

168

T

rade relations have aroused strong positive and negative emotions from the earliest times. Whereas proposals linking free trade with world peace can be traced back to the seventeenth century, trade conflicts have been common since the Middle Ages. The conflicts are often limited in scope, but sometimes escalate and become “trade wars.”1_{Societal groups today often}

express strong views about trade. For example, internationalist firms that depend on exports, imports, and multinational production pressure for trade liberalization agreements; but domestically oriented firms threatened by import competition oppose these agreements.2_{Civil society groups also often}

oppose efforts to expand the authority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trade agreements (RTAs). Trade is a contentious issue because interest groups and the broader public view their welfare as being more affected by trade policy than by monetary, investment, or financial policy. Thus, business, labor, agricultural, consumer, environmental, and cultural groups try to influence government trade policies.

The forces of globalization have had a major effect on trade relations. From 1950 to 1973, world economic output (or GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent while trade increased on average by 8.2 percent. From 1974 to 2007, the figures were 2.9 percent for GDP growth and 5.0 percent for trade growth.3 _{The growing interdependence of states has also made trade relations}

more vulnerable to economic downturns. Thus, the 2008 global financial crisis precipitated “drops in global production and trade, first in the developed economies and then in developing countries.”4 _{In efforts to promote their}

exports, many countries began to engage in the “competitive undervaluation” of their currencies, and this raised the possibility of a trade war.5 _{Trade and}

foreign investment are closely related. MNCs have considerable influence on trade issues, and intrafirm trade within MNCs accounts for about one-third of total world trade. As a former WTO director general stated, “businesses now

Global Trade

In document NORMAS LEGALES SUMARIO PODER LEGISLATIVO PODER EJECUTIVO. Año XXXIV - Nº JUEVES 5 DE OCTUBRE DE 2017 COMERCIO EXTERIOR Y TURISMO (página 71-75)

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