Responsabilidad Social Empresarial

Discussions with all of the research participants indicates that the hierarchical status associated with each of their specific roles in their organisational structures is universally perceived to affect their available influence. The predominant interpretation of the causal link is that organisational structure is considered to be based on the deliberate and intentional choices of the executive leadership.

The lines of accountability, of responsibility and of communication that are formally established for any position are therefore seen to reflect how that particular position is valued within the company. The specific functions and tasks that are associated with any specific role are viewed as definitions of the scope and range of authority and therefore implicit indicators of the role’s expected influence on decision-making within the

organisation. The most voiced concern is that organisational structure typically impedes rather than promotes operational safety professionals.

The most significant finding about structured influence, arising from this research, is that operational safety professionals are afforded very few formalised authorities. The most common examples of influence that are related to functional responsibilities as discussed by the interviewees include:

§ technical authority to review and approve or prohibit operational modifications or deviations such as new equipment of changes to processes;

§ procedural authority related to interpreting regulatory compliance requirements into the standards and procedures for operations to follow;

§ authority to conduct audits of operations with various ways of addressing non- compliances generally based on reporting on the urgency of issues and

§ regular reporting to leadership on operational KPI related to safety parameters. These formal authorities are limited, even when associated with fairly senior positions, and are also found to be predominantly reactive. The ability to garner leadership attention by reporting on audit findings and recommendations is only available after the fact of the non- compliant behaviour. The ability to withhold technical approval of proposed modifications until they include recommended safety factors relies on the input of operational managers. Not only does operations raise the request for approval of a modification but must also comprehensively identify the scope of the issues.

The responsibility for implementing the recommended safety measures for both audit findings and modifications also remains with operations. The regular reporting of safety performance to leadership often focus on KPI that can be misinterpreted, misrepresented or manipulated. Even the raw data for KPI may not involve regular or direct communication with safety professionals but instead rely on self-monitoring and self-reporting by

operations personnel.

Interestingly there is a clear discrepancy between the organisational sources of influence that are typically associated with a structured and defined role and those that safety professionals seem to hold. The organisational sphere of activity, as discussed in Section 2, is formally defined by position, functions, interactions, information, qualification, access to resources and access to authority. There is a significant and pervasive trend for these to be quite limited for functional positions. As already discussed, position can be superficial; functions can be restricted; interactions can be limited; information can be second-hand; qualifications can be lacking; resources can be withheld and authority can be circumscribed. Even those safety professionals who hold fairly senior positions and have authority to promote safety activities can be obstructed by simple and common corporate practices that reduce or limit available influence. The fact that there is rarely any financial authority or budget control assigned to operational safety functions and roles is a particularly significant example. In one particular situation described by an interviewee, a facility operations manager is able to neglect operational safety initiatives and avoid implementing measures that have been formally authorised at higher levels of the organisation.

Even though the facility safety manager has functional support and formal authority to undertake several projects, the facility operations manager, who has different priorities, controls the budget and simply does not allow for the funds to be allocated. Similar

examples of obstructions to circumvent safety priorities are found in all of the nine participating companies.

All of the thirty professionals who have been interviewed describe many alternative sources of influence that are needed for them to bolster their limited legitimate sources of influence in order to fulfil their operational safety responsibilities:

§ In Company H, the CEO asks for daily reports on operational safety issues so that they can be personally followed up to ensure corrective actions are implemented;

§ In Company E, safety committees that include executives and are chaired by technical specialists, provide both the reliable information and the appropriate authority for effective discussions and recommendations;

§ In Company F, the operational excellence team liaises with the engineering teams in operations and with operations managers to demonstrate financial benefits or production advantages of safety measures to garner interest and support; and

§ In Company J, one interviewee relies on building strong personal relationships with critical people to keep abreast of and perhaps strategically influence decision-making. It is clear from the case studies that many aspects of organisational behaviour other than those parameters that are related to designed structure and formally defined role are seen to modify available influence. Like organisational structure, these factors can also be: inhibiting and obstructive; or elevating and supportive to operational safety prioritisation. Company A provides the clearest example, where the organisational salience of the Safety Manager and Technical Support Manager is effectively the same. However, due to

differences in reputation, attitude and their spheres of activity, the latter is perceived to have greatly increased safety prioritisation while the other is perceived to have very limited impact. There are several common corporate practices and attributes, amongst the

experiences discussed by the research interviewees, that are perceived as critical. These have been collated from the various themes of significance identified in each case study and categorised as relating to one of three distinct modifying factors: leadership support; management systems and personal credibility. The impact that they have on influence is illustrated as either positively or negatively impacting on the organisational salience of each potential POSS as illustrated in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 How other organisational parameters modify the Influence of Potential POSS roles

Each of the three modifying factors is discussed respectively in each of the following three sub-sections with reference to Figure 5.2 as well as to key findings from the case studies. Each is evaluated as an additional consideration to structure in affecting the influence exercised by operational safety specialists. The inter-relationships establish a broader context for the central research hypothesis and this expansion of Hopkins’ hypothesis is presented in Section 5.5.

5.4.2

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S

The research found that the attitude and understanding of operational safety issues by senior management plays a critical role in determining the influence of technical specialists. In several of the participating companies, the strong and open support of leaders is clearly recognised as directly strengthening the available influence of operational safety

professionals. Those interviewees who believe that their executive leadership takes

operational safety very seriously also report that the broader organisation tends follow that lead. In Company C, the potential POSS is supported by an experienced operational

executive manager who understands the importance of safety metrics and a new CEO is not only supportive of the POSS, but is restructuring the entire organisation to create a

Company Manager Identified as Potential POSS

A Safety Manager <<< <<<

A Technical Support Manager (Unit A) >>> >>>

B Executive Manager HSE+ * >>>

C Corporate Manager HSE+ <<< >>>

C General Managers HSE+ (Units) <<<

C Corporate Safety Manager (new) >>> >>>

D Manager HSE+ (Division A) >>>

D Executive Safety Manager (previous) <<<

E Technical Manager (Division B) >>> >>>

F Corporate Safety Manager

F Senior HS+ Manager >>> F Engineering Manager G Senior Manager HS+ >>> H Manager HSE+ >>> H Engineering Manager >>> J Senior Manager HS <<< J Engineering Manager <<< as previously determined

influence related to organisational salience <<< >>> influence as impacted by modifying factors <<< >>> * no operational safety activities <<< >>>

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