Teorías y Estudios de Investigaciones Aplicadas

The organisation’s management systems are also observed have considerable impact on the influence available to and exercised by operational safety professionals. There are various functional systems of management that are required to coordinate the activities of an organisation and dictate how tasks and responsibilities are controlled and monitored throughout the organisation. The fundamental aspects of financial control, legislative compliance and human resourcing are all guided by formalised systems and procedures. All of the participating companies have documented safety management systems to establish corporate expectations of how safety will be managed, coordinated, communicated and recorded. These systems range from corporate policy statements, that promote awareness and attention, to specific and detailed operating protocols, that establish minimum

The research findings clearly indicate that such safety management is still predominantly non-technical and considered to be a provision of services to the main operations of the business. Historically, safety has been seen as an issue that is strongly aligned to the human resources function. Matters of personal safety, such as issues of workers compensation and management of return to work following an injury, require organisations to clearly define systems for managing individuals and their employment relationships.

It is common for safety management to be integrated with other functions such as health and environment in a management system addressing all three issues as separate from core operational activity. Whilst there are clearly advantages to highlighting organisational functions that support excellence in safety, this governance approach effectively isolates safety objectives from operational practices. This is especially the case where the safety management system is treated as the responsibility of safety professionals and is viewed as an imposition of a value system that is different to the values that drive operations. The system itself can become about reporting and documentation: guided by requirements for oversight, assurance, insurance claims and the like. This approach does not allow for effective operational safety management, which inherently requires ongoing operational diligence and process control, as well as continuous monitoring and performance analysis. Half of the potential POSS roles identified in this research are shown in Figure 5.2 to either utilise or contend with the impacts of organisational management systems. Additionally, several of the other interviewees described various corporate policies and procedures, as well as the common business practices in the organisation, that impacted on their ability to prioritise operational safety issues. The stories that are detailed in the case studies include accounts of various management systems that either presented opportunities to expand influence or created obstacles that impeded influence.

The most successful management systems that are described by interviewees seem to be those in which the safety requirements are integrated into the operating standards and operational practices and procedures and even the management of the business. These safety requirements can be specifically managed at the operational level as a necessary function and consequence of the broader management systems that provide governance and assurance at executive level. Modifying the operating requirements in this way can be clearly seen to expand the available influence of operational safety professionals, enabling them to affect behaviours throughout the organisation. Those who control systems of management have considerable influence through the interpretation of procedures and standards to which operational activities are expected to comply. Figure 5.2 shows that

these positive impacts are found in Company A, in Company B, in Company F and in Company H. These benefits seem to correlate with organisations in which technically competent safety professionals have a strong involvement in either or both the operations and safety management systems.

In Company A, technical support managers without actual oversight authority are able to strengthen their influence by integrating safety priorities within operations management systems because they are responsible for incorporating regulatory requirements into the operating standards. In Company H, a corporate competency management system is utilised to demonstrate the expertise and experience of safety professionals and provide support for their credibility and for their advice. In contrast, Company C has systems in place that limit the corporate auditing process to reviewing and reporting on operating performance data and the findings of in-house audits. This system limits the safety team’s ability to verify the information or to enforce audit recommendations, even those that address identified non-compliance. In Company G, there is a Technical Authority system that is utilised to involve technical specialist for advice to guide operational modifications or deviations. However, the system does not empower the designated Technical Authorities to initiate such involvement, instead relying on the operational managers to call on expert input reactively, when potential issues have escalated to actual problems.

The two most significant aspects of management systems, as an organisational factor that modifies the influence of operational safety professionals, are that they can be both too formalised and too informal. There are problems with the system if it is perceived to be burdensome and overly documented that can lead to a box-ticking paperwork process that is not integrated with actual practices. However, if it lacks the details and specifics that relate the system to the actual practices, it can also be perceived as too vague and casual to warrant strict attention. The vulnerability and opportunity of management systems is that they must be developed, implemented, monitored and updated to both control and reflect operating conditions. The findings suggest that input by the safety function can be a source of considerable influence – detrimental if mishandled but significant and profound if based on technically sound and operationally effective principles.