El resultado que se obtenga conforme a la metodología señalada, se aplicará a los litros de combustible fósil para el cual se calcula la cuota conforme a lo dispuesto

I summarize the results of this paper in figure 6, focusing on the replicator-interactor duality, and taking a slighly different view on the causal circuitry analyzed in the previous sections. The first important insight is that we have to refer the term ‘institution’ to the entire causal circuitry, which corresponds to Aoki’s model. This directly implies that we can think of the selection of institutions, relative to a particular environment. This selection works via the state of nature impact on the outcomes of the interactions within a population that follows an insti- tution. Treating the institution as the entire causal circuitry corresponds to the type/token dis- tinction in the relation between the individual and species: The individual corresponds to the individual action, and the species corresponds to the population level patterns. Insofar as fol- lowing an institution is a performative action, the individual action reflects the population- level patterns, in the same way as the individual reflects the species features, within a range of

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variation, which, as we have seen for the case of institutions, result from the stochastic rela- tionship between dispositions and actions.

Figure 6: The Darwinian approach to institutions

Since selection operates via the outcomes of the interactions, we can identify the realized pat- terns of behavior on the population level as the interactor in the generalized Darwinian sense. This catches the different uses of the term ‘institution’ in the literature, which vascillate be- tween the rules of the game and the realized equilibria (e.g. Aoki 2001: 24ff.; Dixit 2004: 5ff.). In my approach, both is true to a certain extent, but more exactly, the game equilibria are the interactor (which corresponds to the notion in biology that the interactor is actually equal to the selectively relevant behavioral patterns of a species).

The interactor relates with the replicator via the process of epigenesis (compare Jablonka and Lamb 2006). I relate this process directly to the disposition that generates the individual ac- tions. It is essential to see that this disposition is created by the causal conjunction of the signs and the emotions in the replicator. Therefore, the notion of epigenesis captures gene-culture co-evolution in the specific sense that the emotions are genetically anchored, but the gene expression is always mediated culturally, i.e. via the signs that evolve entirely independently

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from the genetic level. This extends the notion of epigenesis from somatic mechanisms to extra-somatic mechanisms. By implication, it is not possible to reduce observed actions di- rectly to the genetic basis. This offers a solution to the nature-nurture quandary, as all gene expressions are seen as culturally contextualized, such that culture is an ontologically auto- nomous channel of the transmission of biological information (which matches with approa- ches such as Richerson and Boyd 2005).

Thus, institutions build on a new kind of replicator, which, as I have discussed extensively, consists of a causal conjunction of signs and neuronal structures. The intricate property of this replicator is that the signs are strictly population level phenomena, whereas the neuronal structures are strictly individual phenomena. Important properties of the institutional replica- tor therefore directly relate with the material stability of the signs. Signs change, too, because of the population level processes. But it is important to notice that those changes only become evolutionarily relevant if they result into altered dispositions which in turn generate actions that change the ppoulation level equilibria. It is perfectly possible that a new sign generates similar actions and hence reproduces a similar institution.

In this paper, this model of institutions has been applied on a core institution of ther economy, money. My analysis shows that it is necessary to strip institutions of their technical complexi- ties in modern societies in order to make their evolutionary foundations explicit. The reason lies in the reflexivity of status functions, which create new social facts continuously. As we have seen in the case of money, this means that money today is a very complex phenomenon, with different uses and expressions in different contexts. Money emotions may not count much for a central banker. In my analysis I have not scrutinized the process of growing complexity in the evolution of institutions, which is often driven by the reflective powers of human reason and imagination. However, this is just another reflection of the ontological au- tonomy of institutions. If we want to understand the fundamentals, we have to go back to the prototypical institutions, as I have shown for the case of money. On the other hand, complexi- ty also means that those institutions also may exert an indirect impact on institutional innova- tions that connect with them. So, financial markets may bear the imprint of the primordial institution of money (which is evident from the many effects of money emotions on their per- formance). I think that a similar analysis is possible for other primordial institutions, as I have argued earlier (Herrmann-Pillath 1994) for the case of property. In standard modelling appro-

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aches to animal conflicts (the Hawk-Dove game), the so-called Strategy of Bourgeois is evo- luntionarily stable, which builds on a particular emotional structure, that is, to invest more resources into the defense of a territory if one is incumbent than if one is intruder. In human culture, this emotional structure has been causally conjoined with the emergence of numerous signs that signal the relative positions of incumbents and intruders. This would be the arche- typical situation of the emergence of private property, akin to my analysis of money in this paper. I think that similar evolutionary approaches can be specified for other elementary hu- man institutions, such as the institutions of cooperation (following Skyrms 2004 and others). With relation to the more general problem of the extension of Darwinism into the domain of human social systems, this paper has shown that we can draw on more recent abstract refor- mulations of Darwinism, especially the replicator-interactor duality, in order to achieve a con- ceptual unification. However, I emphasize that this is only possible if we adopt a radically naturalistic ontology which follows the rule that all entities that are posited must have a phy- sical realization. We may not yet have discovered such realizations, similar to Darwin’s posi- tion, when genes were still unkown. But we always need to present a reasonable speculation. This paper offers a speculation about the physical nature of the replicator in institutional evo- lution: The causal conjunction of neuronal structures and signs. I think that this hypothesis can be also extended into the analysis of human material culture, that is, consumption. This raises the additional question how far consumption activities are institutionalized. However, the basic point seems promising, namely to analyze the evolution of human consumption pat- terns in terms of replicators which are ontologically defined as causal conjunctions of emoti- ons and signs. There is already a growing literature on the Darwinian analysis of consumption (e.g. Saad 2007) which makes the accomplishment of this task straightforward. In the end, I expect that we will be able to identify a set of universal human emotions that connect with a cultural cosmos of signs, that we can further systematicize into different domains of instituti- ons and economic activities. Whereas the set of emotions is mainly in the state of evolutiona- ry stasis, the evolution of signs drives the continuous emergence of behavioral novelties, which also change the context of the expressions of human biology.

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