Resultados del proceso de codificación

Immediately following the end of WWII Air Commodore A. de T. Nevill, the Vice Chief of Air Staff, RNZAF presented the Minister of Defence with a report that recommended the government control of commercial air services as a public utility (Aimer, 2000, 2009e). At the end of June 1945 the Labour Government announced that all domestic civil air services in NZ would be state owned and operated (Aimer, 2000; Driscoll, 1979). This policy was largely to remain in place until the National Airways Corporation of NZ Ltd (NAC) was merged with Air New Zealand in 1978 (Aimer, 2000, 2009e; Thompson and Clements, 2003). The National Airways Act 1945 made:

[P]rovision for the Incorporation of the New Zealand National Airways Corporation for the Purpose of Establishing and Operating National Air Transport Services to meet the Needs of the People of New Zealand and for the Purpose of Fostering and Encouraging the use of Air Transportation within New Zealand and between New Zealand and other Countries; and to make Provision for other matters incidental thereto.

At the time the legislation was passed there were only nine commercial aircraft in New Zealand capable of carrying a total of 68 passengers, however, the war had left military aircraft that could be converted for civil use and numerous men keen to continue their aviation careers. The war had also left the country short of money, materials and skilled labour which hampered the development of airfields (Aimer, 2000). Ewing and Macpherson (1986) and Rendel (1975) suggests that this slow post-war development was also due to the confusion created by the National Airways Act 1945 in respect of how far the authority of the NAC extended into the establishment, development and operation of airports. Rendel (1975) and Aimer (2000) are in agreement that airfield development was not the corporation‘s responsibility. The corporation could merely identify inadequate key aerodromes and request that they receive immediate attention from the government departments of Air and Public Works (Aimer, 2000). In 1947 the government established the Aerodromes Committee with the expectation that it would address these issues and charged it with the responsibility of preparing a co-ordinated plan for airport development (Rendel, 1975). The work of this committee was to be significantly influenced by the recommendations of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Mission to New Zealand led by Sir Frederick Tymms in 1948. The committee finally produced a "seven-year plan for the development of an airport system" in 1953 but it was never implemented (p. 104). Rendel believes that this lack of planning worked in New Zealand‘s favour as it was able to avoid "the errors of prediction inherent in long-term centralised planning".

By 1947 there were 16 airports approved for civil use within New Zealand, all of which are still in use today. A further 23 were available for use subject to Ministerial approval (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986). The pre-

September 1947 for the construction of sealed runways. The grass runway had often been unusable during winter; it was considered unsuitable for current and future commercial operations and no longer met the safety standards of ICAO. NAC had to move its air operations to the former military base at Paraparaumu further north (King, 2009) which quickly became one of the country‘s busiest airports. The grass runway at Mangere aerodrome in Auckland closed at the same time and all civilian air operations were moved to the military base at Whenuapai in Auckland (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986).

New Zealand‘s acceptance of the international standards and recommenced practices and procedures of the Chicago Convention 1944 were ratified in the Civil Aviation Act 1948 which passed into law on 26 August 1948. This Act authorised the issue of regulations, and created the position of Director of Civil Aviation under law (CAA, 2003). It now restricted the definition of an aerodrome to ―any area of land or water normally used for the taking off, landing, and alighting of aircraft‖ and ―include[d] any buildings or installations on or adjoining any such area used in connection with the aerodrome or its administration‖ (Civil Aviation, 1948 No 12, s2, p. 130). Provision was made in section 3 (2) (f) for regulating charges for the use of aerodromes and the facilities or services they provided. This ability to impose and set charges was part of a movement towards the users of airports meeting at least part of the cost of developing and operating them.

The British Civil Aviation Mission to New Zealand was invited to review New Zealand aviation and advise the Minister in charge of the Air Department in 1948. It presented its formal report, which is also known as the Tymms Report, two months later in November of the same year. In this report the mission made recommendations to the government as to how civil aviation in New Zealand could be developed both domestically and internationally. Although some parts of the Tymms Report (1948) were never implemented by the government, the literature credits it with providing guidance (CAA, 2003) and influencing the development of civil aviation in New Zealand over the next 30 years (McGreal, 2002; Rendel, 1975). Thompson and Clements (2003) go further; they suggest that the Tymms Report ―provided New Zealand, for the first time, with a comprehensive and cohesive blueprint for its future civil aviation needs. Not a vision, but a practical plan‖ (p. 57).

The Tymms Report (1948) investigated and advised "[w]hether any change should be made ... in the organisation, administration, and control of civil aviation in New Zealand". The government wanted the report to look at four areas in particular. One of these areas was " [t]he standards required of aerodromes in New Zealand for the operation of internal and international civil air services, and the economic principles governing the provision of aerodromes and air route organisation" (p. 3). It confirmed that Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch should be served by international air services. The report recommended international land aerodromes for both Auckland and Christchurch and the use of Wellington harbour for trans-Tasman amphibious aircraft because ―the topography of country surrounding Wellington made it "impossible ... to provide an aerodrome of international standard for landplanes" (p. 34). The report suggested that although few flying boats were being built now Wellington‘s needs might "justify the retention of

seaplanes" (p. 36). The authors therefore recommended the government establish "both landplane and seaplane services across the Tasman" (p. 35) and supported TEAL‘s decision to replace their Sandringhams with the more modern British Solent flying boats. The Australian Government, a minority shareholder in TEAL, disagreed, favouring instead the purchase of American DC4 landplanes. The decision to purchase the flying boats was to limit the number of direct air services to Australia and some Pacific Islands and delay the development of ground based international airports in Auckland and Wellington for some years. The team suggested in the report that the NAC domestic operational and base headquarters be at the "natural geographical hub" Rongotai aerodrome at Wellington rather than the more expensive option, Palmerston North (p. 37). NAC subsequently moved to Wellington in the early 1950s. The Mission also recommended the use of small domestic amphibian aircraft as a cheaper option in some areas because of the need to construct costly land aerodromes as a result of the natural terrain.

The Tymms Report addressed the need for aerodrome construction and development in New Zealand and acknowledged the increasing cost of building landing areas, runways and other necessary airport facilities in difficult terrain. It recommended that a clear policy should be adopted ―regarding ownership and the responsibility for development of aerodromes required for civil aviation‖ (p. 97) and suggested that the government should accept responsibility for the ownership, ―construction, maintenance, and operation of the aerodromes‖ (p. 98) while local authorities should establish local advisory committees to provide passenger terminal facilities and amenities for the public. The British Civil Aviation Mission found that there was no "unified control of the administration and all activities of the aerodrome" in New Zealand. To remedy this situation it proposed that the Director of Civil Aviation assume responsibility for administration and operation, the Director of Air Routes and Aerodromes control the organisation, and an officer be appointed to be in charge of each aerodrome.

Of particular interest to this study are the Tymms Report‗s (1948) evaluation and recommendations concerning aerodrome revenue and charges. The Mission acknowledged that at that time, cost of providing and operating most aerodromes exceeded the revenue being derived and "the ability of the limited number of users of the aerodrome to meet the cost" (p. 100). It suggested that while the government should meet part of the cost, the user "that is, the passenger, the consignor and the consignee of goods, the user of the air mail system, and the operator of private aircraft – should bear a fair proportion" of the true cost of air transport (p 101). The report makes mention of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention which states that "there shall be uniform charges for the use of aerodromes and air navigation facilities... as between national and other aircraft engaged in similar operations" (p.101) and recommended that the international system of landing based on the weight of the aircraft and housing charges be used. It also encouraged the development of services for the public such as restaurants and car parks by local aerodrome committees (Tymms; Spencer and Warcup, 1948).

After the war most aerodromes only had basic facilities and grass runways (Rendel, 1975). The Tymms Report had highlighted the need for these aerodromes and aviation equipment and procedures to be upgraded to keep pace with the aircraft replacement programme (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986, Aimer, 2000). The closure of two inadequate key airports Rongotai (Wellington) and Mangere (Auckland) in 1947, had created problems, however. Passengers were now faced with bus rides of over an hour from city depots to makeshift terminal buildings at Paraparaumu (Wellington) and Whenuapai (Auckland). Aimer (2000, p. 41) suggests that ―no single factor damaged the [National Airways] Corporation‘s profitability [in its first three years] more than the closure of Rongotai and Mangere airports‖ as the densest air traffic in the airline‘s network was that between Nelson, Blenheim, and (Rongotai) Wellington. The travelling public now viewed alternative methods of transport such as the train, the Cook Strait ferry and small chartered aircraft from Rongotai as cheaper and more efficient options. Further damage was done to NAC‘s reputation and finances when severe flooding closed Gisborne airport from May to December 1948 and in addition three of its planes crashed. The National Government attempted to sell the struggling airline without success but eventually the ―crisis passed‖ (Wright, 2002, p. 100) and by 1952 NAC was showing a profit.

In the early 1950s major developments occurred in relation to the ownership and operation of airports with the introduction of a scheme that would result in shared ownership, cost, and revenue between the Crown and local authorities. The government also amended the Local Authorities Government Empowering (Aviation Encouragement) Act 1929 in 1956 to remove the limit on the amount of money NAC could borrow, and then amended it in 1957 to allow it to borrow on the open market. The same incentive was also used 30 years later when amendments to the Airport Authorities Act 1966 in 1986 enabled the new airport companies that were to be established to borrow on the open market.

Graham (2003) suggests that historically ―the influence of the private sector on the airport industry was very limited‖ (p. 9). In New Zealand small private licensed airlines like Northwest Airlines (1950–1951) (McConnell, 2003), South Island Airlines (1953–1956) (Waugh, 2003a), and Trans Island Airways (1956- 1959) (Waugh, 2003b) operated in aircraft that were easily accommodated by the existing airport infrastructure. Waugh (2000a) is adamant one of the reasons these small airlines experienced difficulties was the licensing regulations of 1948 which favoured the national airline:

Not only did applicants for licences have to prove they had adequate capital, evidence indicating a need for the service, sound organisational acumen and stringent safety systems, they also had to prove that ―the necessity or desirability of the proposed service‖ was not detrimental to NAC (p. 11). Almost all the small airlines subsequently ceased to operate for various financial reasons. One exception appears to have been the West Coast Airways, a subsidiary company of Southern Scenic Air Services (1947- 1967) (Waugh, 2003c) whose longevity could be attributed in part to the fact that it operated on routes that

NAC had found uneconomic. The airline consequently enjoyed at least the tacit support of the national domestic carrier (Waugh, 2003d).

South Pacific Airlines of New Zealand (SPANZ) acted as a catalyst for the development of some provincial airports. The airline gained a great deal of public support from many who were pleased to see a privately owned major domestic airline challenge the monopoly position held by the state owned NAC. The airline operated from 14 December 1960 (Waugh, 2000b) until 28 February 1966 (Waugh, 2000c). SPANZ was a public company that obtained investment from shareholders across New Zealand, and subsequently internationally when Ansett Australia Limited bought a 33% share in the company (Waugh, 2000a), later increasing it to 49% (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986; Waugh, 2000a). The original route established by the airline was from ―Auckland to Hamilton, New Plymouth, Nelson, Christchurch, Oamaru and Alexandra and back to overnight at Christchurch ... The following day the aircraft flew to Blenheim, Wellington, Masterton, Napier and Matamata and back to Auckland‖ (Waugh, 2000b, p. 29). At first the route was operated by two DC3 aircraft and ultimately three were used (Layne, 2000b). The DC3 could land on undeveloped provincial airfields but did require a long runway (Wright, 2002). Although SPANZ was keen to include more potentially lucrative tourist destinations like Rotorua, Taupo and Queenstown in 1960 it was unable to do so as these airports were not suitable or licensed for DC3 operations.

Small communities, like Matamata and Taupo, were keen to acquire a scheduled air service and as a result financed, maintained and developed their own airports. SPANZ made a financial contribution towards both airfields; paying £500 towards the cost of preparing the Matamata airfield to bring it up to DC3 standard in 1960 (Layne, 2000b; Waugh, 2000b) and 50% of the total funding required for a temporary runway on Lochinver Station at Rangitaiki 25 miles east of Taupo on 1961. SPANZ struggled from the start in a highly regulated environment. The airline was opposed by many who considered it a threat to NAC and there were difficulties with insufficient passengers, unproductive routes and the payment of airport and airways dues. The company also faced a requirement for it to charge 10% more than the fare offered by NAC on any route on which they both competed directly with each other. In 1963 SPANZ appealed to the government for financial help. The government responded by agreeing not to press for the payment of airport and airways dues for a period of two years (Layne, 2000a). Ansett withdrew from the company in August 1964 (Layne, 2000b) and by 1965 the airline had fallen further into debt with its two major creditors, the government and NAC. The former was for ―deferr[ed] airport and airways dues and providing loan assistance‖ and the latter was offering ―to take shares in SPANZ‖ for unpaid and continuing engineering services (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986, p. 193). Questions were raised in parliament about SPANZ continuing to operate in competition with NAC when the government was in effect propping it up (McGreal, 2003). The major creditors withdrew their support and SPANZ ceased trading and went into receivership in 1966 (Waugh, 2000c).

Mount Cook Airlines built two private airfields at Mount Cook; one for ski planes and the Tasman Airfield with a sealed runway which is still used today (Sheehan, 2003) and prompted airport development in tourist areas like Queenstown. NAC may have felt less threatened by the tourist focused Mount Cook Air Services, a subsidiary of the private Mount Cook and Southern Lakes Tourist Company which had flown non-scheduled services in the South Island prior to 1961 (Driscoll, 1972). The airline bought three DC3s from NAC during the early 1960s and began services to Queenstown from Dunedin and Christchurch and later Rotorua and Auckland (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986). These services were a success and on 1 January 1968 (Driscoll, 1972) the company officially took over New Zealand Tourist Travel of Queenstown which gave them an extensive light aircraft operation (Sheehan, 2003). Later the same year in November the company was renamed Mount Cook Airlines and added a Hawker Siddeley 748 turbo-prop aircraft (Driscoll, 1972) to its fleet. By the mid-1970s Mount Cook Airlines had given up its amphibious operations, added more HS748s to its fleet, and sold 15% of its shares to NAC. It was now the largest private scheduled operator in New Zealand (Ewing and Macpherson, 1986) and had extended its services to include Taupo, Hamilton, Palmerston North and Wellington in the North Island and Invercargill, Mount Cook, Milford Sound and Te Anau in the South Island. In July 1985 Air New Zealand was given approval to purchase a 77% share of the Mount Cook Group Ltd which it secured in October of that year. Six years later on 18 April 1991 Air New Zealand was finally able to acquire a 100% interest in the Mount Cook Group (Air New Zealand, 2006).