Resultados Técnica de Observación

With the link between technological prowess and national interests at its core, techno-nationalism bears different meanings when used in different contexts. It initially referred to the technology policy in the United States and other major industrial powers to prevent the foreign exploitation of their technologies in the 1980s (Ostry and Nelson 1995; Reich 1987). First appearing in the Atlantic Monthly in May 1987, the term was used to describe the emerging political concern in the United States about Japanese access to its technologies, and some national-oriented initiatives meant to give preference to American firms and protect American technological breakthroughs (Reich 1987). In relation to the fear of declining power compared

Chapter 2: A theory of firm responses to state policy

to other states, the literature on techno-nationalism has latterly been largely focused on the catch-up of emerging economies by their moving up technological ladders. Most of the scholarly efforts have pointed to the fundamental role of reducing the dependence on foreign technologies in national security and economic prosperity (Feigenbaum 2003; Keller and Samuels 2003; Samuels 1994). While in developed countries techno-nationalism is chiefly concerned with maintaining power and prosperity by protecting technological edge (Kennedy 2013), in late-industrializers it is more relevant to gaining power and wealth through enhancing technological capability.

Most existing studies on techno-nationalism focus on industrializing economies and their aspirations for technological autonomy. In Rich Nation, Strong Army, Samuels (1994: x) demonstrated that Japan built up its techno-economic power guided by such a strong ideology, in which “technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong”. Looking at China in the second half of the twentieth century, Feigenbaum (2003) provided a similar rendition highlighting the central role of technology, the strategic underpinnings of industry policy, and the indigenization of technologies. Rather than simply referring to a specific set of industrial policies, these studies covered almost every aspect of building up national technological competencies and achieving independence from other states. They ran the gamut from historically rooted motivations for self-sufficiency to national systems of innovation, and from science and technology policy to measures promoting all-round penetration of knowledge among national actors. In general, these studies featured a holistic approach, a connection between defense and commercial production, and a well-orchestrated, self-reinforcing system of cooperation between public and private sectors.

Aside from the all-encompassing approach to techno-nationalism, some studies focus on the developmental aspect of techno-nationalism with a special interest in the neo-mercantilist rationale of industrial policy. Techno-nationalism is relevant to the technology decisions of the late-industrializers that prefer “making” their own proprietary technologies and building up national firms, which Amsden (2001) referred to as “independents”. Through the examination of a wide range of underdeveloped countries in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, Amsden (2001) also discovered that another group of countries, namely “integrationists”, were generally content with “buying” skills and relying on foreign investment. The distinct patterns of technology choice represent the difference between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism, of which the latter underscores an open approach to techno-industry development. With regard to developing countries, international collaboration in innovation often means greater reliance on foreign advanced technologies than the other way round. Therefore, for the “independents” it

Pan, National champions or global partners?

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is necessary to use industrial policy to reduce the insecurity related to foreign dependence, but the “integrationists” do not have such concerns and tend to follow market mechanisms. In this sense, techno-nationalism is associated with but not limited to policy interventions that the state uses to mend market imperfections in the area of techno-industrial development.

Featuring an independent complex in industrial policy, the ideal type of techno-nationalism at one extreme of a continuum is often manifested as an intermediate regime in practice. As Kennedy (2013: 912) put it, “techno-nationalism has pragmatic variants” and “states may adopt a mix of nationalistic and liberal policies in pursuit of national technological goals”. At the core of “pragmatic techno-nationalism” is the promotion of indigenous technological capabilities by taking advantage of the opportunities provided by world economic integration, especially foreign technology transfer. The mixed regime echoes the concept of “neo-technonationalism”

that stresses four elements as expanding state commitments, public-partnerships, openness toward foreigners, and international cooperation (Yamada 2000). In other words, strategic technology and industrial policies that are motivated by nationalism often go hand in hand with

“leveraging the opportunities presented by globalization” (Suttmeier and Yao 2004: 3).

Similarly, Keller and Samuels (2003: 12) referred to the regime as “techno-hybrids”, in which countries like China “self-consciously invite high-technology foreign direct investment as a means of technical learning” and at the same time “position domestic firms to capture some portion of added value in the production process”. With deepening globalization, therefore, the efforts of nurturing domestic innovation capacity and achieving technological autonomy in many countries often involve active engagement with the world economy.

In this sense, techno-nationalism should be treated as an ideological motivation and in many cases involves the expedient use of mercantile and liberal policy instruments. Some studies have underscored the historical legacy and a policy orientation toward technological autonomy in many late developers. Even though Naughton and Segal (2003: 161) acknowledged that China became more open to foreign technology and investments than in the past, they insisted that

“China remains strongly technonationalist” if techno-nationalism is conceptualized “as an ideological orientation toward self-sustained autonomy and independence from other states, rather than a specific set of policies”. Similarly, Segal (2003: 167) also argued that “it is important to stress the strategic context of technonationalism rather than the policy tools”. On top of the historical legacy and continuity of a nationalistic sentiment, some scholars paid attention to policy variation and changes that many countries have undergone as a result of changing global economic environment. In the Rise of “the Rest”, Amsden (2001) stressed that the “independents” need to buy large quantities of foreign technology. Even Japan, the paradigmatic example of techno-nationalism, used to rely on imported technology and its

Chapter 2: A theory of firm responses to state policy

technological success was attributed to “the paradox of autonomy through dependence”

(Samuels 1994: 271). These studies paved the ways for the understanding of mixed policy regimes. Be it “neo-technonationalism”, “techno-hybrids”, “open techno-nationalism” (Kang and Segal 2006), or “pragmatic techno-nationalism” (Kennedy 2013), a common aspiration of the late-industrializers is to seek a balance between achieving technological independence and maintaining links with the outside world.

The literature on techno-nationalism is rich and multifaceted, and an understanding of the term should not miss the following connotations. First, even though techno-nationalism can be protecting or gaining technological preeminence, it is often examined in the context of late-industrializing countries aiming for technological competencies and autonomy. Second, it is related to but should not be reduced to state intervention and policy tools meant to mitigate the risks of foreign technology dependence. Third, techno-nationalism is often not the antithesis of an open economy but may be pursued in a pragmatic manner that allows for exchange with the outside world (Kennedy 2013). In brief, pragmatic variants of techno-nationalism are common in the government effort towards achieving technological autonomy.