RIEGO POR GOTEO

Having completed the pragmatic examination, in this section I focus on outlining specifically what it implies for other accounts of the epistemic condition, and how it’s adoption might be encouraged. In section 6.4.3.1, I outline the implications for Sher’s account, and provide some useful exploration to how the pragmatic might be adopted more widely. In 6.4.3.2, I propose and answer some lingering questions about view 2, i.e. the pragmatic view. And finally, in 6.4.3.3, I present a summary of some key philosophical differences between view 2 and Sher’s account, and illustrate how view 2 might (or might not) conform with other accounts that have been discussed in this thesis.

6.4.3.1 Implications for Sher and challenges of adoption

In section 6.3, I presented an epistemically motivated thought experiment, accompanied with epistemic arguments, to illustrate why view 2 would seem better justified than view 1. Further, in sections 6.4.1–6.4.2, I presented a philosophical pragmatic argument in support of view 2 as well as evidence from social psychology to support view 1 being counterproductive in terms of best fulfilling our moral goals. Both of these can be viewed as arguments to undermine Sher’s FEC clause 2 (see sect. 4.1 or 4.2), insofar as Bob and Jack are considered to fall under that clause, which was represented by view 1 judgments of them. As mentioned in 6.3.1 (n144), it isn’t clear to me why Bob – and by extension Jack – would not fall under the clause. The case of Bob and Jack acting badly due

to ignorance of the evidence seems to be especially comparable to Sher’s example cases Bad Policy and Bad Weather (see sect. 3.3.2; cf. 6.1.1).¹⁷⁸ Just as Sylvain continues to act unfairly due to his ignorance (or unawareness) of the deficiencies of emotional empathy (see 6.1.1.3), and amerika preparing and killing for a revolution due to his ignorance (or unawareness) of the deficiencies of his ideology (6.1.1.3), Bob and Jack seem to be acting in comparable ignorance (or “lack of moral insight or imagination”). Thus, it seems the arguments presented against view 1 apply against Sher’s clause 2 as well.¹⁷⁹ In terms of the question presented at the end of section 3.3.2, of whether we should rather question our intuitions or to question the role of awareness in responsibility, it now seems that we should rather question our intuitions, if we want to take our moral aims seriously.¹⁸⁰

However, given that Sher’s account or some other non-pragmatic account is, by and wide, a representation of the intuitions of the majority, it may be asked if view 2 is too demanding of people.¹⁸¹ This seems to be a legitimate concern: how realistic is it to ask people to change their intuitions regarding responsibility and agent evaluation? I am not sure, but the more people could adopt view 2 the better the outcome would seem to be. This doesn’t mean everyone needs to change their intuitions: it already helps that people who are disposed to change theirs keep working at it, and people who already possess different intuitions to Sher’s are encouraged to acknowledge how their view might be beneficial to tweak and embrace.

In the process of wider change and adoption, for example metacognitive training (e.g., Callender et al. 2016; Stokes 2012), perspective taking training (e.g., Hooper et al. 2015), compassion interventions (e.g., Klimecki et al. 2013, 2014), as well as some (further) forms of mindfulness or meditation (e.g., Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno 2013; Hopthrow et al. 2016; Lim, Condon,

& DeSteno 2015; Wang, Geng, Schultz, & Zhou 2019) may be seen to play beneficial roles, especially if properly implemented to our educational institutions.¹⁸² If ethical reasons are not enough, this implementation could be motivated by the mere learning benefits these methods are likely to bring, while their effects on our moral intuitions could be considered a welcome byproduct.¹⁸³ Raising awareness of the importance to effectively communicate knowledge would likely motivate us to not only follow through with the subsequent responsibility, and accordingly practice more pragmatic agent evaluation, but also better pre-emptively fact-check our own beliefs; as we are then responsible to others, not just to our biased selves.¹⁸⁴ Simultaneously, we ought to strive to become better self-aware of our many biases, and systematically meditate on them (e.g., Hopthrow et al. 2016). At the very least, it seems plausible that a considerable number of people could learn new heuristics to utilize in their moral judgments: if we can reflect our judging detached perspective from a further critical

detached perspective, we may come to engage with the world in a more fruitful way (see also Flanagan 2017, 157–216; sect. 6.6).

While encouraging critical evaluation of our detached perspective, the pragmatic view can also be seen to encourage us to reflect on the importance of the engaged perspective – after all, the perspectives seem to be significantly interlinked (see sect. 6.2.1). Particularly, in the thought experiment, Bob and Jack are victims of their respective limited epistemic states, which are essentially cognitive states that concern their engaged perspectives in relation to their beliefs and actions. And the only thing that can free them from their limited states are outside agents who notice those limits within Bob and Jack’s perspectives, manifested via all the possible beliefs and acts that imply deep unawareness of some crucial knowledge (in Bob’s case unawareness concerning, for example, media literacy, science literacy, and AGW; and in Jack’s case unawareness concerning effective communication to people like Bob). Only these outside agents, who know better, can set out to help the misguided Bob and Jack by addressing their mistaken (meta)knowledge and consequent behavior. And they should aim to do so in the most pragmatic ways they know how to convey information and illicit cognitive change. In the process, they are also the only ones who can enable Bob and Jack to rationally accept responsibility to change their actions, after successfully passing on the required knowledge (6.3.2 & 6.3.3). Of course, some misguided people may find and fix their errors all by themselves, but we should never blindly count on it, because we do not know how deep a mistake or an error in another’s epistemic state goes (6.3 & 6.4).

It should be underlined still that if due to our communicative efforts someone misguided – like Bob or Jack – comes to subsequently ‘accept (taking) responsibility’ relevant to the knowledge they previously lacked, as is the goal, this does not mean they ‘accept being responsible’ nor that they

‘were responsible’ for their relevant beliefs or acts that were done prior successful belief revision (6.2.2). That is, when Bob or Jack accept responsibility it does not follow that they were responsible.

Indeed, it seems they were not responsible if they were acting in ignorance of some relevant (meta)knowledge, insofar as they display regret for acting how they did after they successfully gain the (meta)knowledge (6.1.1.4). When they accept responsibility – which seems to often happen near the first point of feeling other-regarding sorrow and regret connected to the gained knowledge – what they are accepting is that they previously lacked important (meta)knowledge that they are henceforth aware of and willing to incorporate into their future decision-making processes lest they otherwise become responsible for related future decisions, and liable to be held responsible, for now they possess the requisite (meta)knowledge. For our moral goals, this appears to be all that matters.

One additional way to think about these issues, and one that also illuminates how we might want to think about effective persuasion, is illustrated by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s rider-and-elephant metaphor, briefly mentioned at the end of section 4.1.4, in note 81 (see Haidt 2012, 52–83).

Essentially, one ought to try to appeal to and affect the elephant (a priori automatic processes), not the rider (post hoc reasoning). When one encounters a rider, and asserts responsibility, the rider will likely continue rationalizing the elephant’s movement who may be reacting aggressively to being challenged on a basis it is not properly aware of (e.g., when holding Bob or Jack responsible before properly communicating the relevant knowledge to them) – in which case responsibility as an action-guiding tool can quickly fail its intent. So how to effectively appeal to the habits of the elephant instead? Via the right kind of communication that compassionately thinks before it judges, while speaking to the elephant when communicating the knowledge. In addition to presenting evidence – and even more importantly – this might include, for example, moral reframing, analogous thought experiments, Socratic questioning¹⁸⁵, principle of charity, assumption of sincerity, making sure the matter is not merely of terminological or definitional in nature, finding ways to replace any necessary emotional needs the false belief might serve¹⁸⁶, and generally forming a positive and trusting relationship with the rider and elephant rather than just letting your own reactionary elephant take the rein. In effect: try to get the target elephant to persuade itself. Conveniently, at the same time, we would seem to open our own elephant to better accept its own fallibility, and thus open ourselves to new viewpoints and arguments.¹⁸⁷

Following this note from Haidt, we may find one answer to the question proposed at the end of section 4.1.4 (see also sect. 4.1.3.2–4.1.3.5; 5.2; Waller 2014, 639–641): why should merely the part of us who is aware be responsible, when the thought processes that we are aware of rely on processes we are not aware of? One answer could be: Because it seems misguided to hold the part of us who is unaware directly responsible via the part who is aware, when the actual culprit in (faux-)control is much deeper inside us (even deeper than any information we have acquired but are unaware of). And, more importantly, because most often the actual culprit seems not to be efficiently corrected via assignments of responsibility. Instead, most often it seems best corrected either via very careful and considerate discussions with the agent who represents it, by those who know better, or via new (meta)knowledge being accumulated in the agent experientially without such communication. In a sense, Sher is arguing that we hold the elephant and rider responsible and direct blame at them, but that is exactly what we ought not do: it encourages reactive dogmatic response (in those who do not possess knowledge relevant to the responsibility), instead of encouraging openness and building a trusting dialogue.

6.4.3.2 Questions about the pragmatic view

In this section, I pose and answer some lingering questions that the pragmatic account has raised.

These should further clarify the view.

Question 1: If knowledge should come prior to responsibility, how can those who possess knowledge about AGW or social psychology, for example, be responsible to suspend their likely intuitive judgment on Bob and Jack’s moral responsibility and instead only try to effectively communicate with them?

It is true that we cannot hold anyone responsible to suspend their judgment on the agents’

responsibility by default. People would first need to become aware of, and properly understand and internalize the kind of philosophical theses and their justifications as presented here. They would become responsible when they realize they are the only ones who can have responsibility relevant to the (meta)knowledge and justifications they possess, and that others do not necessarily possess that knowledge. This ought to give them justification and motivation to try to most effectively communicate with others, which, if I am correct, would imply adopting view 2.

Question 2: What about research that seems to conflict with the empirical evidence presented in section 6.4.2? For example, research about “guilt appeals” (see, e.g., Graton, Ric, & Gonzalez 2017;

Xu & Guo 2017)?

The question assumes that guilt appeals are comparable to assignments of responsibility – which I am not sure if they are. In many cases, they would seem to be at most some specific form of implicit assignment of responsibility – which mere communication of information can also be, though ideally in a more neutral way still. In any case, it seems to me that the value of guilt appeals is also optimized via view 2. That is, it seems most effective to make appeals to those who have come to possess knowledge relevant to the appeal, and otherwise the appeal may not reach its aim, or it may even backfire (see Wonneberger 2017).

Still, insofar as guilt appeals, or, for example, mere group pressure, can encourage people to change their transgressive behavior, at least in the case of AGW they should be encouraged, especially via intergovernmental regulations and transnational treatises. However, mere guilt appeal or group pressure having moved someone to conform does not mean they themself have sufficient justification based on understanding the evidence (or based on understanding why some people can be considered reliable testifiers to that evidence). And, of course, guilt appeals as well as group pressure can

themselves be often misguided in relation to proper evidence. Thus, to optimally eliminate the chance of people at some point rebelling (if they are the uninformed target of the appeal) and to optimally address the possibility that unsubstantiated evidence is utilized (by the ones making the appeal), as well as to make social deliberation more effective in general, it would seem most reasonable to encourage adaptation of view 2 – even if guilt appeals are at the same time utilized in some carefully considered contexts.

Question 3: Couldn’t we just deal responsibility however we like, insofar as we then commit to defend the possible further assertions (epistemic or otherwise) that lay behind our assignment of responsibility? This way we would spread the relevant knowledge and justifications, but only after first assigning responsibility.

Granted, it would seem most important that the knowledge gets to spread at some point.

However, there are some problems with this suggestion. One problem seems to be revealed when spectating the discourse space on social media (see sect. 1.1; 6.4.2.1n164): many people largely just assign responsibility, and then leave it at that (and this often happens rudely and on misguided premises about what happened, I might add). Of course, this is no worse a problem than the one view 2 seems to face: majority seems not to have adopted this way of thinking. But there is also a bigger problem with the suggestion: the rationalizing, defensive psychological effect seems to be immediate when assigning what the agent’s intuitive elephant judges to be unfounded responsibility, and thus the damage is already done even if immediately afterwards trying to communicate relevant knowledge to the rationalizing rider. Thus, view 2 would seem like the better option, encouraging us to suspend judgment on the agent’s responsibility, and instead focus on proactively communicating the relevant knowledge that would give sufficient reasons for the agent to change their beliefs (and subsequently take responsibility).

Question 4: What would this entail for democratic decision making, laws, or international treaties?

Would it mean, for example, that all kinds of collective responsibility would be misguided as not everyone knows all the relevant laws and treaties?

It seems to me that the commonly understood notions of responsibility in terms of obeying the law or following international treaties would be little to no affected. Legal responsibility and democratic attendance are not the same as moral responsibility. This is perhaps clarified, also in any further sense of collective responsibility, by noting that democratic institutions and the rule of law necessarily require only the executive institutions to be informed in some organized manner (even

though it is advisable for the educational and media institutions to communicate any relevant knowledge to the wider public). If someone is not aware of some law, they can still be legally responsible, and they can still be held legally responsible if the executive institution finds out about them performing illegal actions.

Strictly speaking, this is separate from the interpersonal moral responsibility in question in the overall discussion about the epistemic condition. Any collective responsibility related to citizens of democratic governments seem to arise via citizens being engaged in citizenship – albeit usually by force of birth. Thus, insofar as Bob is living in a democracy, he is presumably committed to following, for example, carbon taxes, should they be legislated, despite him not believing in AGW. To follow any democratic laws is Bob’s first-order duty, while communicating about any law that he sees misguided is a second-order duty. The collective responsibility arising in a democracy seems to significantly concern the willingness to follow the laws that are in effect, excluding civil disobedience, while also enjoying from the privilege of being free to campaign to change any laws one sees to be misguided. In other words, the privileges of democracy entails commitment to any democratic decisions made, and a freedom to try to affect future decisions the best one sees fit.

That being said, if Bob does not know why democracy is a better form of government compared to any other alternatives (assuming it is), or what a proper citizenship entails, or why a given law is or is not good for the society, this should be communicated to him in a pragmatic manner also, rather than hold him de facto morally responsible for his (potential) ignorance and actions that accompany and signify that ignorance. Ideally, this communication would also be done prior to any relevant law changes, though that seems an unfortunately tall order for all the Bobs and Jacks and newborns in the world and for all possible changes in law (especially insofar as view 1 is widely adopted). Still, it is something to strive for. In any case, even after any changes in law, it seems most pragmatic to not hold Bob morally responsible insofar as he genuinely lacks relevant knowledge. Instead, we ought to try to communicate that knowledge to him the best we know how, even if it is amidst him misguidedly campaigning or acting against some new (or old) law.

Question 5: Still, isn’t the pragmatic view simply asking too much of people if they ought to suspend their judgment about moral responsibility until relevant knowledge would have been communicated to the target agent(s)?

To be clear, it is not so much that the pragmatic view asks much anything of people per se, it is merely asking us to pay more attention to the knowledge requirement and to what could be done to

pragmatically account for it and to implement that account into our communication. Practically, what is being asked is for the pragmatic view to be well noted and implemented into our educational institutions, via implementation of relevant philosophy, psychology, and critical thinking into the curricula. And, further, what is being asked is for the pragmatic view to be noted in the new media landscape and amplified via educational communication where possible. These are all very well achievable, practical steps that can be taken to mitigate the effects of the current times of polarization (see sect. 1.1 & 1.2). Additionally, anyone who finds these arguments appealing can and ought to make a personal project out of reflecting the aspects relevant to one’s own thinking and behavior, and how one could become more productive and prosocial in communicating across groups.

Question 6: The pragmatic view advocates for cultivating what seem to be minority intuitions relating to agent evaluation and communication, and thus the focus is on cultivating the (meta)cognitive processes of the evaluator. Why not instead advocate for cultivating some minority intuitions relating

Question 6: The pragmatic view advocates for cultivating what seem to be minority intuitions relating to agent evaluation and communication, and thus the focus is on cultivating the (meta)cognitive processes of the evaluator. Why not instead advocate for cultivating some minority intuitions relating