SEPARACION ENTRE LAS TOMAS DE TIERRA DE LAS MASAS DE LAS INSTALACIONES DE UTILIZACION Y DE LAS MASAS DE UN CENTRO DE TRANSFORMACION

Broadly speaking, there can be distinguished four types of answers to the revisionist implication of the regress argument. These positions have been labelled a bit differently by Wieland (2017) and Rudy-Hiller (2018). Mentioning Wieland’s categories first followed by Rudy-Hiller’s, they correspond as follows: [I] internalist-friendly responses, i.e. weakened internalism; [II] externalist responses, i.e. accounts of ignorance and epistemic vices; [III] orthodoxy-breaking responses (internalists and externalists both accept the orthodoxy), i.e. capacitarianism; and [IV] quality-of-will accounts of blameworthiness for ignorance (as opposed to accounts of prior blameworthy conduct), i.e. quality-of-will accounts. Here, I will adopt the latter terms by Rudy-Hiller. Further, there could be distinguished accounts of moral responsibility skepticism, which are largely omitted from examination by both Wieland and Rudy-Hiller (cf. Caruso 2018), though revisionism may be viewed as a form of skepticism. These are omitted from this examination also, yet do briefly come up elsewhere in the thesis (e.g., sect. 6.1.2 & 6.6.3).

Below, in sections 5.4.4.1–5.4.4.4, I briefly summarize the four answers, respectively, in terms of how they approach the revisionist implications. Wieland’s reconstructed regress argument presented in the previous section above should be a useful reference. I also list some philosophers that Wieland mentions to have advocated the positions, and provide my initial thoughts on the positions. These will follow and summarize Wieland’s account (2017), but see Rudy-Hiller (2018) for an alternative, more in-depth exposition, and Talbert (2017, ch. 5) for a yet additional outline.

5.4.4.1 Weakened internalism

These internalist-friendly responses accept (1)–(6) of Wieland’s reconstruction of Zimmerman’s regress argument, but propose a more liberal reading of (2) and (5), avoiding the revisionist conclusion in part. (Wieland 2017, 14.)

The idea is that blameworthiness can be traced back not only to akrasia, but also to other mental states. For example, even if one is unaware that their act is wrong when performing it, one might nonetheless suspect that it is, or hold the belief unconsciously that it is, or have sufficient (even though indecisive) evidence that it is. If this sort of view is accepted, then Zimmerman’s criteria may be satisfied much more frequently. (Wieland 2017, 15.)

According to Wieland, this sort of view has been advocated by, for example, Haji 1997, Peels 2011, and Robichaud 2014. (ibid.)

Personally, I have doubts about this position because it appears that if we are epistemically honest, or properly skeptical, this may very often be our predicament when making choices. At least I personally have these kinds of suspicions all the time, concerning choices to all sorts of directions, with different seemingly valid arguments supporting different choices. The present discussion about what would be the right choice of view about the epistemic condition being only one example. The work required to make even a choice that appears right is thus arguably a great ordeal, the success of which to some significant degree rests on luck. Consequently, if weakened internalism was accepted, it would seem I could be held responsible very arbitrarily for some things yet not for some other things.

5.4.4.2 Ignorance and epistemic vices

These externalist responses deny (5)–(6) as necessary for (4) in favor of an alternative sufficient condition for (4) relating to epistemic vices. (Wieland 2017, 14.)

The idea is that blameworthiness may trace not only to akrasia, but also to the exercise of epistemic vices (e.g., laziness, arrogance, incuriosity, dogmatism). And these vices can be sufficient for blameworthiness; i.e., even if the agent is not aware that they are doing anything wrong, they can be blameworthy if their ignorance is due to their vices. However, some externalists add that history of S’s vices is also relevant. According to these views, S may be blameless for A1 if they had no opportunities to be less vicious (e.g., due to warped upbringing and non-virtuous surroundings). Thus, with the historical condition, the view is that S is blameworthy for A1 if A1 is due to S’s epistemic vices and S had normal opportunities to develop his/her virtues. (Wieland 2017, 15–16.)

According to Wieland, this sort of view has been advocated by, for example, Montmarquet 1999, FitzPatrick 2008, 2017 (accepting the historical condition), and Talbert 2017 (without accepting the historical condition). (ibid.)

Personally, I view the variation with the historical condition more promising, but even then – foreshadowing chapter 6 – I have doubts about this position because it seems to ignore the pragmatic possibility that virtue might be better taught and spread without appealing to responsibility. Also, it is unclear how we would confirm someone having had or having been deprived of “normal”

opportunities.

5.4.4.3 Capacitarianism

These orthodox-breaking responses deny (2)–(3) as necessary for (1) in favor of an alternative sufficient condition for (1). (Wieland 2017, 15.)

The idea is that S’s blameworthiness for A2 does not imply that S is blameworthy for her ignorance that A2 is wrong. Thus, S can be blameworthy for A2 without requiring any other blameworthiness fact to be true of S. Instead, it suffices for blameworthiness that S’s unawareness of relevant aspects of their situation falls below a cognitive standard that applies to them, given their cognitive and volitional abilities and the situation they are in. (Wieland 2017, 16–17.)

As established, Sher (2009) represents this type of account (ch. 3 & 4). According to Wieland, another prominent advocate is Clarke 2014. (ibid.)

As chapter 6 especially underlines, these views appear to rely on suspect intuitions. Indeed, in addition to what I discuss there, and what has been discussed thus far, Neil Levy (2017) has provided an error theory for the intuitions that motivate Clarke (see also Wieland 2017, 17–18).

5.4.4.4 Quality of will

Accounts focusing on quality of will (rather than on prior blameworthy conduct) deny (4) as necessary for (3) in favor of an alternative sufficient condition for (3) (and for a range of things). (Wieland 2017, 15.)

Different quality-of-will theorists differ in details, but they are united in their denial that blameworthiness for unwitting acts is derivative (i.e., in particular, they deny that blameworthiness for unwitting acts is to be explained by blameworthiness for benighting acts). Instead, blameworthiness for unwitting acts – and for many other things, e.g., benighting acts, failures to notice, remember, and other attitudes – is to be explained by a lack of moral concern. This is similar to the epistemic vices account except the focus is not on the lack in epistemic attitudes but moral.

(Wieland 2017, 18–19; see also Wieland 2017, 20–22.)

According to Wieland, some variations of this account have been provided by, for example, A.

M. Smith 2005, Arpaly 2003, and Björnsson 2017. The following approximations of these views may serve as examples of the variety in quality-of-will accounts: As established in section 5.2, Smith approximately views that S can be blameworthy for an attitude, including a failure to recognize or remember something, if S’s attitude is due to a lack of moral concern on S’s part. Arpaly approximately views that S is blameworthy for some unwitting A2 if, and only if, A2 is due to a lack

of concern for the features that make A2 wrong (i.e., lack of de re concern¹⁰⁴ ; see sect. 5.4.1.1). And Björnsson approximately views that S is blameworthy for X when and insofar as X is explained by S’s quality-of-will falling short of what can reasonably be expected. According to Wieland, many others have also defended variations of the quality-of-will approach, including many writers in Robichaud & Wieland 2017 (namely Talbert, Harman, Zimmerman, Mason and Wilson, Alvarez and Littlejohn). (Wieland 2017, 18–19.)

Personally, I view these positions comparatively promising out of the four answers to revisionism. However, like in the epistemic case (sect. 5.4.4.2), I am likewise uncertain whether appealing to responsibility is the best way to elicit or teach moral virtues. I am also cautiously sympathetic towards revisionism itself, as well as more largely towards moral responsibility skepticism. However, some of the quality-of-will accounts are interested in responsibility as attributability rather than accountability (Wieland 2017, 19n21), which may partly explain why I find them the most promising: they may be interpreted in terms of a forward-looking consequentialist view of responsibility, instead of a backward-looking merit-based view of responsibility (cf. sect. 2.2;

see also Caruso 2018, ch. 1).