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Ezzat Ali Ezzat (1983) pointed out that the first press law in Bahrain and in the Gulf States was established in 1930 by the British adviser to the government of Bahrain. The intent behind the legislation was to monitor journalists. This was evident in the provision that "any correspondent who works for a newspaper, or a freelance reporter, must record his name and the newspaper he works for in the department of the Bahraini government". The penalty for breaking this press law could be a fine or imprisonment for a period of 6 months (pp. 111-112). The second press law that was established in 1953, granted the local authorities the right to refuse to provide press licenses without having to give a reason, and the power to suspend and confiscate the property of a newspaper that broke the law. In 1954, another law was announced before it was replaced in 1965 by a new press law that was declared by the Prince of Bahrain, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalia to become the first law to be announced by the royal family itself (pp. 112-114). This 1965 law granted the manager of the Information Department the power to suspend the publication of newspapers, or to revoke a newspaper license (pp. 116-118). A television report produced in 1966 by BBC about the political situation in Bahrain showed that the ruling family rejected the concept of freedom of press early (Ibnkan 2012b).

The 2002 the Press, Printing and Publishing law replaced the 1965 law. This new legislation was ratified by the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, and grants wide powers to his government as represented by its Information Affairs Authority. Control of the media is given to the regime with the power to refuse or

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suspend licenses for media outlets: Article 4 of the law states that "Anyone who wishes to establish a printing press, before carrying out any business in it, shall obtain licensure for this purpose from the Ministry." The law also closely monitors journalists' work. For example, Article 68 paragraphs (B) and (D) states that a journalist can be punished for criticizing the king or for instigating the overthrow of the regime. This new level of regulation encourages self-censorship by both journalists and editors. As a 2014 report by the US State Department comments, the current press law grants wide control to the regime over media in Bahrain:

The government did not own any print media, but the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) and other government entities exercised considerable control over privately owned domestic print media. The government owned and operated all domestic radio and television stations. (U.S. Department of State 2014).

Moreover, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011) that was established by the King of Bahrain reported that the regime, through its control over media, launched media campaigns to vilify the opposition (p. 178). A recent example of the strict control by the regime is that a new pan-Arab news television channel Al Arab owned by the Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal was halted by the regime hours after it started airing live from its offices in the capital Manama. While several media reports suggested "technical and administrative reasons", other reports cited an

"offending interview" with an opposition leader (Black 2015; Omran 2015; BBC 2015; Khalifa and Schreck 2015). With such strict control over the media, anti-government activists have had to resort to social media to organize their activities and to exchange news about the uprising. This use of social media is in line with the activities of many opposition campaigns to organize demonstrations in "The Arab Spring". However, what is somewhat unusual in the Bahrain context is that the regime also incorporated social media into its strategies to crack down on the uprising.

While other national governments, such as the former regime, attempted to block satellite coverage nationally to prevent the opposition from using social media to organize protests (Freedom House 2012a), in Bahrain the regime itself used the online social networking service Facebook to identify protesters (Welsh 2011).

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Within days of The Athletes’ March, a Facebook page was set up to post images of activists, or sometimes even peripheral participants photographed during the protest marches, who were labelled as "traitors". Bahrainis were called on to look through the images to see if they recognized their neighbours or colleagues, and then to post information about their names, age or work place. Some of those people who were identified were sacked from their jobs or detained.

Bahrain has one of the best levels of the Internet coverage in the Middle East countries and there are a number of service providers including Batelco, a company that is operated through the royal family. This, however, does not mean that all Bahraini had access to social media or alternative political websites during the uprising. According to the Reporters Without Borders report (2012a), the level of Internet filtering and surveillance in Bahrain is one of the highest in the world and Bahrain was added to the list of "Internet Enemies" in 2012. The regime also targeted pro-opposition activists to stop online activities. The online surveillance has increased since the 2011 uprising:

The National Safety Status (emergency law) was initiated in March 2011 for two and a half months, leading to an intensive punitive campaign against bloggers and internet users (among others) that was characterized by mass arrests, incommunicado detention, torture, military trials, harsh imprisonment sentences, and dismissal from work and study based on online posts or mobile content. (Freedom House 2012b).

The screenshot presented in Figure 8 shows an example of a Facebook page that was created to target protesters. The page was titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite Traitors" with an image of the King, the Bahrain flag, the map of Bahrain and the subtitle "The Kingdom remains for Al-Khalifa". The page was soon closed by the Facebook management after reports sent by pro-opposition activists but another page was later created titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite Traitors 2". Thousands of pictures and large amounts of personal information about people who participated in the demonstrations or those who attended the Pearl Roundabout were posted and made public to facilitate arrest of the protesters who were called "betrayers".

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Figure 8: A Facebook page that included protesters' personal information. The still taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011)

The screenshot in Figure 9 shows a photograph sample of the social media campaign launched against the protesters. It shows a protester carrying a sign in Arabic that states: "ماظنلا طاقسإ ديري بعشلا" which can be translated as: "The People Want to Topple the Regime". The photograph was posted on Facebook and eventually ticked "هلاقتعا مت" which means "arrested" after the individual in the screenshot was successfully identified via social media networks. The protester’s name, his job and work place had been identified. In comments on Facebook, pro-regime users called for the death or imprisonment of those who participated in the uprising or those who visited the Pearl Roundabout.

Figure 9: A photograph of a protester posted in a Facebook page and ticked "arrested". The still taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011)

Journalists were also the target of pro-regime Facebook campaigns. For example, pro-regime Facebook users created a page titled "Nicholas D. Kristof – A true Liar of the Media". Nicholas Kristof is an American journalist who was detained and deported from Bahrain after reporting about the crackdown and banned from entering the country. This page, although no longer active, was created on February

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22, 2011 only 8 days after the beginning of the uprising. It was posted on April 15, 2011. All posts were in English including the following:

Nicholas D. Kristof is a man of lies, all his news about Bahrain is bull.... This makes me think, what about the other so called undercover missions he did that brought good to the society? probably was all lies as well.. I'm glad now I know. Media can never be trusted! specially with one as an imbecile as this one!

There are no official records of the pages that were created by the pro-regime activists during this time; however, a pro-opposition online forum listed 106 pages and 15 personal accounts on Facebook that were removed by the Facebook management in the period between March and July 2011 as a result of an anti-government activists' campaign (Fajrbh 2011). While there is no evidence to link the regime to the publication of these Facebook pages, it was clear from the site visitors and comments that ministries and government officials were following the posts to gather information about their employees who had participated in the demonstrations (Welsh 2011).

Most significantly for this present thesis, are many of the edited digital images of sports figures and journalists that were shown in the "special" broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel, an official channel owned by the regime, on April 4, 2011.

Days after the broadcast of these images during a special televised event, the identified sports figures were arrested or singled out to be subjected to an investigation by their teams and to public prosecution.

Figure 10: A still from the Bahrain Sports Channel With the Event broadcast on April 4, 2011 (Bahrain Sports Channel 2011)

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After the Pearl Roundabout crackdown, some official figures of the Al-Khalifa regime appeared in public in the company of those who were believed to be the online activists who launched internet campaigns against pro-opposition activists.

For instance, the Prime Minister of Bahrain, the Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, on June 23, 2014 met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman, one of the royal family members who is believed to be "Mnarfezhom" (the one who jitters them) and a Twitter user who led a campaign against the protesters by circling their faces and publishing private information about them (Bahrain Mirror 2014). In fact,

"Mnarfezhom" and other users such as "Hareghum" (the one who burns them),

"Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of Al-Waleed" are anonymous online social networking users believed to be answerable to the regime. The real personalities of "Mnarfezhom", "Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of Al-Waleed" were revealed after Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman alongside others were interrogated for their online activities against some pro-regime figures.

While he was not asked about his activities against regime opponents, some pro-regime figures sued "Mnarfezhom" for accusing them of planning secret activities against the regime (Al-Watan 2014; Al-Wasat 2014; Manama Voice 2014).

Figure 11: The Prime Minister of Bahrain Prince Khalifa bin Salman (left) meets Mohammed bin Salman who is believed to be Mnarfezhom (Bahrain News Agency 2014a)

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The regime in Bahrain has also been accused of using social media to spy, identify and monitor pro-opposition users by sending malicious spy links. As Bahrain Watch reported in 2013:

Since September 2011 or earlier, Bahrain’s Government has been targeting anonymous social media accounts, apparently in an effort to identify their operators. The Government targets accounts using malicious links and social engineering. It appears that the Ministry of Interior's Cyber Crime Unit is orchestrating the attack.

(Bahrain Watch 2013).

Reports from non-governmental organizations have raised concerns about the use of special software to crack down on online activists in regional countries such as Saudi Arabia. With the increase of protests against the Saudi regime, Human Rights Watch has investigated whether surveillance software was used to identify Shiite online activists in this country.

According to the Human rights Watch, independent security researchers reported on June 24, 2014 that the Saudi government has been hacking into mobile phones by creating a malicious application that provides access to the Qatif Al-Youm (Al-Qatif Today), an Arabic language news and information network of the Eastern Province town of Al-Qatif. The report indicates that the spyware enables the government to access the phone’s files of applications such as Facebook, Whatsapp or Skype, messages, contacts and call history, the phone's email. The report also suggest that the spyware can operate the phone's camera or its microphone to take pictures or record conversations without the holder being aware (Human Rights Watch 2014). This shows that the regimes in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are monitoring, not just the mainstream media, but also online media. While the troops of both regimes' were involved in the crackdown on the opposition in Bahrain, the human rights organizations reports show that both regimes have used the same methods to identify online opposition.