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The ‘Chinese Dream’ is the new government’s political slogan. This occurred after President Xi Jinping's speech when he was elected by the 12th National People's Congress in March 2013 (China Daily, 2013). According to President Xi, the

‘Chinese Dream’ refers to ‘the rejuvenation of the nation and prosperity of the country and the wellbeing of the Chinese people’ (Xinhua, 2013). This concept is now widely upheld by the party and promoted by mainstream media. For example, a talent show of the syndicated version of Chinese Idol on television is even translated as ‘The Voice of the Chinese Dream’ and schools organise speech competitions about this ideal. Vice-President Li Yuanchao has called for the dissemination of the concept of the Chinese Dream among children so as to inspire their ideals of becoming contributors to national rejuvenation. Li made these remarks when he visited students in Xianyang City of northwest China's Shaanxi province, a day before International Children's Day. He urged the Chinese Young Pioneers, the country's largest children's organisation to promote the Chinese dream among children and inspire their senses about science and creativity. In his view, children should be educated to love the country and become builders and creators as well as contributor to the Chinese dream (China Daily, 2014).

From ‘Four Modernisations’, ‘Three Represents’, ‘Harmonious Society’, the latest slogan of the ‘Chinese Dream’ integrates national and personal aspirations, with the twin goals of reclaiming national pride and achieving personal wellbeing.

Individualism is now addressed as a Chinese national goal for the first time. Since the humiliating events of the 19th century in China, for example the Opium War and Western Imperialism from 1750 to 1919, China’s goals have been to gain wealth and strength through modernisation. Chinese state policy regarding modernisation differs

from the western concept of modernity. Despite historical Westernisation movements, reforms and revolutions, Chinese people have sought prosperity. From another perspective, such movements, reforms and revolutions have transformed China from an ancient civilisation to a modernised nation and from a closed nation to one open to the world. The Four Modernisation development path includes the ongoing development of and a reinvigoration of the overall state of the economy measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country (OECD, 2014). The Reform and Opening Program initiated in the early 1980s was aligned with the mission of achieving ‘Industrialization, Application of Information Technology, Urbanisation and Agricultural Modernization’ (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2011). As a government-led effort, the Reform and Opening-up Program is a national policy whose social aspects include industrial modernisation, agricultural modernisation, modernisation of defense and modernisation of science and technologies. In the 1960s President Mao Zedong tried to achieve a somewhat utopian view of prosperity through Marxism. Later, for Deng Xiaoping and his successors, the ideology was more flexible although party control was absolute.

Since Jiang Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’ has meant the Communist Party must embody a changing society, allowing private businessmen to join the Communist Party. ‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui) was the political ideology and concept introduced by President Hu Jintao in 2002. It refers to the aim of achieving social stability (Chan & Terence, 2011). The ‘Chinese Dream’ embodies some common aspirations for the stable development of the domestic economy, a unified national identity, and the use of ‘soft power’. ‘Soft power’ a political concept  developed by Joseph Nye (2004) to describe the ability to attract and cooperate in

international relations, typically involving the use of a nation’s economic or cultural influence. In order to drive people to go forward to achieve their goals, the ‘Chinese Dream’ is an idea that seems to increase attractiveness of the nation. Such strategies reflect China’s desire to construct a new global image that is in line with traditional Chinese culture, yet is not a refashioning of the past.

This new doctrine, the ‘Chinese Dream’ is often compared to the American Dream. The American Dream illustrates the basic American desire for opportunity, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Rather, 2002). The American dream is an idea associated with a Protestant work ethic held by many people in the United States of America that success can be achieved through hard work, courage and determination (Rather, 2002). In an authoritarian state, the ‘Chinese Dream’ can be interpreted as a dream of the whole nation and also a dream for every individual Chinese person. So the ‘Chinese Dream’ is for individuals to have better lives and for the country to provide conditions for achieving it: an individual’s efforts would therefore add to the country's prosperity. While the American Dream focuses on the power of the individual, the Chinese Dream is not self-driven and individually attained but government provided.

When there is a crisis, there is a need for dream. The concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’ has come in time when China faces new risks generated by an over industrialised economy, yet the American Dream is also questioned under difficult economic conditions. Despite that Chinese people enjoy the benefits of a booming economy, the side effects of the country as the world manufacturer are evident in polluted skies, acid rain and food scares. In government policy think tanks, the new

‘Chinese Dream’ is intended to show how a Chinese region can transform. As new risks emerges alongside the machinations of industrialised society, there are

numerous threats to basic living conditions so people turn to embracing new dreams, which reflects the political reality in China: people’s expectations require unity to achieve a higher objective. China has achieved significant economic growth in the past three decades, with hundreds of millions of people lifted from poverty.

However, the One Child Generation finds themselves struggling to meet life’s demands, ranging from strong competition for jobs to the rising cost of living, which is further exacerbated by urgent social issues such as income inequality, pollution and corruption.

Consequently, the top-down version of the ‘Chinese Dream’ has largely failed to appeal to today’s young people. Although the Chinese Dream is an expression of acknowledging the aspirations of the country, young people also have personal dreams. Michael Stanat (2006), author of China's Generation Y: Understanding the Future Leaders of the World's Next Superpower, addresses how the Chinese 90s

generation’s personal dreams are mainly of entrepreneurships and aspirations of building their careers. His study was contextualised in the early days of the economic reform era. Based on much criticism of China’s development, the study interviewed members of the One Child Generation to reveal their ‘personal dreams’ and their place in the country’s ‘Chinese Dream’. This work shows there is a gap between their paternalistic national dream, their parents’ dreams for their children and their own dreams or aspirations, and in doing so it provides an insight into the way these generations’ values are evolving.

Current scholarship concerning the One Child Generation aligns with Internet research because it helps to develop a framework that captures the interplay between technology and individuals in China. More importantly, such interactivity shows that

Child Generation, researchers need to pay specific attention to the One Child Generation’s relationship with technology and other social forces, for instance popular consumption, and other social practices in order to define the unique capacities of the One Child Generation. While current scholarship maps the One Child Generation’s consumption and lifestyle patterns, these works are based on an assumed idea of economic development in China. Few scholars have situated these conflicts and controversies within the One Child Generation’s direct relationship with risk society and technology.

Rather than focus upon the consumption orientated tribes (Wang, 2013), this thesis provides perspectives of community-orientated social functions viewed as an increasing responsiveness to social issues in China, and so this thesis provides a new approach for re-evaluating how the One Child Generation is becoming increasingly engaged in social issues. It examines their changing consciousness. Members generation perceive themselves more as global citizens than their predecessors and they active oppose practices of conspicuous consumption whilst promoting global values of sustainability. In this respect the thesis also examines the role of digital communication and shows that exposure to the Internet brings gradual changes of consciousness through the formation of a global sense of self and the capacity for building grassroots communities.

Much literature defines the post-80s, post-90s generations as the most self-centred of all generations because of an attachment to immediate pleasure and strong tendencies toward individualism and hedonism. The Chinese One Child Generation is under pressure for changes in the family size, and competition in society among other diverse social challenges. Throughout the 21^st century, the One Child Generation have been the target of a moral panic fuelled by mass media, and have

come to symbolise the decline of traditional collective culture and the nation’s excesses of materialist hedonism. Yet such a crisis for youth is not unique to China.

According to Beck (2009), it is symptomatic of the global mapping of neoliberalism, which marks the twenty-first century, namely ‘Risk Society’. During this time, China has rapidly evolved into an economy based upon consumption and speculative logic has replaced traditional beliefs consequently the young generation are in peril under an economy driven by speed and risk (Giroux, 2003). Precisely because of such post-industrial conditions, which foretell a new Chinese future in the context of these generations, these generations are uniquely positioned to symbolise the possibility of a new social and economic future.

By critically reviewing existing studies in ‘risk society’ and digital communication in the area of empowerment and over reliance by the digital natives, next chapter indicates how this thesis will address some gaps in the present body of knowledge through an examination of ‘urbanism’ in the global context and ‘sharism’

in the local context. In this way, the thesis is located within an interrelated and interdisciplinary field of research incorporating social media studies, youth study, and media sociology.