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With the winning of the consulship Sulla may fairly be said to have, politically speaking, at last arrived. The hero of the Social War had finally won for himself a place within the small circle of the Roman ruling class and he now lost no time in making that place secure by judicious marriage alliances. He was gratified to discover that his new-found political ally, Q. Pompeius Rufus, whose acquaintance he would probably have made while they were both members of Drusus’ circle, had been elected as his fellow consul and he immediately cemented the ties that bound them by giving his daughter in marriage to Pompeius’ son. It was to prove to be a wise move for, until his own untimely death, Pompeius showed himself to be a staunch ally of Sulla. For himself, although he was now nearly fifty years of age, Sulla also arranged a most brilliant political match. To accomplish it, he had to divorce his present wife. Aelia had, in the meantime, either died or been divorced and the hapless female who was now unceremoniously shunted to one side, on the grounds of sterility, was thus Sulla’s third wife, the otherwise unknown Cloelia. Shortly afterwards the consul married Metella, widow of the princeps

senatus Aemilius Scaurus. She, of course, was one of the Metelli, and Sulla

in this way became aligned with that powerful family. We may view the event in two ways. It could be argued that Sulla, once a despised outcast, was now in such a powerful position as to demand and receive her hand from these haughty nobles. On the other hand, we could suggest that, to judge from their recent absence from the Fasti, the Metelli had been partially eclipsed and were therefore glad to be associated with the most brilliant figure of the day. Whatever view we take, we may be certain of a couple of facts. First, the Metelli were to show themselves to be worthless as allies in the troubles which lay immediately ahead, but were to prove valuable, if somewhat difficult supporters, in the last years of Sulla’s life. Second, the marriage itself caused great stirrings and excitement in the city.

There were many who decried his treatment of Cloelia, claiming that the grounds for divorce were a sham and that Sulla had afterwards taken a new wife in indecent haste. Among the populace, who were obviously well aware of Sulla’s keen sense of humour, numerous good-natured and scurrilous lampoons on the subject of their hero’s marriage circulated freely. From a section of the nobility there came the by now familiar frostier reaction. Sulla, they said, fully deserved the consulship as the reward for his achieve- ments, but it was a monstrous thing that he should presume to marry into a distinguished family. However, shielded by his general popularity and with his marriage ties secure, Sulla could now afford to dismiss such carping out of hand. Indeed, he was already aspiring to rise yet higher. For him the long-coveted consulship was as nothing compared to the still greater prize which had now fallen into his hands, the command of the war against Mithridates. The king had at last taken Marius’ advice and, determining to be strong, had launched an invasion of the Roman province of Asia. The man who would repel him would win great gloria indeed and would truly be the first man in Rome.1

But even as Sulla basked in the glory of his present achievements and contemplated the further fame which would soon be his, forces were already at work which were to topple him from his pinnacle of popularity and make of him, before the year was out, the most hated man in Rome. Their prime mover was a former intimate of Pompeius Rufus, the tribune P. Sulpicius. The latter had been a member of the circle of Drusus and indeed was more or less designated as his political heir, the one who would continue to prosecute his policies after his death. After the Social War, in which he served as a legate, Sulpicius’ friendship for Pompeius naturally brought him into contact with Sulla. He seems to have formed the impression that the consul would use his considerable influence to support those schemes which he, as the natural successor to Drusus, was about to bring forward. His principal proposal was that he, the new champion of the Italians, should oversee their distribution among all of the tribes. As a result of the Social War the Italians had been given the citizenship. However, instead of being enrolled among the existing tribes, they were placed in eight supplementary ones which had been specially created for the purpose. Thus, their votes were of little real value and Sulpicius determined to remedy the situation with his plan for redistribution.2

He had, indeed, already some call on the goodwill of Pompeius and Sulla for he had, but lately, rendered them both valuable service. Sulla’s old enemy, Caesar Strabo, had sought to obtain the Senate’s permission to be a consular candidate for 88, although he was technically ineligible. He, too, had been a supporter of Drusus and he intended, if elected, to press for the recall of the Varian exiles. These were prominent members of the Drusan

circle who had been condemned to exile at the start of the Social War when, in the prevailing atmosphere of paranoia, charges of treason had been brought, under a law of the tribune Q. Varius, against followers of Drusus who were alleged to have incited the Italians to revolt. Such a proposal ran clean contrary to Sulla’s wishes, for it would appear that many of his noble opponents were among those whom Strabo wished to recall. Although it is unlikely that his candidature would have proved a threat to Sulla’s own chances of election, it is at least possible that Caesar would have beaten Pompeius Rufus and he would, in consequence, prove to be a very awkward colleague for Sulla. So Sulpicius, acting in the interests of both Pompeius and Sulla, opposed Caesar’s candidature. Matters went so far, in fact, as to result in a battle between their respective followers on the streets of Rome before the Senate refused Strabo’s request for an extraordinary candidature. Sulpicius evidently hoped that these services would make Sulla willing to support his own proposals for the Italians. However, gratitude in politics is a lively expectation of favours to come and Sulla, enjoying immense popular support, had no real need of Sulpicius. Indeed, his own views on the Italian question were diametrically opposed to those of the tribune. Like his fellow Romans he had perforce to accept the concessions the Italians had wrung out of the unwilling enemy in the Social War, but he saw no reason to go further and grant them anything more. In this attitude he was, as we shall see, at one with the feelings of the Senate and the old citizens of Rome. Sulpicius, therefore, found little encouragement from this quarter. Outraged by the cold reception, he immediately broke off his association with the consul. Still determined, however, to pursue his policies and now also desiring revenge for the slight he had just suffered, he went in search of a new ally. 3

He found in Marius the ally whom he sought. The old general had always in the past been able, at the very least, to simulate a certain tender regard for the Italians, but, more important, he was now a man suffering from the pangs of thwarted ambition. Although he had performed well in the Social War the Senate had consistently refused to appoint him to a command commensurate with his rank and experience. Most of all, he was furious to find that the long-coveted Mithridatic command had been snatched from him for a second time by his arch-foe Sulla. In Sulpicius he saw the one agent who might yet obtain for him the post which, by now, he seems to have thought of as his by right. The two needed each other and so a bargain was struck. Marius would lend his support to Sulpicius’ legislative proposals and, in return, the tribune would secure for him the Mithridatic command. Not surprisingly, in view of what was likely to happen if it should become known, this latter detail was, for the moment, kept secret.

In opposing Caesar Strabo, Sulpicius had acquired a healthy respect for the effectiveness of popularis methods. His experiences then had taught him

the value of having an entourage suitable for battle on the streets of Rome. Opposition to his legislation could be expected from the old citizens, anxious to maintain their privileged position, and he intended to be ready for it. He maintained a band of 3,000 swordsmen and kept about his person a body of young equites – sons of senators enjoying a flirtation with radical politics before settling down to follow in their fathers’ footsteps – whom he jocularly nicknamed his ‘anti-Senate’. He was seen at a table in the Forum engaging in monetary transactions, so that a malicious rumour went about that he was selling Roman citizenships. More likely, he was adding fresh recruits to his private army.4

Thus fortified, Sulpicius unveiled his legislative programme. Completely reversing his former stance, he now declared his intention of recalling the Varian exiles. He also proposed that no senator should have debts exceeding 2,000 denarii. But the crowning item was his proposal to distribute the Italians and freedmen among all the tribes. The first piece of legislation was obviously aimed at Sulla and his supporters, who would be considerably discomfited by the return of their enemies. It has often been suggested that the debt bill had Sulla as its target too, but this seems unlikely; after all the wars he had been in it is highly improbable that the consul should now be short of funds. More likely, Sulpicius had other senatorial victims in mind, since the Senate, like the old citizens, was implacably hostile to his proposed redistribution. The transfer of the Mithridatic command to Marius was not, however, mooted at this point and, if we are to understand what happened next, we must take care to remember this.5

The reaction to Sulpicius’ plans for the Italians was instantaneous and predictable. The old citizens were roused to fury and set upon the tribune’s supporters. Days of rioting followed, in which both sides fought each other with sticks and stones. During all of this commotion Sulla himself was absent from Rome. Although he had been assigned the command against Mithridates, he had not yet officially assumed it. At Rome the king was not yet regarded as a serious threat and the Senate believed that, before dealing with him, it was far more important to stamp out first what remained of the Italian rebellion, for, after all, that rebellion had almost toppled the state. Hence Sulla delayed his Eastern expedition for the moment and instead began operations against one of the principal rebel strongholds, Nola, which as we know he had once before tried to reduce in the previous year. The siege then was marked by an incident in which Sulla yet again received divine assurances of success. On one occasion, as he was sacrificing, a snake crawled from under the altar. His haruspex Postumius declared that this presaged victory and, when Sulla went out to battle, he captured a strongly fortified Samnite camp. But he was unable then to reduce the town itself and now was still besieging it when news of the disturbances at Rome reached him.6

Upon hearing of them Sulla returned to Rome to find that, as the day for the comitia and the voting on Sulpicius’ legislation drew near, the rioting was growing worse and that Sulpicius was about to pass his programme by force and intimidation. To avert this danger Sulla and Pompeius declared

feriae, that is, days of public holiday on which no legislative business might

be transacted. Sulpicius, however, was an angry and determined man who would not be fobbed off by this legal subterfuge. Arming his followers he led them into the Forum where the consuls were holding a contio (public meeting) before the temple of Castor and Pollux. He declared that the feriae were illegal and demanded that the consuls annul them so that voting could take place forthwith. Not surprisingly a brawl developed and in the ensuing mêlée Pompeius’ son, who had stupidly provoked the mob by an ill-timed display of aristocratic hauteur, was killed. Pompeius himself was luckier and made good his escape. Sulla, too, managed to extricate himself from the situation by taking refuge in Marius’ house which stood nearby.7

It may very well have been just a lucky accident which led Sulla to choose this particular bolt-hole but, equally likely, given that the compact between Marius and Sulpicius was common knowledge, he may have gone there deliberately to try and get Marius to use his influence to put an end to the disturbances. At any rate, the two great enemies were now face to face. No account of what passed between them exists but, judging by the sequel, we may make a pretty good guess as to what happened. Marius, in his well- known blunt manner, told Sulla he would have to comply with Sulpicius’ demands and annul the feriae if he wished to leave the Forum alive. Scholars have, indeed, attempted to suggest that other issues, such as the Mithridatic command, were discussed and that some kind of a bargain was struck, but it is difficult to see how either of these hypotheses can be defended. Marius, with a mob outside baying for blood, was, to put it mildly, the dominant party, and one cannot imagine how Sulla could do otherwise than simply obey his dictates. And, by reference once more to the sequel, we shall see that it is improbable that anything was said about the Mithridatic War.8

Sulla now emerged from Marius’ house and meekly annulled the feriae. He then, proceeded unmolested to his army, first calling at the staff-quarters in Capua before finally rejoining the main army at Nola. In conceding to Marius and Sulpicius all they had demanded, he had suffered a great political humiliation and a loss of prestige. There now appeared to be but one way in which he could recover his standing: by foreign war. Certainly he had before regarded the consulship as nought compared with the Mithridatic command and now that command assumed an even greater importance in his eyes. Success in a spectacular Asian war would more than make up for the loss of face he had just suffered in this recent miserable business. So he immediately set about preparing his troops for the Eastern campaign.

It is difficult to say if he realised that Sulpicius and Marius were planning further mischief. It is true that Marius’ ambition to lead an Asian war was of long standing and that everybody in Rome must have known about it. On the other hand, his deal with Sulpicius was still a secret and no-one at this juncture knew that he was actually taking practical measures to realise his ambition. Certainly Sulla himself was as ignorant of this plan as any man in Rome. Nevertheless, he definitely knew of the hatred Marius and Sulpicius felt for him and his recent experience must have taught him to be extremely wary of them. We may conclude, therefore, that Sulla had a certain suspicion that this was not the end of the affair. However, so long as he had but a suspicion, there was nothing he could actually do but wait upon events among his loyal soldiers. His next move would be dictated entirely by what Marius and Sulpicius would do. Should they remain quiescent then he could safely depart to fight Mithridates, but if they made further trouble then his reaction would depend on the situation as it then stood.9

Sulla, in fact, did not have long to wait before seeing his fears confirmed. With the feriae annulled Sulpicius proceeded to make his bill for the redistribution of the Italians and the freedmen law. Since it is in the highest degree unlikely that the old citizens were suddenly and miraculously converted to his point of view, we have no option but to conclude that the measure was passed by force and violence. It was at this point that the tribune, flushed with success, overreached himself. He removed, by a vote of the people, both Pompeius Rufus and Sulla from their provinciae and handed over the Mithridatic command to Marius, greatly surprising the many who were not privy to his agreement with the old general. When news of this reached Sulla his reaction was predictably one of fury at having the cherished command taken away from him. He at once called his troops together and told them of the wrongs that had been done to him. He said nothing of his actual plans but urged them to obey him in all things. They, correctly divining what he had in mind, clamoured to be led on Rome.10

The first observation on this moment has become an oft repeated commonplace. For the first time in Roman history a magistrate of the Roman republic had turned his arms against the state. Soon, however, others were to imitate him and bring ruin to the commonwealth. But in their anxiety to fit this moment into a conceptual framework historians have almost entirely forgotten the man responsible for it and have made little effort to analyse Sulla’s position at this time or to probe his motivation.11

The truth is Sulla had little choice but to act as he did. He had already once before been outmanoeuvred by Marius and Sulpicius and, in truth, had barely escaped with his life. Now for a second time they were about to triumph over him, and more than triumph. The loss of the Mithridatic command would swiftly and inevitably be followed by political extinction.

All the struggles of the previous ten years would have been for nothing, and Sulla would be thrust back into that oblivion whence he had but lately emerged. Tenacious fighter as he was, he was not prepared to quietly acquiesce in this state of affairs and so he cast around for a remedy, only to find that