Entre lo tradicional y lo artesanal: opciones y estrategias para abordar la enseñanza

When Sulla and Marius began their tussle over the Mithridatic command neither could have foreseen that the victor of that struggle was not to earn, as they imagined, the opportunity to garner immense piles of Asian loot and win an easy triumph, but rather was to take on the command of a great and difficult war against a formidable and determined opponent. Mithridates had yielded so easily in the past that the Romans found it difficult to take him altogether seriously; when they fully awoke to their peril, Asia was already lost and the king’s armies were in Greece. Marius, indeed, thought so little of the king that he seems to have been partly responsible for engineering this war in pursuit of his own ambition of winning easy glory in the East. The new quarrel with the king had begun in 91. In that year Mithridates, after chasing his one-time ally Nicomedes IV out of Bithynia and his old opponent Ariobarzanes – yet again! – out of Cappadocia, established his own puppet-princes in these kingdoms. Although preoccupied with the Social War, the Senate, in the next year, sent out an embassy to order Mithridates to withdraw from the disputed territory. As in the past, Mithridates meekly obeyed. However, two of the ambassadors, M’. Aquillius and T. Manlius Mancinus, were old friends of Marius and they now revealed their true intent. This was nothing more than a determination to provoke a war so that Marius might be given a command against Mithridates. The pair, therefore prevailed upon Nicomedes, who was heavily in debt to the Romans, to invade Pontus.

True to form, Mithridates withdrew before Nicomedes and sent an embassy to protest. As might be expected, he received no satisfaction and the preparations for a general Roman advance into his dominions were begun. By now (89) Mithridates must have been as heartily sick of the Romans as they were of him, and he resolved on vigorous action. With the full muster of his forces he brushed aside the puny Roman forces opposed to him. The envoys and the governor of Asia were captured or fled and by the end of the

year the greater part of Asia Minor was in the king’s hands. Then, in order to bind them tighter to himself and alienate them for ever from Rome, Mithridates ordered the Greek cities to murder every Italian in the province. Exasperated by years of Roman misgovernment and exploitation and ready to hail Mithridates, the new Dionysius, as their deliverer, the cities, with some notable exceptions, showed no reluctance in obeying the command. In a horrendous massacre 80,000 perished in one day. Then, in the next year, with parts of Asia Minor still unsubdued, Mithridates’ fleet sallied forth to capture the islands of the Aegean. Rhodes alone, secure behind its massive walls and relying heavily on the skills of its sailors, resisted every effort to bring it to heel. And even while Aegean operations were still in progress Mithridates, ever desirous of new conquests, despatched part of his fleet to invade Greece.1

Thus, by late 88, nobody at Rome could have regarded the Mithridatic War as a triumph-hunter’s dream. Italy itself was being threatened by an enemy in Greece who showed every intention of making common cause with the remnant of the Italian resistance.2 _{However unsatisfactory the}

domestic political situation might be, Sulla had no option but to leave Italy and face the Eastern menace.

Mithridates’ invasion of Europe in 88 was two-pronged. He had an alliance with some Thracian tribes, and they, seemingly at his instigation, had made an attack in the previous year on the Roman province of Macedonia, only to be repulsed by Sentius, its governor. Now they returned to the attack and penetrated Epirus as far as Dodona. At the same time Mithridates sent his son Ariarathes to conduct a surprise raid on Macedonia. But, as his forces were small – Mithridates’ armies were now being spread over a wide area indeed – Sentius was able to contain the menace. 3 _The

second prong of Mithridates’ assault on Europe came, as we saw, from the sea. Leading it was his best general, Sulla’s old foe, Archelaus. In truth it was a somewhat delayed assault, since the general had been wounded in mopping up operations in Asia Minor earlier in the year. But once he recovered Archelaus soon showed what he was capable of. While his master was still vainly trying to bring Rhodes to heel, Archelaus, with another part of the Pontic fleet, swept westward to subdue the Cyclades and all the islands east of Cap Malea. One of his subordinates, Menophanes, overran the island of Delos and slaughtered the greater part of the large Italian trading community there.4

Undoubtedly the most important entry-point into Greece was Athens, and indeed the situation there invited immediate intervention, for the city had been in turmoil for several years past. Wrangling among the ruling aristocracy resulted in one Medeius becoming tyrant in 91. Appeal was naturally made to Rome, but the Senate, preoccupied with the war in Italy,

elected to leave things as they were for the moment. Sometime in late 89 or early 88 Medeius disappears from history. Whether he died of natural causes or was removed by his aristocratic rivals we cannot tell. At any rate, the Athenians, disgruntled by Rome’s support for him, turned to Mithridates, who was now sweeping through Asia, and despatched a philosopher called Athenion as an emissary to him. The latter rapidly ingratiated himself with the king, who naturally was not unaware of Athens’ strategic importance. A few months later the philosopher returned to Athens to a hero’s welcome. In many words he spelt out a simple message for his fellow countrymen. Rome was finished as a great power; Mithridates was the coming man. Amid general enthusiasm he was elected strategos epi ta hopla. This situation did not endure long, however. Athenion, fired by the example of Medeius and his own popularity, proceeded to make himself a tyrant, and launched a pogrom against his former aristocratic supporters. He then dramatically reversed his former policy and, from being an enthusiastic partisan of Mithridates, declared himself well-disposed towards the Romans. When the king heard this he used his naval superiority to cut Athens’ corn supply from the Black Sea. What Athenion evidently hoped for was that the Romans, faced with the threat from Mithridates, would be prepared to support him as they did Medeius. His plans, however, were ruined by the revolt of Athens’ dependency, Delos. The numerous Italian traders there would have nothing to do with someone tainted by association with Mithridates, the man who had massacred so many of their fellow countrymen. So Athenion was forced to attack Delos and entrusted the command to a fellow philosopher, Appelicon who, unlike the professional Archelaus shortly afterwards, completely botched the job. A night attack by the Romans successfully scattered his forces. It is at this point, with the Pontic forces now approaching Greece, that Athenion, like Medeius, vanishes from our gaze. Doubtless he did not long survive the disaster suffered by his supporters.5

Although we have only seen Archelaus in the role of conqueror so far, he was also committed to wooing as many Roman subject-nations as possible. Greek states in Asia had already willingly embraced the Pontic side and there was no reason why their relatives in Europe should not also hail Mithridates as a deliverer. In pursuance of this end he now handed Delos back to the Athenians after he had overrun it. At the same time he showed himself not unaware of the problem of governing that turbulent city. Athenion had proved himself to be both incompetent and disloyal. A new ruler had to be found and the choice fell on yet another philosopher, Aristion, who had previously acted as a roving ambassador for Mithridates. To make sure that the Athenians did not try to get rid of him and that he did not make an untimely display of independence himself, a bodyguard of 2,000 Pontic troops was despatched with him when he set out. Aristion quickly

set about proving his loyalty by murdering all among the aristocracy who might be suspected of sympathy with Rome.6

Our attention must now turn briefly to events a little further north. While Archelaus was busy securing Athens, one of his lieutenants, Metrophanes, in command of another portion of the Pontic fleet, ravaged Magnesia, Demetrias and Euboea, all of which had remained loyal to Rome. As a consequence the last-named surrendered and Metrophanes could boast of having secured for his master yet another strategically vital point of entry

into Greece. He did not, however, have everything his own way. Braetius Sura, an able and dashing legate of the governor of Macedonia, soon challenged him. With a small fleet scraped together from various sources, he advanced against Metrophanes and bested him in a naval skirmish. Fresh from this success he went on to wrest Skiathos from the hands of the enemy.7

Then came a second Pontic challenge. Archelaus and Aristion now advanced with their forces against the town of Thespiae, which still held out for Rome. Clearly this was to be another great test: would the Romans be able to show yet again they could still defend their friends in Greece? Sura, accepting the challenge, fought and defeated, at Chaeronea, the Pontic forces and those Greeks who were allied with them. Archelaus, taking advantage of his complete mastery of that element, pulled his troops out by sea but, in so doing, gave the Roman commander the opportunity for the most spectacular coup of his career. With an open road before him Sura made a swift dash and seized the very nerve centre of Pontic operations, Athens. But his occupation was destined to be a short one. However valuable a propaganda blow it might be, however much it might restore battered Roman prestige, it was, in military terms, nothing but an empty gesture. The arrival of Archelaus and his fleet rendered Sura’s position untenable and he was forced to retreat northwards. Winter now put a stop to hostilities and with the coming of spring (87) Sura’s skirmishing tactics had become otiose, for a large Roman force had landed in Epirus and was marching on Athens. Cutting himself loose from his domestic entanglements Sulla had, at last, arrived in Greece to fight Mithridates. His quaestor, L. Lucullus, who commanded an advance force, met with Sura and ordered him out of Greece, since the command in this war had been voted to Sulla alone. Sura had no option but to obey and withdraw to Macedonia after having done much, in these early days of the war, to maintain the Roman presence in Greece. Realising the size of the forces opposed to him and that his small army would be no match for them, Archelaus elected to remain in his fortified position in the Piraeus. His intention was obvious: he intended to await reinforcements from Asia before attempting to venture forth to meet Sulla and his legions. At the same time he may already have begun to form in his mind the plan which was to dominate his strategy in the coming months: far from being a mere place of refuge, Athens could become the linchpin of a great design which would utterly destroy Sulla.8

The Roman commander, for his part, was equally determined that Mithridates’ army should not remain in possession of the Piraeus and that it should be snatched from the enemy at whatever cost. Of the three highways by which the Pontic army had poured into Greece, Athens was, at this moment, far and away the most important. Macedonia, with the invasion repelled, was for the time being safe in Roman hands and a small detachment

under Sulla’s officer, Munatius Plancius,9 _{would suffice to keep the enemy}

in check at Chalcis. If Sulla could seize Athens, then the main entry-point to Greece would be his and he would thus be at leisure to deal with another attack from Macedonia if, as seemed likely, one should come from that quarter.

As he marched from Epirus, by way of Thessaly and Boeotia, receiving on the way repentant delegations from most of the Greek cities who assured him that their recent change of allegiance had been all a mistake,10 _{Sulla had}

every reason to feel confident that he would soon accomplish his aim, for he had just received a most encouraging message from his patron Apollo. Puzzled by a dream he had had in which he saw Venus in full armour leading his army, he applied to the oracle at Delphi for an explanation. The god told him that from now on Venus herself would champion his cause. Although he had neglected her previously, he must henceforth show her especial devotion. As a token of this new reverence he should send the gift of an axe to the shrine of Aphrodite at Aphrodisias in Caria. Like Ma- Bellona and Apollo himself, Venus was to become one of Sulla’s patron deities who would watch over his career and cause it to prosper. Unlike the other two deities, however, her interest was not in his personal fortunes; rather she favoured him because of what he represented. As the mother of the Roman race her anxiety was for all her descendants as they engaged in a great struggle against Mithridates. The man who was waging this war, on their behalf, was Rome’s chosen proconsul, Sulla, and, in consequence, Venus aided him and blessed his enterprise because he was the champion of her people.11

The measure of Sulla’s confidence, upon receiving this assurance of Venus’ favour, can be gauged from his foolish and hasty action after arriving at Athens. Leaving a small force to watch the city, he immediately launched a wild and ill-prepared attack on the Piraeus. With siege ladders alone and without any kind of engines he assaulted the strong defensive walls with the inevitable consequences. After a fierce struggle, the Romans were repelled and Sulla retired in bafflement to Eleusis.12

Here he set about his task in deadly earnest and began the construction of proper siege towers. To build these unwieldy monsters Sulla hacked down the historic groves of the Academy and Lyceum where Plato and Aristotle once taught. Ten thousand mules were gathered to drag these same engines into place. Supplies of all kinds came from Thebes which, like so many other places in Greece, had with commendable rapidity deserted Mithridates once Sulla had appeared on the scene. Sulla’s plan was to use these siege towers to protect the mound he was constructing from the rubble of the Long Walls, which once connected Athens with her port. While his men were engaged in this latter task two slaves, within the walls, sent out a message,

inscribed on a sling ball, which warned Sulla that, on the morrow, Archelaus intended to make a sally. Sulla, therefore, carefully prepared an ambush and when the Pontic forces rushed out, confident in the element of surprise, they themselves received an even greater surprise from Sulla’s ambuscade. Undaunted by this setback, Archelaus continued his efforts to counter Sulla. As the Roman mound began to rise he built his own towers opposite and equipped them with engines. A kind of artillery duel now followed between the Roman and Pontic towers. Hails of lead balls were exchanged between the two, as well as fire missiles, which did severe damage to Sulla’s equipment. Then Archelaus prepared for a second sally. Summoning reinforcements from Chalcis and arming his sailors, he issued forth at midnight and succeeded in burning one of Sulla’s towers. It proved to be a barren triumph for, Sulla, with a tremendous effort, replaced it within ten days and Archelaus was obliged to counter by establishing yet another tower opposite.13

Now, however, the balance of forces altered. Receiving reinforcements by sea, under the command of one Dromichaetes, Archelaus felt confident enough in his own superiority to attempt a pitched battle. He therefore led his army out and for a long time a doubtful struggle was waged. First, the Pontic forces yielded, but were rallied by Archelaus. Then, the Romans, in turn disheartened by this revival, turned their backs until the propraetor Murena rallied them. The issue was finally decided when a legion, which had been gathering wood, arrived on the scene and joined the fray. The Pontic forces fled once more and this time there was to be no rally. Archelaus found himself shut out of the town and had to be hauled up by ropes.

Winter was now approaching and Sulla began to fortify his camp at Eleusis, preparatory to withdrawing some of his forces there. There was, however, no question of relaxing the siege, and throughout the whole of the season assaults and counter-assaults continued. Since it was perfectly obvious that lack of ships was hampering the Roman war effort, Sulla now despatched his quaestor Lucullus to raise them in the eastern Mediterranean.14

As the fighting dragged on into 86 it must have seemed to many dispas- sionate observers that the destruction of Sulla and all his army could not be long delayed. So far from wresting the Piraeus from Pontic hands, he still lay baffled before its walls with an army which now showed signs of mutiny through exasperation at the long siege. Nor could the news from home be described as encouraging. There had been a revolution at Rome. After his departure, Sulla’s enemy Cinna has revived once more Sulpicius’ proposals for redistributing the Italian citizens. The reaction of the old citizens had been precisely the same as in the previous year, and in the ensuing mêlée Cinna was forced to flee the city. He immediately set about recruiting an army in the Italian countryside and was soon joined by Marius, who was not slow to seize this opportunity of regaining his lost position and paying

off old scores. The pair laid siege to Rome and after a brief struggle captured it. They then set about a massacre of those of their opponents who would not or could not get away in time. Sulla’s wife Metella fled to him with their two children and, after a perilous sea voyage in the winter of 87, announced to him in person that he had been declared a public enemy (hostis) and that