La selección de sustantivos como base derivativa con -izar

(Source: adapted from the DfT no date and Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.22).

The duality of the CPMs used within the SSS is examined later in this chapter. One research participant suggested that any successes from the SSS are more about the actual management of the station rather the physical assets in place as CPMs.

“The greatest achievement of the scheme is to reduce the fear of crime that is greater than the actual figure of reductions in crime”

(BTP Officer, Retired)

Furthermore, in terms of security design, the resilience of a space such as SPIRS is not a single consideration; rather it should be seen as a collection of issues, which all must be addressed and considered to ensure the ‘whole’ space is resilient to security threats. Moreover, CPMs and CTMs were seen to have an integral part in this prevention plan.

“Not having the incident in the first place. Key to preventing disruption is a plan. Have deterrents such as patrols and greater manpower.”

(Network Rail Operational Manager)

The enhanced visible presence of staff in SPIRS, whether they were actual security staff and police officers, or uniformed members of station staff is a strategy for the prevention of crime and terrorism. This works on the principles of RAT in terms of prevention measures in the form of a visible presence of staff. This can be seen to have a cost saving benefits when members of staff to carry out a different role and become a form of (un)intentional prevention measures. The intangible and tangible aspects of resilience (Bosher, 2014, p.240) can be enhanced in spaces such as SPIRS and other Category A railway stations if both ‘structural and non-structural approaches’ if they are built in from the conceptual stages of a project (Bosher et al., 2007 and Bosher and Dainty, 2011).

However, the political rhetoric of the underlying ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) resilience strategy of the SSS, provides an important opportunity to engage with stakeholders of the railway station. However, one apprehension surrounding

Governmentality, through ‘responsibilisation’, is it uses the resilience to security threats as a mechanism to control the behaviour of both stakeholders, the public and potential criminals (Rogers, 2017). The SSS is based on the principles of CPTED designs out the potential of human malign threats, at all ends of the crime continuum.

7. 3 Issues of Resilience

As the views of the participants and academics have been examined thus far in this chapter, the research findings clearly demonstrate that the concept of resilience within the space of SPIRS is extremely complex and frequently lacking clarity by those who choose to use it. It is proposed the obscure nature of the term could be simplified if those in industry, academia and in politics could create a cohesive and combined series of expectancies (Vale, 2014) for the understanding and operationalisation of resilience within a Category A railway station. Therefore, the research has brought to light the lack of clarification regarding resilience policies and its implementation in SPIRS is highlighted by the findings and as such, it can conceal

internal tensions and contradictions, as it [moves] from a narrative of national protection to one of localised prevention and self- organizing responses.

(Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, p.95)

This research argues that both resilience and the specific railway station (SPIRS) and how it manages security threats, depends both ‘on the scale and on whether the focus is on physical spaces or social communities’ (Vale, 2014, p.191). Therefore, the larger and more complex railway station, such as SPIRS, is undeniably in terms of both its space and the stakeholder communities is multifaceted in how resilience against security threats are dealt with. As the significance and size of railway stations in England and Wales reduce so too does the complexity of managing the space, the stakeholders, and the subsequence resilience to security threats. This research has shown that the concept of resilience is interpreted and understood differently by the multiple stakeholders who are involved in securing SPIRS from human malign security threats. There is an increased expectation by the Government that both the public and private sectors are obliged and expected to be responsible for the resilience of the built environment, and in this case specifically SPIRS against human malign security threats. Yet, within the complex space of SPIRS, the rhetoric of ‘responsibilisation’

(Garland, 1996) of resilience is handed to the multiple and disparate stakeholders to operationalise and the findings have shown there are tensions because of divisions and

blurred boundaries. This is examined in more detail in sections 7.9 and 7.12 of this Chapter.

Moreover, it is contended that stakeholders in both the public and private sphere of SPIRS experience frequent complications and hindrances when endeavouring to enhance resilience in the space (Bosher, 2014). The findings of this research call for the resilience towards security threats to be improved and utilised by multiple stakeholders, in a space such as SPIRS, in a consistently cohesive manner (Bosher, 2014 and Bosher and Coaffee, 2008), which at the time of undertaking the research, the strategies were competing and disparate. It was expressed by one participant that the greatest threat to the resilience of SPIRS was that private companies frequently owned CNI.

“There is an awful lot of brittleness in our processes, it's the fact that the majority of our infrastructure is owned by private companies and not by the Government, there is an awful lot of stuff that we just don't seem to have any real control of anymore. I think they are part of the issues around resilience.”

The research indicates that resilience does not just challenge the physical structure of SPIRS, it also presents challenges to the multiple stakeholder’s operational policies, and individual and corporate perceptions and comprehension of the concept and the actual responsibility of the specific railway station. This research suggests this could be achieved through a logical, primary strategy, however, how this is achieved in practice is open to deliberation. The operational concept of resilience in SPIRS needs to be transformed from the tenuous and vague definitions as discussed in Chapter Two to a consistent and clearly defined understanding of what ‘resilience essentially denotes and how it can be accurately applied or measured’ (Bosher, 2014, p.241). The participants suggested that an overarching concept of resilience could be customised specifically for SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. Conversely, this could be one of the greatest challenges to the resilience of SPIRS is the stakeholders do not become ensnared in endeavouring to create one overriding definition of resilience (Rogers, 2017) which is operationalised by the multiple stakeholders. Furthermore, the resilience of the space must be able to adjust to current and future nascent security threats, thus the conceptual and operational resilience of SPIRS to security threats should be fluid and temporal. In ‘an age of uncertainty’ (Rogers, 2017, p.22) developing space to establish new ways to consider and undertake resilience and security is an ever-evolving consideration.

Therefore, to endeavour to achieve this, the research validates that involving the multiple

and complex stakeholders of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales in discussions around the issues of resilience to security threats will enhance and develop a mutual understanding of the concept (Sicar et al., 2013). Moreover, it is proposed there are potentially several options to tackle the current and future resilience to human malign security threats of spaces such as SPIRS (Bosher et al., 2007). Firstly, there could be a change of cultural practice where stakeholders at all levels completely support and adopt a unified resilience agenda for the space in question. Resilience measures (prevention or recovery) whether built-in or at the retrofit stage could be devised to handle numerous threats. However, this research has revealed that although resilience can be included in the design stage of building or refurbishment projects, there is uncertainty and tension from local level stakeholders concerning how this holistic stance translates into the reality of practice and are actually contained within in the final project (Bosher et al., 2007, p. 245).