The research data has exposed that designing in CTMs, within spaces such as SPIRS can be frequently fraught with issues due to a lack of Governmental support and guidance. RIBA
and guidance such as SIDOS merely recommend and do not legislate that security advisors and consultants must work in tandem with the owners and architects to ensure that CTMs are included into the design of the new build railway station or as in the case of SPIRS the retrofitting of measures. One Security Consultant felt that as a profession, the architects and designers often treated them negatively because of the often limited or ‘tight’ budget needed to include CTMs.
“We are essentially saying to them, 'you know that fancy atrium you were planning, you might want to have to rethink the finishes, less marble because actually, you may need some more slate because outside you've just burnt all of your fee on that and having to put in a bollard line. So, in other words, the cost consultants and architects can get fairly tense when they see us, because they know oh dear it's the Security Consultants! “
(Security Consultant)
Security Consultants can be recommended and endorsed to the owners of properties, Network Rail and architects through the Counter-terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) from the BTP and the Home Office Police Forces. A number of the research participants felt that the CTSAs were very professional but extremely overworked and very difficult to reach.
However, when they did work with the Security Consultants, the owners of the railway station and architects did appear to take on board their recommendations for CTMs. CTMs in SPIRS and other railway stations in England and Wales are necessary because they are
“a privately owned space but publicly accessible. You have a duty of care. You also have a duty of care to the building occupants, users, passengers, public.”
(Security Consultant)
Therefore, it would appear from the research participants interviewed that CTMs are viewed by the owner and architects as a necessary cost for the project. However, at an operational level, one BTP officer felt that their voice of experience and understanding the nature of policing a space such as SPIRS could be overlooked and ignored both by designers and at a later operational date by Network Rail (High-speed One). The example discussed below was concerning another Category A railway station in London,
“there are lots of examples where CPO [Crime Prevention Officer] recommendations on retrofit measures or new builds have been ignored. Like for areas of repeat
victimisation, CCTV was recommended, the TOC did not agree to spending any money. Very often the CPO will have to become friendly with station maintenance staff – informal networking again. This helps get figures to justify to the TOCS to spend money on prevention measures.”
(BTP Sargent)
Moreover, in terms of planning and design, the Security Consultants and Advisors who were interviewed felt that designing in CPMs was far more difficult than designing in CTMs. This was because the Secure by Design guidance for CPMs is very patchy and highly dependent on the type of development it is being applied to. The Secure by Design guidance was criticised by the research participants as they felt it needed to be much more robust and demanding in terms of the CPMs that need to be implemented for railway stations retrofit projects. In addition, it was suggested that the guidance could present more specific indicators for performance for the measures. Participants maintained there needs to be a greater emphasis on endeavouring to see how specific measures improve or have no impact on reported crimes. This would be an aid for the design of future CPMs.
“We would like to see for instance the numbers of reported contact crime. So, are they stabilised or do they tail off 8 years after the station has been commissioned?”
(Security Consultant)
This form of metric could add value to owners and designers of future new build or railway station refurbishment projects who are looking for demonstrable evidence that the CPMs they are being advised to design has value and impact.
“We need evidence that what you are doing will achieve the right effect, I think there is still this sense of 'well we're doing this, a bit of a grudge purchase, we're not quite sure why we're doing it!”
(Security Consultant)
The role of the Security Advisor/Consultant is to get the owner/client of the project to think about the security risks that could be viable by the completion of the project. Thus, it is essentially trying to get the client to understand prevention measures and the practical application of them and what the completed project would like in terms of good security risk management. The client
“will freely admit from the outset that 'you're going to have to tell us that, you're going to have to almost create an image of what good likes and then give us the roadmap of how we get there."
(Security Advisor)
Furthermore, there are the financial impacts and implications on the security measures that are designed into a new build or retrofit of a railway station. This has been particularly noticeable since the global recession of 2007; one Security Advisor stated that the resilience of a railway station to security threats could be impacted on by financial agendas of both owners and architects.
“I’ve noticed my first projects when I was appointed had very reasonably well furnished fee bases. We were given plenty of time to sit down, think and to produce good reports, to review designs thoroughly. So, in other words, to provide a good and reasonable service. Now people just want more for less which means something has got to go, and that could be the fact you’re skating too quickly through architect’s drawings and not necessarily picking up on absolute design details.”
(Security Advisor)