I suggest that we’re rational in our moral thinking to the extent that we’re (1) consistent, (2) informed, (3) imaginative, and (4) a few more things. While we’ll never be completely rational, we can strive for greater rationality.
(1) Consistent. We need to be consistent in ways that we’ve sketched in the last two chapters. These include logicality, ends–means consistency, conscientious- ness, impartiality, the golden rule, self-regard, future-regard, and the formula of universal law.
(2) Informed. As far as possible, we need to know the situation, alternative moral views, and ourselves.
First, we need to know the situation: circumstances, alternatives, conse- quences, and so on. To the extent that we’re misinformed or ignorant, our thinking is flawed. (An exception to this is that it may be desirable to eliminate information that may bias or cause cognitive overload.)
Second, we need to know alternative moral views and arguments for or against them. Our thinking is less rational if we’re unaware of opposing views.
Finally, we need self-knowledge. We can to some degree neutralize our biases through understanding how they originated. For example, some people are hostile toward a group because they were taught this when they were young. Their attitudes might change if they understood the source of their hostility and broadened their experience. If so, then their attitudes are less rational—since they exist because of ignorance.
Of course, we can never know all the facts; and we often have no time to research a problem and must act quickly. But we can act out of greater or lesser knowledge. Other things being equal, a more informed judgment is a more rational one.
(3) Imaginative. As far as possible, we need a vivid and accurate awareness of what it would be like to be in the place of those affected by our actions. This differs from just knowing facts. So in dealing with poor people, besides knowing facts about them, we also need to appreciate and envision what these facts mean to their lives. Movies, literature, and personal experience can help us to visualize another’s life.
Imagining another’s perspective is a common human experience. A child pretends to be a mother or a soldier. A chess player asks, “If I were in my opponent’s place, how would I respond to this move?” A writer dialogues with an imagined reader who misunderstands and raises objections. A teacher asks, “How would I respond to this assignment if I were a student?” The ability to take another’s perspective (empathy) is especially important for applying the golden rule.
We also need to appreciate the future consequences of our actions on our- selves. Knowing that drugs have harmful effects differs from being able to imagine these effects in a vivid and accurate way. An essay about drug addic- tion might give us the facts, while a story or movie about drug addicts might bring these facts to life for us.
(4) A few more things. Here are five additional suggestions (Gensler 1996: 151–2 has a longer list):
• Feel free to think for yourself (instead of just conforming).
• Develop feelings that support the rational principles—especially feelings of concern for yourself and for others. Feelings can guide us when we don’t have time to think things out.
• Dialogue with others in your society and in other societies. Other people can point out our inconsistencies and make us aware of fac- tors to which we’d otherwise be blind.
• In areas where you don’t have the time or ability to be very rational, give weight to the views of those who are more rational—especially if there’s a consensus.
• Don’t be dogmatic on areas where rational people differ.
Keep in mind that many of our rationality conditions are idealized and that only God could satisfy them completely.
Our rationality conditions link up in various ways. Ends–means rationality requires that we harmonize our ends and our means; but it’s also about understanding our goals, how they originated, and how to achieve them. Impartiality requires that we make similar evaluations about similar actions; but it’s also about taking account of facts and arguments on both sides of an issue. Concern for others relates to the golden rule; but it’s also about understanding others, imagining ourselves in their place, and having feelings of concern.
We’re rational in our moral beliefs to the extent that in holding them we satisfy the rationality conditions—and thus are consistent, informed, imagina- tive, and a few more things. This gives a criterion not of what is “true,” but of what is “rational.” Someone might satisfy the rationality conditions to a high degree but still have moral beliefs that are incorrect. This wouldn’t disprove our principles.
Our rationality conditions are principles about how we ought (ideally) to form our moral beliefs. Most of our conditions aren’t very controversial. But we can still ask why we should follow these conditions and not others. How can we justify our rationality conditions?
The short answer is that these rationality conditions grow out of the consis- tency requirements that we’ve already defended. Consider the “Be informed” condition. Since we demand that others try to be informed when they delibe- rate about how to act toward us, we will, if consistent, demand this of ourselves too—and hold that we and others ought to be so informed. So consistency will lead us to accept “Be informed” as a rationality condition. In a similar way, consistency will lead us to accept “Be imaginative” and the other conditions.
Since our rationality conditions are ought judgments, their status is contro- versial. Are they objective, irreducible truths about how we ought to do our moral thinking? Are they demands of society, of ideal observers, or of God? Or are they exclamations or imperatives, instead of truths? People will disagree on the status of the conditions; but they may still largely agree on their content. Indeed, I think the most plausible content is much the same, regardless of how we view the nature of moral judgments.