What disturbs me most about emotivism is its claim that we can’t reason about basic moral principles. Suppose that we disagree with a Nazi on a basic moral principle. Emotivism says that we can’t progress further by reasoning; but we can try to change the Nazi’s feelings. However, the Nazi can also try to change our feelings; historically, Nazis were very good at manipulating feelings. So the emotivist model of moral thinking would seem to lead to propaganda wars, in which each side, unable to resort to reason, simply tries to manipulate the feelings of the other side. I find this disturbing.
Ima says that intuitionism can’t reason about basic moral principles either. We can’t argue about basic intuitions any more than we can about basic feelings. She concludes that emotivism and intuitionism are in the same boat. If so, I’d like to be in a different boat from both of them; I want some method whereby both sides could sit down and reason together, instead of just trying to manipulate each other’s emotions.
Some emotivists try to bring more rationality into ethics. They move to moderate emotivism. This view still sees moral judgments as emotional exclamations and not truth claims. But it insists that feelings can be rationally appraised to some degree: rational feelings are ones that are informed and impartial. On these grounds, we could argue that the Nazi’s principles are irrational. This approach works much like the ideal-observer view (see Chapter 2). We’d pick our moral principles by following our feelings—but we’d first develop rational feelings (ones that are informed and impartial).
Moderate emotivism gives a larger role to rationality in ethics. Hare’s prescriptivism, which we’ll consider in the next chapter, goes further in the same direction.
5.7 Chapter summary
Emotivism says that moral judgments express positive or negative feelings. “X is good” means “Hurrah for X!”—and “X is bad” means “Boo on X!”
Since moral judgments are exclamations, they can’t be true or false. So there can’t be moral truths or moral knowledge. We can reason about moral issues if we assume a system of norms; but we can’t reason about basic moral principles. Some emotivists base their view on logical positivism, which holds roughly that any genuine truth claim must be able to be tested by sense experience. Since moral judgments can’t be tested by sense experience, they aren’t genuine truth claims. So moral judgments only express feelings. Thus logical positivism leads to emotivism.
One problem with this argument is that logical positivism is self-refuting. It claims (roughly), “Any genuine truth claim must be able to be tested by sense experience.” But this claim itself can’t be tested by sense experience. So, by its own standard, logical positivism can’t be a genuine truth claim.
Some argue that emotivism is better than the other approaches because it’s simpler and explains more of the facts. They appeal to this principle, which is an important part of scientific method: “A view is better if it’s simpler and explains more.”
However, it isn’t clear that emotivism explains morality adequately; by deny- ing moral knowledge and moral truth, it seems to water down what morality is. Another problem is that moral judgments, instead of being essentially emotion- al, go from “very emotional” to “not very emotional.” And moral judgments don’t always translate plausibly into exclamations.
Emotivism also would seem to destroy the objectivity of scientific meth- od—since it would translate “A scientific view is better if it’s simpler and explains more” into the exclamation “Hurrah for scientific views that are simpler and explain more!”
Emotivism claims that, in disputes about basic moral principles, we can’t appeal to reason but only to emotion. This would seem to lead to propaganda wars in which each side, unable to resort to reason, simply tries to manipulate the feelings of the other side.
Moderate emotivism tries to add a stronger rationality component. While admitting that ethics is based on feelings, it insists that our feelings can be more or less rational to the extent that we’re informed and impartial.
5.8 Study questions
1. How does emotivism define “good”? What method does it follow for arriving at moral beliefs?
2. Define these terms: “truth claim,” “empirical statement,” and “analytic statement.” (5.1)
3. Explain what logical positivism is and how it led Ima to emotivism. 4. Why did Ima reject definitions of “good” that use empirical language
(such as “socially approved”)?
5. Why did Ima’s boyfriend accept emotivism?
6. Explain how emotivism and subjectivism differ. (5.2)
7. Suppose that Hitler, who likes the killing of Jews, says “The killing of Jews is good.” Would subjectivism say that Hitler’s statement is true? Would emotivism say that it is true?
8. What social functions do moral judgments have?
9. Suppose that you don’t feel like doing X. On emotivism, why might it still make sense for you to say to yourself, “It’s good for me to do X”? 10. Why did Ima think emotivism gives a simple explanation of morality? 11. According to emotivism, why can’t we define “good” in descriptive
terms?
12. What evidence did Ima give that emotivism is accurate linguistically? 13. In what ways can we reason on moral issues? How does the Nazi
example show the limits of moral reasoning? (5.3)
14. How did Ima apply emotivism to moral education? Did she think emotivism would destroy morality?
15. Write about a page sketching your initial reaction to emotivism. Does it seem plausible to you? What do you like and dislike about it? Can you think of any way to show that it’s false?
16. What objection is given to logical positivism? (5.4)
17. Explain the objection that moral judgments aren’t always emotional. (5.5) 18. Give some examples of sentences with “good” or “bad” that don’t seem
to translate into exclamations.
19. Explain the objection that emotivism would destroy the rationality of science.
20. How might the emotivist model of moral thinking lead to propaganda wars? (5.6)
5.9 For further study
To solidify your understanding, do the EthiCola exercise (see Preface) for “Ethics 05—Emotivism.”
Classic defenses of emotivism include Chapter 6 of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and Stevenson’s longer Facts and Values. Recent defenses of emotivism include Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism and Gibbard’s Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Also of interest is the related view in the first chapter of Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Frankena defends moderate emotivism in the last chapter of his Ethics.
Ayer’s book mentioned above gives a classic defense of logical positivism. Also helpful are Passmore’s brief “Logical positivism” and Ashby’s brief “Verifiability principle.” The Bibliography at the end of the book has informa- tion on how to find these works.
56 Ethics
6 Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism:
“You ought to do this” is a universalizable prescription (not a truth claim); it means “Do this and let everyone do the same in similar cases.”
Pick your moral principles by first trying to be informed and imaginative, and then seeing what you can consistently hold.
Prescriptivism sees ought judgments as a type of prescription (or imperative). “You ought to do A,” like “Do A,” doesn’t state a fact and isn’t true or false. Instead, it expresses our will, or our desires. But unlike simple imperatives, ought judgments are universalizable. This means that they logically commit us to making similar evaluations about similar cases. This leads to a useful form of golden rule reasoning.
We’ll begin by listening to the fictional Ima Prescriptivist explain his belief in prescriptivism. Then we’ll consider objections.