E L SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE TAXIS

the formula agreed upon by U.M.H.O. and M.C.A. Based on its suspicions of U.M.H.O.'s consistent one up-manship and the M .C.A

.'3

weak bargaining position, the D.A.P. was skeptical over the formula. As there were many

ways to arrive at a solution such as the formula, the D.A.P. felt that U.M.H.O. might, in conceding to the M.C.A., one aspect of the problem, make encroach-

166. New Straits Times,

7

th July, 1979*

1

67

. Ibid. U.M.H.O. Youth viewed education, and thereby university enrol­ ment, as within the scope of the H.E.P.

168 See Hew Straits T imes,

29

th June, 1979 and Malaysia, August 1979> and article,"University Balancing Act", Asiaweek, 13th July, 1979* While the formula is still officially a secret, it is generally beli­

eved that the agreement was that by 1982, the proportion of Malay to non-Malay entrants would decrease gradually from the present

64

- 36 to a more satisfactory 55"45 3plit. The agreement is expected to help the M.C.A. in the 1983 general elections. Far Eastern Economic R eview Asia Yearbook 1980» p? 228,

merits on another aspect, so that the net effect would be no effect at all. Lim Kit Siang was worried that the next proposal by the government might be that racial entry not be based on the the total intake, but on the numbers

170

who actually graduated. Then U.M.N.O. would add up all the figures of the different races since the first Malaysian graduate and use that as its yard-

171

stick. On these grounds, the D.A.P. speculated that the formula would be 172

"most unsatisfactory" where the non-Malays were concerned. In the absence of the formula’s details being publicised, it is difficult to affirm or disprove the D.A.P.'s contention.

In retrospect, the Merdeka University controversy arose when a technical and administrative problem, i.e. the lack of higher educational opportunities for non-Malays, which had racial implications, became entangled with the fear of what was perceived as the erosion of Chinese culture and

language. The D.A.P.'s strategy was to pressure the government to resolve both the issues of the shortage of university places and Chinese fear of cultural and linguistic loss. It believed that these problems which had been suppressed but never resolved in the past, had become very serious and com­ plex, and unless they were tackled immediately and at the roots, it was like­ ly that they would become even worse in the future. The D.A.P. justified its contention by pointing to the increasing apprehensions of the Chinese over the series of events ranging from the desecration of Hindu temples to the allegedly seditious speech by the M.P. for Kinabalu, Mark Koding. The government'3 response to these events appeared to the D.A.P. an tactical

170. See Hugh Lunn, op. cit. It's rationale was that since more non-Malays had graduated, more Malays should be admitted.

171. Ibid.

172. See article,"University Balancing Act", Asiaweek, 13th July, 1979» op. cit.

balancing and never resolving the issues at all. Thus while the government

)[iC 0 & t6 V \ i t condemned temple desecrations

by iVwbliVtf

, X t 1 mpl i edly gave in to Malay extremists over the U.T.M. convocation attire and the use of ethnic languages over

R.T.M.

In the case of the allegedly seditious speech by the M.P. for Kinabalu,

the government appeared passive and the D.A.P. had to press the seditious

charges. In all fairness to the D.A.P., had there been a similar outcry

against Malay schools and Malay sign-boards, the government would not have

hesitated to take immediate action to prosecute the offender. The govern­

m e n t ’s actions over these issues served to confuse the Chinese as they inter-»

preted them as double standards. The D.A.P. believed that the government

was only paying lip service to the Chinese by its actions. Far from r e -as­

suring the Chinese, the D.A.P. charged that the government's actions over

2 subsequent incidents in fact aggravated Chinese apprehensions.

The first concerned the influx of Vietnamese refugees in the last

quarter of 1978» continuing throughout 1979* The predominantly ethnic Chi­ nese Vietnamese refugees landed in the Malay east coast states of Peninsular Malaysia. The Malays there regarded them as essentially Chinese

rather than Vietnamese, and given the background of Sino-Malay hostility,

engaged in hostile acts, such as stoning them and pushing their boats back 173

to sea. Government official policy was also hostile, applying the term t n I

"illegal immigrants" on them. ^ As the refugee waves thickened, the govern­

ment threatened to chase all refugees in existing camps out and even to shoot 175

those, who out of desperation, persisted to reach Malaysian shores. While

173.

174.

175.

For details, see Hugh Lunn, op. c i t ., and Bruce Grant,The Boat P e o ­ ple? An Age I n vestigation, Penguin, Melbourne, 1979» Chapter VI.

The term "illegal immigrants" was used on the boat people because the government felt that they were escaping not from the ravages of war, but harsh living conditions under the communists, and were seeking greener pastures in developed countries by illegally entering Malaysia

first. This threat was made by the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, out

these allegations were difficult to substantiate, they nevertheless created

■t*

the feeling in the Chinese that government assurances of goodwill were empty.’ They could point to the comparatively favourable treatment that the govern­ ment accorded to the Moslem refugees from Cambodia and the Southern Philip-

1V6

pines as implications of Chinese antagonism. The D.A.P. called on the

177

government to adopt a more humanitarian approach towards the refugees.

In case the government showed any signs of branding Chinese showing sympathy to the Vietnamese refugees as fifth columnists, Kit Siang maintained that the fact that there was no public Chinese outcry against the pushing back

178

of Vietnamese boats out to sea, showed that they were committed to Malaysia. Kit Siang's statement reflected the wariness of the Malays, particularly U.M.N.O. Youth, to watch for any possible Chinese reaction over the govern­ ment's moves towards the refugees, and then to brand them as fifth columnists. It is difficult to gauge the impact of the Vietnamese refugees on the Chinese

against the government in the sense that they increased Chinese fears and

apprehensions. But one source has indicated the government's treatment of

the refugees reinforced its opposition to the Merdeka University and gave the D.A.P. its first by-election victory in the predominantly Chinese cons­ tituency of Kampong Kolam for the Penang state assembly since Dr. Chen Man

of exasperation rather than intent. Asiaweek, 27th July, 1979*

176

. See for instance Pertubohan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia fPHRKIM) plan

to take in pOO Cambodian Moslem refugees for resettlement in Malaysia, New Straits Times, 13th June, 1979» and the government's reference to to the Moslem victims of the Christian-Moslem conflict in the Southern Philippines who fled to Sabah as "refugees". A letter to Asiaweek, 17th August, 1979» candidly asked if the 70,000 Vietnamese refugees in Malaysia converted to Islam, would Tuhku Abdul Rahman, the Presi­ dent of PMRKIM, accept them for resettlement in Malaysia as in the case of the Cambodian Moslem refugees. For further details on alle­ ged hostile attitude towards the Vietnamese refugees on grounds of religion, see Hugh Lunn, op. cit.

177» On Dr. Mahathir's harsh attitude towards the refugees, Lim Kit Siang called on the government not to follow Vietnam's barbaric and irres­ ponsible attitude, but to take all steps to bring international pres-

179

H in '3 v i c t o r y in th e Rahang s t a t e c o n s titu e n c y o f N eg ri Sem bilan i n 1965. 7

The second i n c i d e n t in v o lv e d th e a lle g e d ly p ro v o c a tiv e sp eech by th e Horae A f f a i r s M in is t e r , G h azali S h a f ie , on th e l i o n d an ce. O pening a sem in ar on M alay sian c u l t u r e a t th e N a tio n a l U n iv e r s ity i n May 1979» G h azali was r e p o r te d as s a y in g t h a t th e C hinese l i o n dance co u ld n o t be a c c e p te d as

180

p a r t o f M alay sian c u l t u r e . The m i n i s t e r h e ld t h a t as i t was a lr e a d y ex­ t i n c t in C hina, i t s c o u n try o f o r i g i n , i t c o u ld n o t be d eveloped f u r t h e r and be a c c e p te d by a l l . G h azali added t h a t th e l i o n dance was n o t on ly in c o n ­ g ru o u s in th e M alay sian en v iro n m en t, b u t t h a t i t h in d e re d th e emergence o f a M alay-based n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . I t m ight p e rh a p s be a c c e p ta b le i f i t was m o d ifie d to a t i g e r dance, accom panied by Malay and In d ia n m u sic. G h azali l a t e r claim ed t h a t he was m isq u o ted and th e Prim e M in is t e r , Plussein Onn, had

181

to c l a r i f y h i s sp eech to show t h a t no o ff e n c e was meant to th e Chinese'.

s u re on Vietnam to be more humane. New S t r a i t s T im es, 17t h Ju n e, 1979* The D .A .P . a ls o u n s u c c e s s f u lly ta b l e d a m otion i n P a rlia m e n t to e f f ­ e c t a more h u m a n ita ria n a t t i t u d e to th e re fu g e e problem . New S t r a i t s Tim es, 19t h Ju n e , 1979«

1 7 8 . Hugh Lunn, o p . c i t .

179* See K.Das, '‘V ic to ry f o r th e wrong r e a s o n s " , F ar E a s te rn Economi c Re­ view , 29t h December, 197Ö and Lim Say Boon, op. c i t . Kampong Kolam had

an e l e c t o r a t e o f 17,638 made up o f 14»5 2 2 (8 2 .3 $ ) C h in ese, 2 ,0 3 2 (1 1 .5 $ ) Malays and 1,064(6$ ) I n d ia n s . The D .A .P . had won t h i s c o n s titu e n c y in th e 1978 g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s b u t an a p p li c a t io n a g a in s t th e d i s q u a l i ­ f i c a t i o n o f th e N .F .(G .R .M .) c a n d id a te was s u c c e s s f u l . In th e by- e l e c t i o n , th e D .A .P . p o lle d 8,063 t o b e a t th e G.R.M. by a m a jo rity o f 3,665 v o te s . Appendix C. The D .A .P . however d e n ied t h a t i t made an i s s u e o f th e V ietnam ese re fu g e e s in th e b y - e l e c t i o n . See K arpal S in g h' 0 l e t t e r to th e F ar E a s te r n Economic Review, 2 6 th Ja n u a ry , 1979» 180. F or d e t a i l s , s e e a r t i c l e , " S p e c t r e o f K e rlin g " , A siaw eek , 8t h Ju n e, 1979

and Thaung M yine, "M alays w o r r ie d by C h in e se L io n D ance", The A s ia n , V ol. I l l No. 2, J u n e / J u l y , 1979.

1 8 1 . Datulc H u sse in Onn d e n ie d t h a t th e governm ent had o p e n ly s u g g e s te d t h a t t h e l i o n d an ce be changed t o a t i g e r d an ce and c la im e d t h a t G h a z a l i 's s p e e c h had n o t a r o u s e d i l l - f e e l i n g s betw een t h e r a c e s . G h a z a li, a c ­ c o r d in g t o D atuk H u ss e in Onn, o n ly r e f e r r e d t o th e d an ce as an exam­ p l e i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e p r o c e s s by w h ich c u l t u r a l e le m e n ts from o t h e r

Whatever Ghazali’s intention in making that speech, it stirred up Chinese dissatisfactions from the numerous Chinese cultural organizations in the country. The Home Affairs Minister was regarded as unnecessarily provoca­ tive in his previous utterances on government policy towards the Chinese. In the past he had been alleged to have suggested a multi-racial "kompan/r" (Malay drum) group, wearing Malay dress taking part in a National Day parade. The significance of this to many Chinese appeared to be assimilation towards Malay culture, which they resented. The fact that Ghazali had a strong in­

fluence in determining the N.E.P. and his hostile attitude towards the Viet­ namese refugees helped to create the "ultra" image in him as far as the Chi­

nese were concerned. It was pointed out that if he had shown any inclina­

tion towards fair play, it was never recalled that he had made a similar suggestion as regards any Malay dance being accompanied by Chinese and Indian music to be considered as part of national culture. Predictably the D.A.P.

attacked Ghazali’s speech as being blind to the realities of a multi-racial, 18?

multi-cultural society. "At the same time the party justified the need for the lion dance to be part of Malaysian culture.

countries could be absorbed and fully accepted in its new environment. Excerpts of the speech were as follows:"As an example, the presenta­ tion and accompanying music of the lion dance would hot possibly be accepted as a dance movement and melody in Malaysia. The dance had originated in Mainland China and its environment; nevertheless the

lion dance was no longer in existence there. As such how then could

it be developed and be accepted widely by all? In the future, through the process of reorientation and restructuring, an interaction of all the various cultures would take place. Maybe then we will have ele­ ments of a national culture, one of which would adopt the movements

of a "tiger" dance accompanied by various types of drums of the game-

lan or the barong dance as in Bali". New Straits Times, 9th Novem­

ber, 1979) op. cit.

182. Lira Kit Slang described Ghazali’s speech as "shocking" and showing

"surprisingly little perception of the basis of a plural society". He added that the fact that the dance was extinct in China was all the more reason it should be accepted as part of Malaysian culture. This would, in his opinion, show that Malaysian Chinese cultural

expressions were distinctly Malaysian, and not subject to the con­

Thus as far as the D.A.P. was concerned, so long as the Chinese feel insecure about their culture and language, they would strive for the establishment of Merdeka University, trying to link it to any related problem that became available, such as the lack of higher educational opportunities. As their major representative in Parliament and the state assemblies, the D.A.P. felt it had every right to speak on their behalf. U.LI.N.O, on the

In document El Municipio en México (página 164-168)