SIAS 4 Seguridad en la Calidad

The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory is grounded in (i) Abraham Maslow’s theory of human motivation (Maslow, 1954), (ii) Philippe Ariès’ idea of different motivations for birth control (Ariès, 1980), and lastly, (iii) the response of Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa towards the theory of cyclical fertility proposed by Richard Easterlin (Lesthaeghe, 2010). This section first discusses these foundations. Next, Ansley J. Coale’s RWA-model and its three preconditions for innovation, precisely readiness, willingness and ability, (reported in several studies on the SDT such as Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002 and more recently in Lesthaeghe &

Lopez-Gay, 2013) is presented in order to explain how changes in demographic behavior occur in different societies.

Richard Easterlin developed his cyclical fertility theory after the baby boom of the 1960s and the baby bust of the 1970s. It states that cohorts in smaller groups have better employment opportunities and, as a consequence, earlier marriage and higher fertility, while cohorts in larger groups have the opposite chances and demographic responses (Easterlin, 1973). It causes cyclical fertility swings, as the fertility among cohorts in small groups is high (generating large cohorts) while that

of cohorts in large groups is low (generating small cohorts). By the middle of the 1980s, Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa perceived that the sub-replacement fertility of the 1970s was driven by more than reduced employment opportunities and, in the words of Lesthaeghe (2010), “was not only going to last much longer, but could even become an ‘intrinsic’ feature of a new demographic regime”

(Lesthaeghe, 2010). This expectation is grounded in Abraham Maslow’s theory of human motivation (1954) and Philippe Ariès’ view of different motivations for declining birth rates (Ariès, 1980).

In his article, ‘Two successive motivations for declining birth rate in the West’, Ariès (1980) looks at two periods of decreasing fertility rates: one from the end of the 19^th century until the 1930s and another starting in the 1960s. According to the author, the decline in birth rate in the first period was driven by a ‘child-oriented’ culture and “unleashed by an enormous sentimental and financial investment in the child” (Ariès, 1980, p. 649). Fertility was controlled through family planning in order to invest enough resources in the future of the child.

Parents desired to give their children the opportunities which they did not have.

According to Ariès, the motivations for fertility control from the 1960s on are very different. From this period, life is no longer planned in terms of children and their future. On the contrary, children became “one of the various components that make it possible for adults to blossom” (Ariès, 1980, p. 650). Having children is not a ‘need’ anymore, but an individual choice. In terms of demographic behavior, as stated by Lesthaeghe (2010), in the first period, couples started contraception to avoid pregnancies; nowadays, contraception is stopped in order to start a pregnancy (p.213).

These different motivations for birth control and parenthood are considered by the SDT a result of the rise of non-material or higher order needs.

The concept of higher order needs is based on Maslow's (1954) theory of human motivation, which classifies human desires hierarchically. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is often portrayed in the shape of a pyramid, with the largest and most fundamental levels of needs at the bottom (e.g. physiological, subsistence and safety needs), and the higher order ones (e.g. freedom of expression, emancipation,

self-actualization and recognition) at the top. According to Maslow (1954), it is necessary to have the fundamental needs satisfied in order to desire those of a higher order. Socioeconomic development favors the rise of higher order needs, leading to substantive changes in the ideational domain and, as a consequence, in demographic behavior.

The inclusion of Maslow’s theory of human motivation as one of the foundations of the SDT helps to differentiate the SDT from the FDT, as well as from other alternative explanations of demographic change. While the FDT happened in a phase of societal development based on concerns about basic material needs, the SDT is considered the “expression of the development of the higher order, non-material needs and of expressive values” (Lesthaeghe, 2011, p. 183). In addition, the inclusion of Maslow’s theory of human motivation as one of the backgrounds of the SDT clearly differentiates this theoretical framework from other theories that consider demographic change as pure responses to changes in economic context.

Among these theories we can highlight classic economic interpretations, neo-Marxist theories and “purely structural sociology and history” theories (Lesthaeghe, 2011, p. 183). According to Lesthaeghe (2011), different from the SDT framework, these alternative theories “either fail to incorporate cultural shifts altogether or fail to specify universal mechanisms that link material and non-material driving forces”

(Lesthaeghe, 2011, p. 183).

In this sense, the SDT framework accepts the importance of the effects of contextual changes and of individual cost-benefits calculation. However, it also recognizes that these explanations are not sufficient to understand changes in demographic behavior. In the same vein, pure cultural explanations are equally insufficient, as well as models or theories that consider cultural change as

‘endogenous’. In the framework of the SDT, culture is treated as a dynamic set of value orientations (Lesthaeghe, 2011; Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004). In the words of Lesthaeghe (2011),

“As such these [value] orientations can change at the individual level and they can be linked recursively to the unfolding of the life course. And they can also change at the collective level during particular periods of time, or shift to new

configurations with the succession of cohorts. In a general way, the motor of it all, i.e. Maslowian drift to higher order needs, is positively related to economic growth, but other factors reflecting historical path dependency (often in religious and political spheres) modulate this connection”

(Lesthaeghe, 2011, p. 212).

Consequently, the SDT uses Coale’s RWA-model to explain the spread of innovative behavior in different societies (Coale, 1973, cited by Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2002). According to this model, the success (S) of behavioral innovation depends on the simultaneous existence of three preconditions. First, any innovative form of behavior must bring benefits that compensate its costs or disadvantages, in other words a society must be ready (R) to change. Simultaneously, the new behavior must be culturally (morally) acceptable, or a society must be willing (W) to change.

In addition, a society must be able (A) to change, or have adequate means to do it, in terms of available technology, for instance. Furthermore, the failure of satisfying one of the three conditions inhibits the innovation from occurring, even if the other two are met. Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) expressed Coale’s specification as S

= R∩ ∩ W A (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2002).

The Second Demographic Transition framework combines its theoretical background with the RWA-model to explain changes in family life which took place in Western Europe and is occurring in several other parts of the world, including Latin America. Socioeconomic and technological development (R and A) opened the way for the rise of higher order desires which led to shifts in the ideational domain through secular, individualistic and post-materialist values (W). It changed, not only the motivations for birth control and parenthood, as observed by Ariès, but patterns of family life as a whole. For instance, with regard to nuptial behavior, women’s education and participation in the job market increased their relative power in relation to men, leading to more egalitarian gender relations. As a result, the need and acceptability of marriage and its institutional regulation has been diminished and individuals are free to choose which type of family to form, as well as when and how long the arrangement will last. Divorce has become a socially accepted option for unhappy couples to restart and, subsequently, a multitude of

living arrangements have arisen (i.e. unmarried cohabitation, a variety of step family configurations, LAT relationships).