SITUACION FINANCIERA

Antigovernment agitation by Shiite religious leaders finds fertile ground among poorer Bahraini work- ers. Attempts to detain and deport militant preachers resulted in widespread demonstrations in the fall of 1979. At least one Shiite secret society, al-Sanduq al- Husaini, was raided and several of its members were arrested by the police during the summer of 1980. But political demonstrations again erupted in Jidd Hafs—a working-class, Shiite suburb of Manama—in early December of that same year. Quick action by state security forces appears to have been necessary to prevent the rioting from spreading to Zarariah, a poor district of Manama populated by unskilled foreign laborers.

In December 1981 government officials announced the arrest of more than 70 members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) for conspir- ing to overthrow the regime. This organization, led by the Hojatoleslam Hadi al-Mudarrisi, called for the overthrow of the Al Khalifah and the creation of an Islamic republic on the islands. The conviction and imprisonment of IFLB activists the following spring severely weakened the local Islamist movement but left a number of smaller, more militant groups largely intact. The authorities tried to undercut the appeal of such organizations by authorizing the establishment of joint worker-management councils in the country’s larger factories. Joint councils already existed at Bah- rain Petroleum Company and Aluminum Bahrain; in mid-1980 they were extended to plants operated by Gulf Air, the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yards, and other larger enterprises.

Bahrain’s Shiite movement revived after the 1990– 91 Gulf War, when the government refused to recog- nize a string of petitions demanding the immediate reinstatement of the National Assembly. A leading Shiite preacher, Shaikh ‘Ali Salman, used his Friday sermons to appeal to the population to support the drive to recall the parliament. In addition, his sermons criticized the government for failing to take steps to combat rising unemployment among Bahraini citizens and commented on trends in regional affairs. Other prominent Shiite religious figures joined Salman in demanding political reforms. Their efforts mobilized not only the general public but also such previously apolitical forces as the members of local religious soci- eties (husainiyyahs) and women in outlying villages. Growing activism among the Shia led to a series of clashes between protesters and the police throughout 1994 that culminated in Salman’s arrest and deporta- tion in January 1995.

In the wake of Salman’s forcible exile, popular protests broke out across the country. Security forces suppressed the demonstrations by force, detaining suspected activists and subjecting them to unsuper- vised interrogation and corporal punishment. Officials immediately accused foreign operatives of fomenting the violence and even produced a group of young Shia who confessed on local television to belonging to a Bahraini branch of Iranian-sponsored Hizbullah. By the last months of 1995 political agitation had turned into outbursts of arson and sabotage. Luxury hotels, state-affiliated commercial and industrial establish- ments, and cafes catering to foreign laborers were all attacked during the course of 1996. Meanwhile, the authorities began negotiating with the Shiite religious

leadership. These talks resulted in the release of several imprisoned preachers in September 1995, but crowds took to the streets once again when it became clear that others remained under arrest. An October 1995 rally outside the residence of Shaikh ‘Abd al-Amir al- Jamri, who had started a hunger strike to protest the continued detentions, attracted some 75,000 protest- ers, making the event by far the largest political dem- onstration in the country’s history.

In the wake of the 1994–99 uprising, Shiite activists congregated in the Islamic National Accord (Wifaq) Society, which became the largest and most prominent of the country’s religious associations. Opposite the Wifaq Society stood the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood, whose members made up a major bloc of elected repre- sentatives in the National Assembly. Two smaller reli- gious organizations, the Islamic Arab Centrist (Wasat) Society and the Islamic Action Society, joined the Wifaq Society in March 2003 to issue a joint manifesto oppos- ing the implementation of the amended constitution.

National Prospects

Persistent popular discontent over the restricted char- acter and hesitant pace of the political changes enacted by King Hamad leave little room for collaboration between the Al Khalifah–dominated establishment and liberal reformers. The regime’s insistence on granting immunity from criminal or civil prosecution to military and security personnel accused of engaging in human rights abuses during the 1994–99 uprising limits the prospects for national reconciliation. At the same time, the government’s continuing practice of conferring full voting rights on resident Baluchi, Yemeni, and Syr- ian expatriates, most of whom hold positions in state agencies or the armed forces, undercuts the legitimacy of the newly restored electoral system.

In the aftermath of the 2003 Gulf War, Islamist militants from surrounding states, most notably Saudi Arabia, were reported to be infiltrating Bahrain in sig- nificant numbers. Such radicals posed a serious threat to the ruling family and liberals alike and dampened public demands for more extensive reforms during 2003 and 2004. Nevertheless, National Assembly representatives have become increasingly diligent in subjecting cabinet ministers to formal questioning, especially with regard to the conduct of economic affairs, and more vocal in condemning official mismanagement and corruption. Although high oil prices enabled the authorities to con- tain discontent during the immediate postwar period, simmering, class-based unrest and religious disparities Bahrain 99

offer a wide range of issues around which liberal and radical challengers might mobilize once oil revenues return to more moderate levels.

Further Reading

Bahry, Louay, “The Opposition in Bahrain: A Bellwether for the Gulf?” Middle East Policy 5 (May 1997).

Gause, F. Gregory. Oil Monarchies. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.

Khalaf, Abd al-Hadi. Unfinished Business: Contentious Politics and State Building in Bahrain. Lund: University of Lund Research Report in Sociology, 2000.

Khuri, Fuad I. Tribe and State in Bahrain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Lawson, Fred H. Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.

E

101

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC