on 7 and 9 October 1962. Asked to comment on the Tunku's claim that the Philippines did not seem to know what it wanted, Lopez retorted 'What we want is very simple. We want North Borneo back!' He reiterated that in March the Tunku had told Pelaez that he would accept North Borneo on a 'clean slate', but the Prime Minister had recently changed his attitude 'and is now eager to accept North Borneo at all cost, and later discuss the Philippine claim.' By stating
that 'we are in no position to question the British right to this territory because for nearly 100 years their right to it was never questioned', the Tunku, Lopez said, had shown himself to be virtually an 'apologist for imperialism.'
This interview was also significant because Lopez, for the first time, indicated the geographical extent of the Philippine claim when he stated that 'the Philippine Government's claim to North Borneo is limited to the area that formed part of the Sultanate as of the deed of 1878. Any accretions to the territory, if any, cannot properly be claimed by us, unless the British themselves voluntarily
include these areas with the rest of North Borneo in the settlement.'^
Referring to ASA, the Undersecretary stated that the Philippine government had been seriously studying the question of North Borneo before ASA had been formed;
'indeed, the dream of a Malaysia Irredenta had obsessed for decades many of our intellectuals and political leaders, so that when ASA was established, we looked upon it as a
first downpayment on the realization of that dream. Actually whether North Borneo goes to the Philippines or to Malaya,
it will remain within ASA or within the Greater Malayan
,? /
1 Department of Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.IV, N o .2, June 1963, p.177.
Confederation conceived by President Macapagal.' Lopez, it appears, was uncertain whether or not the Confederation would replace ASA as well as Malaysia.
The North Borneo Referendum Issue
The appearance of hasty improvisation in Philippine policy was emphasized by the confusion over the issue of a referendum in North Borneo. President Macapagal, in the press conference at which he announced his Greater Malayan Confederation scheme, had stated that if the necessity of
ascertaining the wishes of the people of North Borneo regarding their future should arise at any time, the Philippines would support their desire to exercise this right, preferably in a plebiscite under United Nations auspices. It was not clear whether the referendum was to be held before or after the legal claim was settled. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September, Pelaez stated that the claim had been put forward 'without prejudice to the
exercise of the right of self-determination by the inhabitants of North Borneo, preferably under United Nations auspices.'"*’ The Vice-President was also quoted as saying that 'if the people of North Borneo choose to be part of a Malayan
federation - and say so in a plebiscite - then we will have
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no objection whatsoever.' The Tunku welcomed Pelaez's suggestion of a referendum, but was careful to point out that such a referendum should be held after the formation
3 of Malaysia.
The statements of Lopez and Macapagal in Manila did not carry the same conciliatory note towards Malaya as
1 United Nations General Assembly. Official Records, 17th session. Plenary Meeting Vol.l, 1134th meeting, 27 September 1962, p.167.
2 Manila Chronicle, 2 October 1962. 3 Straits Times, 2 October 1962.
did those of Pelaez in New York. Lopez said that North
Borneo should be handed over to the Philippines to strengthen the bulwark of democracy in Southeast Asia, and insisted
that the holding of a referendum should not prejudice the proprietary claims of the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.^
The contradiction between the reported views of Pelaez and those of Lopez on the North Borneo referendum
question became explicit on 7 October, when Pelaez was accused of misrepresenting the views of his government. The Vice-
President's chief critic, however, was not Lopez but Senator Ferdinand Marcos, the President of the Liberal Party. Before leaving for New York to join the Philippine U.N. delegation, Marcos stated that Pelaez 'was not authorized to commit
the Philippine Government to a referendum by the inhabitants 2 of North Borneo before the Philippine claim is settled.'
1 Manila Bulletin, 3 October 1962 . In his Free Press interview in October, Lopez said:
We are committed to a plebiscite, but after the Philippine claim to North Borneo is settled. North Borneo is not Antarctica, inhabited by
penguins. This is a land with people, whose feelings must be considered. The logical thing to do is to settle
the question of ownership but let the owner, whoever it is, pledge himself to respect the wishes of the inhabitants regarding the future.
If we hold a referendum now, while the dispute remains, then we are proposing a political solution in advance of the determination of the legal issue. The process should be reversed; there should first be a legal, then, a political solution.
I am merely reiterating the President's view of the matter. In my opinion what the President had in mind
in his July 27 statement was to conduct the referendum after our North Borneo claim is settled and before
North Borneo is incorporated into the Malaysian federation. Department of Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.IV, N o .2, June 1963, p,177.
This statement was reportedly authorized*‘by ■ the President himself.'*' Marcos claimed that in his July press conference the President's position was 'to the effect that the
Government supported self-determination by a referendum in North Borneo to be conducted upon the settlement of our clai m . ' Macapagal, however, had in fact stated that the Philippines
3 would agree to a referendum in the territory 'at any time.' The Department of Foreign Affairs was quick to rally to Pelaez's defence and denied that the Vice-President had committed the Philippines to a referendum in North Borneo
4 before the Philippine claim was settled.
As Senator Tolentino pointed out, the public feud between the two Government officials had further confused
5
the Philippine position. The clash between Marcos and
1 Ibid. 2 Ibid.
3 Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs Review Vol.IV, No.2, June 1963, p.175.
4 Manila Bulletin, 8 October 1962.
5 Ibid., 10 October 1962. Macapagal attempted to settle
the matter by sending identical telegrams to the disputants, and later in October Marcos issued a statement that 'upon motion of Senator F.E. Marcos, the Philippine delegation to the United Nations recommend to the Philippine Government in Manila the sending of a Note to the British Government for the Philippine and British Governments to agree to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the settlement of the dispute. Vice- President Pelaez concurred in the motion.' (Manila Bulletin, 24 October 1962).
Pelaez seems to have been primarily due to political rivalry between them, as both were likely contenders for the
Presidency in the 1965 elections.'*'
Despite the confusion in Philippine policy
statements on ASA and the Malay Confederation as well as on the Borneo referendum question, there were indications that Macapagal and Lopez were thinking of a wider confederation which would include Indonesia. Macapagal had stated that
the Confederation would consist of Malaya, Singapore, the Borneo territories and the Philippines 'to begin with'; the implication was that the other 'Malay state' in the region might be persuaded to join. This hope reflected the considerable improvement in Philippine-Indonesian relations which had followed Macapagal's election. Philippine-Indonesian Relations 1961-1962
The Macapagal administration came to office during the height of the West Irian dispute. During the first
few months of his administration, the new President was preoccupied with domestic politics, but he could not ignore
the crisis virtually on the Philippines' southern doorstep. On 19 December 1961, Sukarno announced the mobilization of
the 'Peoples Triple Command for the Liberation of West Irian' and despatched small guerrilla groups into the
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