Gráfica 9. Grado de incumplimiento de expectativas del cliente
3.5 Supuesto de trabajo Considerando el contenido, e
After the genocide, the RPF continued to fight opponents within the country and in DRC. There was a genuine distrust of the population and Hutu RPF elites were a possible threat (because they could potentially mobilise popular grievances).
The RPF maintained the appearance of a broad-based coalition but understood that Tutsi security depended on monopolising political control among Tutsis (or ensuring the monopoly of violence was shared with those who were loyal to RPF ideology).
After 1994, Vice-President Kagame led the dominant coalition within the RPF, which comprised the Tutsi Ugandan inner clique and other loyalists (including some Hutu politicians). A scattered group of Hutu RPF members and other political parties opposed the dominant coalition. Other political parties included Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti Démocrate Chretien (PDC). President Bizimungu (RPF) and Twagiramungu (MDR) were both Hutus. Nine ministers were Tutsi while 12 were Hutu. Under labels of
“power-sharing” and “national unity”, the 1994 government represented (on paper)
“a genuine government of national unity” (Prunier 2009, 7).256
The unity did not last long. While the RPF may have envisioned a society where broad-based inclusion could mean open political competition, the party’s own survival quickly became predicated on Tutsi rule (Mamdani 2001). The RPF’s central concern till 2000 was countering security threats inside and outside Rwanda.257 Hutu ministers such as Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga and Prime Minister Twagiramungu protested against the military’s reluctance to reign in reprisal killings. Kagame replied by “defending the honour of the army”, either
256 Reyntjens (2013) disagrees with this, suggesting it was a façade from the beginning.
257 This opinion is expressed in interviews often.
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denying the charge or claiming the security forces were doing the best they could (Prunier 2009, 9). Twagiramungu later resigned while Sendashonga was fired in August 1995. Soon after, both left Rwanda. Others such as Lizinde followed.258 The initial years were a “period of massive imprisonment, arrests and killings, both public and discreet, of an unprecedented magnitude” (Ruzibiza, quoted in Reyntjens 2013, 10). Kanyarengwe was among those who chose silence as a method of protest, rather than exit.259 He officially resigned “because he wanted to devote himself to other functions” but he may have resigned in protest against massacres committed by the RPA in Ruhengeri (Kanyarengwe’s home district) (Reyntjens 2013, 18). When Hutu leaders chose to exit, many of them attempted to form new coalitions outside Rwanda as an alternative to power. Exit was a pathway to voice for some of them.
However, Kigali countered such attempts. For example, Sendashonga had begun to build support (even meeting Ugandan government officials to apprise them of his plans) before he was allegedly assassinated on RPF orders (Prunier 2009).
After Kanyarengwe’s resignation, the façade of ‘power-sharing’ gave way to executive dominance. By 2000, even Bizimungu had resigned.260 When Hutu leaders decided to voice their protest and challenge the regime, such protests were not tolerated. Bizimingu’s attempt at establishing a new party in 2001 led to his house arrest (Reyntjens 2011).261 He was imprisoned in 2004 and given a 15-year prison sentence.262 Other Hutus and rival party leaders such as Pierre-Celestin
Rwigyema,263 Bernard Makuza264 and Vincent Biruta seized the opportunity to prove their loyalty to the RPF.265 Kagame replaced rivals with loyalists, thereby
consolidating his power and position. The 2003 constitution was established, which legalised the existence of a multiparty system, with restrictions (Golooba-Mutebi 2013). Critics (Reyntjens 2006, Beswick 2010) have argued that the constitution has
258 Lizinde was shot and killed in Nairobi in 1996.
259 Kanyarengwe died because of poor health in 2006.
260 Although he resigned “for personal reasons”, charges of tax fraud, corruption and illegal
dispossession of land were levelled against him (Reyntjens 2004, 181). Kanyarengwe’s position was delegitimised publicly (as is the norm when officials are excluded).
261 He established the Parti démocratique pour le Renouveau-Ubuyanja (PDR-Ubuyanja)
262 He was released in 2007 but did not engage in any form of outright protest.
263 He replaced Twagiramungu as Prime Minister in 1995 and remained in the post till 2000. He was later accused of being involved in the genocide and fled Rwanda. This case was suspended in 2011. In 2012, he returned to the country and was elected to the East African Legislative Assembly.
264 Makuza was Prime Minister from 2000 to 2011. He then became a member of the Senate.
265 Biruta served as the Speaker of the Parliament. He has also served as Minister of Education and President of the Senate. He is a Tutsi and a PSD leader.
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allowed the RPF to consolidate power under the guise of multiparty democracy although there is very little space for dissent in Rwandan politics. Supporters argue that national dialogues and forums for political parties ensure that the government listens to divergent voices within Rwanda (Golooba-Mutebi 2013). By the early 2000s, the Kagame-led RPF established a monopoly of violence and power among its Tutsi cadres and loyal Hutus.
The position of many Hutu leaders was insecure but many have assumed prominent positions. For instance, Marcel Gatsinzi had been Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in April 1994. Gatsinzi was removed from his post in the early 1990s after publicly opposing the genocide. He was reintegrated into the RPA after the genocide and was eventually promoted to the rank of General. He later served as Minister of Defence and then as Minister of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs.266 During this time, Gatsinzi was repeatedly accused of genocide charges. Emmanuel Habyarimana preceded Gatsinzi as Minister of Defence, serving from 2000 to 2002. In 2002, he was removed from his position for his “extreme pro-Hutu” views (BBC 2003). He fled Rwanda in 2003. Boniface Rucagu, a popular Ruhengeri politician, was arrested on genocide charges six times between 1994 and 1997 (Kinzer 2008). In 1997, he was appointed Governor of Northern Province to wean the Northwest away from Hutu extremism (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2013).
He currently serves as head of the National Leadership Training Programme, Itorero.
The RPF disciplines Hutu opponents who challenge dominant narratives or mention ethnicity in political campaigns. In 2010, Victoire Ingabire, President of FDU-Inkingi, returned to Rwanda to contest the elections. She challenged the RPF discourse by publicly saying that Tutsis were not the sole victims of the genocide (at a genocide memorial centre). After the speech, she was arrested and charged with
“genocide ideology, minimising the genocide and divisionism” (Waldorf 2011, 58).
Ingabire is still in prison today. There may be genuine grievances among the
population today (as the scholarly ‘consensus’ suggests). However, Tutsi elites (and rivals) collectively guard against the mobilisation of such grievances.
266 He was retired in 2013.
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Some prominent loyal Hutus remain in positions of power. Pierre Damien Habumuremyi served as Prime Minister between 2011 and 2014.267 Francois Kanimba has served as Minister of Trade and Industry since 2011.268 Anastase Murekezi is the current Prime Minister.269 The government’s paranoia is justified by the threat Hutu leaders pose in mobilising the population on the basis of ethnic divisionism. Critics (Lemarchand 2006) argue that ‘real’ power sharing would have led to a more equitable distribution of power. Reasoning follows that the RPF’s methods only mask increasing inequality between ethnicities and will end in renewed ethnic conflict (Ingelaere 2010). However, there is limited opportunity to
instrumentalise ethnic differences. The more pressing threat to the current
government comes from within its RPF Tutsi elite. Box 4.4 illustrates that the RPF ideology was legitimised through historical experiences, including its position as saviours after the genocide (with Kagame as the leading figure) and shared refugee experiences during the liberation effort. RPF ideology was strengthened through distancing itself from the reigns of previous Hutu leaders and the colonial
administration) and the threat posed by former genocidaires abroad. To retain its monopoly of violence, the RPF works against threats posed by opponents within the country (dissenters) or alliances between opponents abroad that could galvanise the dissatisfaction of segments of the population.
267 Habumuremyi’s rise was surprising for many within Rwanda. “Even for me, this is a shock. He had no reputation. If anything, he had a corrupt reputation” (Interview, senior RDF officer, January 2012).
He had served the government since 2000 in posts at the National Electoral commission, as a Representative in the East African Legislative Assembly and as Minister of Education. In 2014, Habumuremyi was removed as Prime Minister. Three explanations were presented for this reshuffle:
i) it was a political decision ahead of the next election; ii) One of Habumuremyi’s relatives was in the FDLR and returned to Rwanda without going through the demobilisation process (Long 2014); iii) He was involved in “business deals conducted through members of his family” and his “propensity for photo ops” (Kanuma 2014a). The second and third propositions delegitimised Habumuremyi as acting for his own benefit and against RPF values.
268 Kanimba was Chairman of the Governance Task Force, which negotiated the first structural adjustment Programme in Rwanda. He had worked for the Habyarimana government for 11 years in the Ministry of Economic Planning. From 1995-2000, he was the World Bank’s Chief Economist in Rwanda. He then worked at BNR till 2011, serving as the Governor of the Bank for nine years.
269 Murekezi is a PSD member. He previously served as the Minister for Public Service and Labour.
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Box 4.4: Illustration of Threats during the First Phase of RPF Rule: The Primitive Accumulation of Coercive Power