Defining civic dignity ultimately bleeds into the discussion of its importance, and now we must take up the question explicitly; that is, why civic dignity is critical to the health of a liberal democratic regime, and what challenges does it face. The definition of civic dignity makes obvious why an individual would prefer living with it rather than without-- surely individuals prefer not being severely infantilized and humiliated. To be treated with indignity is to be denied one’s rightful place as a free and equal citizen, prohibiting (or at least limiting) one’s participation in self-government, politically and personally. But what about our tolerance for small increments of indignity? And in what of others. In practice, however, living with dignity involves the regard in which we are held by others, and how we are treated by them. Our dignity is manifest in how we behave toward others, and in how they behave toward us.” Recognition and respect are concepts Ober emphasizes repeatedly in this 2012 article.
ways does civic dignity expand beyond an issue of individual concern to the political community writ large?
For the political community, civic dignity regulates competing claims of liberty and equality, as has already been discussed, and in so doing, civic dignity yields stability in the political community. Ober writes, “Dignity makes democracy robust: Democratic
institutions defend dignity, whereas the habits of dignified citizens provide behavioral foundations for defending democracy and improving institutions over time.”33 In this sense, the sustained cultivation of civic dignity contributes to a liberal democratic equilibrium.
The discussion about the role of civic dignity in a liberal democracy begs the further question of who the democratic citizen is. Aristotle offers at least one definition of
33 Ober, “Democracy’s Dignity,” p. 828
Democratic institutions provide mechanisms
that defend dignity
Dignified citizens (and their mores) preserve
liberal democracy Individual citizens prefer
living with civic dignity than without Self-governing political community dedicated to
liberty and equality
Figure 1: Sustained cultivation of civic dignity contributing to a liberal democratic equilibrium
citizenship as the “capacity both to be ruled and to rule.34 Yet, under soft despotism citizens unofficially lose their capacity to rule—so what then? What does this imply for citizens who have been living under soft despotism or otherwise lacking in civic dignity?
Do they cease to be citizens; if so, at what point; and can they return to the ranks of
“citizen” later? Or do they never cease to be citizens so long as they are a party to our social contract?35
For the citizenry, civic dignity is a public good to be shared and mutually preserved.
As with other collective action problems, first, citizens need to recognize that the defense of civic dignity is in their self-interest (tied to their intrinsic motivation); second, they need to have the appropriate knowledge or skills to act (or self-restrain); and third, they need to have clear outlets through which they can coordinate and mobilize.36
First, rationally self-interested citizens can discover the ways in which defending one’s own and each other’s civic dignity is advantageous. Consider the self-interested individuals in Locke’s state of nature: even the strong must sleep sometime, so without a common authority, we all have equal ability to kill and be killed. Through consulting their reason, these individuals choose to quit the state of nature, and sacrificing a degree of personal freedom, they enter a social contract to secure their preservation and natural rights. By this same logic employed within the political community, a given citizen may be strong and able to exploit the weak, but someone stronger may appear before too long. If
34 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 1277b 14-15. See also 1277a 26-28, 1275b 16-20, 1253a 27-29
35 A future version of this project may consider Kant's distinction between active and passive citizens.
36 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). Civic dignity is not a “scarce resource distributed by competitive games,” so competition is not a force at play.
the defense of civic dignity has eroded, then to whom will one appeal?37 Diverse citizens can reason that their self-interest rightly understood is tied to the mutual and coordinated defense of civic dignity, thus overcoming the problem of intrinsic motivation.
Having intrinsic motivation does not necessarily result in appropriate or preferred action (to defend dignity) or self-restraint (to not challenge dignity). For the preservation of civic dignity, problems of coordination and skills remain. Ober argues that civic dignity (and its accompanying mores) can escape the ill-fated tragedy of the commons if, coupled with education and awareness, institutions have “well-understood mechanisms and adequate incentives.” Then, he asserts, “any member, or group of members, of a civic community suffering indignity can expect aid from fellow citizens-- most obviously [in the form of] a jury in a court of law, but potentially in the form of direct and collective action by the citizenry.”38 Indeed the latter is the long-term aim of this project— innovative mechanisms or platforms that make more likely the "direct and collective action of the citizenry." This underscores the importance of mores and institutions, both of which need to be directed to the common good and/ or self-interest rightly understood.
Practically speaking, many challenges and questions remain. What constitutes a threat to civic dignity may not be apparent; citizens may not realize that the defense of civic dignity is connected to one’s self interest; and citizens may choose to ignore, which is their right to do so—and these are obstacles associated with just the “demand side.” On the “supply side,” perhaps the biggest obstacle is that the outlets through which motivated
37 See Locke, Second Treatise. See also Ober, “Democracy’s Dignity,” p. 838: Ober does not argue that individuals will be singularly rational; he asserts instead that “civic dignity is thus at once virtuous, reciprocal, and rational.” This may be so, but at the very least, individuals can be rational.
38 Ober, “Democracy’s Dignity,” p. 829, 837
citizens can act may not be so readily available or immediately effective.39 As was discussed above, dignified citizens need opportunities for ownership, but what those opportunities look like and/or how to implement them may not always be clear. Ober’s model speaks primarily to how citizens ought to be treated by their government and by each other, but his argument largely neglects the question of what citizens ought to do.
Tocqueville, on the other hand, speaks to exactly that concern. His discussion of America's
"schools" of freedom provides the basis for the second model of civic dignity.
Tocqueville's work provides further context for what ownership in the political
community may look like, metaphorically and literally, and what sort of institutionalized platforms may increase civic dignity.
A. Second Model of Civic Dignity Through Tocqueville's "Schools" of Freedom