MacamvsGatmaitan 60 Phil 358| G.R. No. 40445
August 17, 1934 Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
The records show that NicolasaMacam fi led a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a will and a codicil. Both will and codicil were executed by LeonardoMacam. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition, but with regard to the codicil, however, an opposition to its probate was fi led by Juana Gatmaitan. After hearing, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as of the opposition thereto on the ground that since the allowance of the will had already become fi nal and executory, it was too late to consider the codicil. Both parties appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N a probate of a will would be a final judgment prior to that of a codicil, thereof a bar to the probate of the codicil?
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through JusticeVillareal, held:
“The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and executor is not a bar to the presentation of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for executing a will. “It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together as the codicil may be concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and they may be presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceeding is merely to determine whether or not the will and the codicil meet all thestatutory requirements for their extrinsic validity, leaving the validity of their provisions for further consideration. “The appeal taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam is, therefore, well-founded and the court a quo erred in flatly denyingher petition for the probate of the codicil on the erroneousground that said codicil should have been presented at the sametime as the will.
“With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellantJuana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file opposition tothe probate of the will does not prevent her from filing oppositionto the probate of the codicil thereof, inasmuch as the willmay satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity,but the codicil may, at the time of its execution, not be in conformitytherewith. If the testator had testamentary capacity atthe time of the execution of the will, and the will was executedin accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition toits probate would not lie. On the contrary, if at the time of theexecution of the codicil, the testator lacked some of the subjectiverequisites legally capacitating him to execute the same, orall the statutory requirements were not complied with in theexecution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.
MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with
libredisposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.
ISSUE:
W/N the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
HELD:
“It is worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own
MACROHON, JENIELYN, A LLB III-B
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930 TOPIC/DOCTRINE:FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION FACTS:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
ISSUE:
WON the deposited amount belong to the fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.
HELD:
This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution.
The disposition contained in clause IX of the will, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir.
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it.
This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.