Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor 89 SCRA 493
FACTS:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty-four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of the qualified devisee?
HELD:
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B
Rodriguez vs Ravilan
G.R. No. 5343 September 16, 1910
FACTS:
The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa Manlili, on the south by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio and of and an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the south by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.
That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuñez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively;
another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano
Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Soliano, secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant?
HELD:
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the same.
Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the Civil Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."
Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the four brothers and sisters aforementioned, there would have beenprima facie proof that they were and certainly are the owners thereof.
RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.
LLB III-B
Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 PHIL 176 October 27, 1905 FACTS:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant. Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased.
What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of representation in the collateral line can extend to grandnieces?
HELD:
As a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word
"children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion. We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
ROSALES v. ROSALES 148 SCRA 69 February 27, 1987 FACTS:
- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross value of about P30,000.
- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.
- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
HELD:
NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of representation
- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art 887. The provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea.
It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art 981.
- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father Carterio.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
Sarita vs. Candia G.R. No. L-7768
November 14, 1912
FACTS:
The spouses Apolinario Cedeño and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.
The spouses Apolinario Cedeño and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.