Since the times of ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the rise of a powerful challenger to a dominant power has generally led to war. While Thucydides originally noted this tendency in The History of the Peloponnesian War—as Athens rose, Sparta lashed out against it in fear—
others have applied his theory to various other power transitions. For instance, Graham Allison, a former Harvard professor of International affairs, analyzes sixteen cases in which a rising power usurped a dominant power, and, out of all of these cases, only four did not lead to war.174
Importantly, Allison writes this work in relation to China and the United States, exploring a foreign policy question with growing importance: are the US and China destined to clash?
In the context of the evolving relationship between China, the United States, and Latin America, there are two main sources of conflict between China and the United States that suggest that a clash may be possible. The first is the crisis in the South China Sea, where China has made an extensive claim to this maritime territory through what is known as “the Nine-Dash Line.” For China, the area bound within this line—virtually the entire South China Sea—is unequivocally China’s because of its historic claims to this massive body of water. Meanwhile, the United States has condemned China’s actions as a violation of international law and a threat to stability in Southeast Asia. As China continues to build islands in the South China Sea and the United States positions its navy in order to deter Chinese expansion, a clash on this front seems increasingly possible. Importantly, U.S. officials are concerned with China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea not only because it threatens to jeopardize U.S. authority within that region but also because China’s overall rise raises anxiety among U.S. foreign policy
174 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
makers. For these officials, China’s rise is a direct threat to U.S. hegemony and, correspondingly, the American way of life.
Similarly, U.S. foreign policy makers have become increasingly concerned with China’s growing presence in Latin America through the BRI. For over a century, U.S. leaders have treated the Western Hemisphere as a zone which the United States should have exclusive access to as a global power. Frequently referring to this part of the world as America’s “backyard,” the United States has shown great concern for warming relations between China and Latin America.
A recent example of this accumulating concern is former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s comments about Chinese involvement in Latin America, where he argues that “Our region must be diligent to guard against far-away powers that do not reflect the fundamental values shared in this region” (emphasis added).175 Tillerson describes the threat of China as a conflict of
“fundamental values,” which is reflective of a century-old understanding among U.S. foreign policy makers that U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere should not be solely economic or military. It must also be ideological, and officials have correspondingly pushed to keep
ideologies that contradict American Liberalism out of the hemisphere. Thus, as China cultivate military, economic, political, and cultural ties within Latin America, U.S. foreign policy makers sound alarms and attempt to balance the rising power’s influence in the Western Hemisphere, potentially signalling a clash between China and the United States.
As these conflicts escalate and China continues to rise as a superpower potentially capable of challenging the United States, it may seem like the Thucydides Trap will be realized and the United States will lash out at the rising power. However, applying this historical analogy erases the nuance that exists within the evolving relationship between China, the United States,
175 “Latin America Should Not Rely on China: U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson.” Reuters, February 1, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-latam-china-idUSKBN1FL6D5.
and Latin America. As Allison demonstrated in his case studies, war is not destined to occur.
There were four peaceful transitions of power where the Thucydides Trap was “escaped,” and his ultimate argument is that China and the United States can also avoid the Thucydides Trap:
“war is not inevitable.”176 When China and the United States clash or escalate conflict, they are choosing conflict, not falling into the inevitable outcome of a fixed struggle for power. This means that in both cases concerning the South China Sea and the BRI, China and the United States can also choose cooperation and convert geopolitical challenges into international opportunities.
Focusing on U.S. foreign policy perspectives and decisions, this chapter explores the growing tension between China and the United States in the South China Sea and the Western Hemisphere. Similar to China’s socially and historically constructed memory of national humiliation, U.S. responses to China in both these regions are guided by the historically
constructed understanding of American exceptionalism. This idea rests on the fundamental belief that “Americans are special, exceptional, because they are charged with saving the world from itself” and need to defend the fundamental U.S. values to which Tillerson alludes—namely democracy and capitalism.177 Although in some instances claims of American exceptionalism are certainly an over-embellished rhetorical tool used to galvanize the public, there is ample
evidence to suggest that American exceptionalism has substantively shaped the interpretations of U.S. foreign policy interests for centuries. Consequently, U.S. decision makers choose policies
176 Ironically, this argument is a bit at odds with the title of Allison’s book, which boldly reads “Destined for War.”
Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), pp. xvii.
177 In reality, neither “democracy” nor “capitalism” are values. Democracy is a system of government and capitalism is an economic system. While the implementation of these systems may imply a societies values, the things themselves are not values. However, this chapter refers to each as values because the rhetoric of foreign policy makers treat them as though they are values. For this reason, I use the language of elites to better capture these actors’ understanding of American exceptionalism. Deborah Lea Madsen, American Exceptionalism (University Press of Mississippi, 1998), pp. 2.
which they believe will achieve these interests. As this chapter demonstrates, because of