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TARJETA DE CRÉDITO

In document CAPÍTULO II MARCO TEÓRICO (página 44-48)

Th e Sui offi cial who had been sent to serve as governor of northern

Vietnam was able to maintain order even after the collapse of the Sui dynasty. Because of the honesty of his administration, the new Tang

emperors continued the offi cial as commander-in-chief of the Tang forces

deployed there until his death in 637.

Th e protectorate of Annam, “the pacifi ed south”, as north Vietnam

was soon called, represented an admission on the part of the Tang dynasty that the majority of the inhabitants were barbarians. Non-Chinese people in frontier areas were put under the authority of a protector-general, who

in northern Vietnam oversaw eight provinces. Th e same arrangement

prevailed in Central Asia, where the Tarim basin was “the pacifi ed west”, in “the pacifi ed north” of Mongolia, and “the pacifi ed east” in northern Korea. A large degree of self-government was permitted, especially in tribal areas where the Chinese authorities preferred to work through chieftains or councils of elders. We are informed how, in 669, the “uncivilized Lao” were encouraged to settle down and cultivate empty land. A Chinese chronicle tells us how they were “beckoned and soothed”.

Th e administrative centre of the protectorate of Annam was Giao

province in the lower Red river valley. Here a large agricultural population came under intense Chinese infl uence and ambitious families ensured that their sons received a thorough Confucian education. Austere courtyards and plain buildings in his temples underlined the simplicity of Confucius’ family-oriented philosophy; its fundamental principles were on display in large black characters—fi lial piety, brotherly respect, loyalty,

honesty, politeness, righteousness, integrity and chastity. Th ere were no

images, no priests and, above all, no divination. What Vietnamese men studying in temple libraries encountered was a this-worldly approach

to life, quite divorced from the ba, the spirits that were propitiated in their own homes. In Buddhist temples, however, the native deities found shelter, because Giao province was also the centre of Vietnamese

Buddhism. Today at the Van Th ieu, “the temple of literature”, this double

legacy is evident in Hanoi. Although this temple is no longer a seat of learning, a statue of Confucius dominates its main courtyard; and this large statue is accorded the reverence usually reserved for a deity, with off erings from those who seek aid with their studies. On special slabs,

set in the backs of eighty-two stone turtles at the Van Th ieu, are carved

the names of all the Vietnamese scholars who came fi rst in government-

sponsored examinations between 1442 and 1779. Th at the heads of the

turtles have been rubbed black suggests how they are regarded as another source of success for examination candidates.

During the Tang occupation, Vietnamese people living in the Red river valley may have drunk deeply from the well of Confucian wisdom, yet for China the protectorate of Annam remained no more than an isolated imperial outpost. Tang census returns show how Chinese

Co-loa AI GIAO HOAN Bach-dang river Red river Gia-ninh Dai-la Hoa-lu 0 50km N Gulf of Tonkin Bo-hai Tenth-century Vietnam

authority was secure only in Giao province where over half the total of all tax-paying families were registered. An estimate of the population is almost impossible now, because census fi gures do not include non-tax payers and a signifi cant number of Vietnamese who chose to live in places where imperial control was relatively weak. But it is not impossible that the total number of people living in the protectorate had already reached one million by the end of the eighth century.

According to Vietnamese historians, Tang rule was the worst of any Chinese dynasty, and a series of revolts seems to confi rm this view. Increased taxation was the reason for the fi rst rebellion of 687; before this date its level was always kept much lower than in China because of the

problems inherent in ruling a non-Chinese population. Th is uprising was

a peasant revolt, pure and simple, against offi cial demands for a greater

share of agricultural wealth. Before their suppression, the rebels stormed the provincial capital of Giao, the city of Dai-la, present-day Hanoi. In spite of its failure, the uprising of 687 began a cycle of unrest that gradually picked up momentum and led to Vietnamese independence. In 722 the so-called Black Emperor defi ed the Tang army before fl eeing to the mountains, where he died. Because of his dark complexion, the rebel

leader Mai Th uc Loan adopted this title and at one stage commanded

thousands of armed followers. In contrast to the rebellion of 687, however, the Black Emperor’s supporters included many non-Vietnamese mercenaries attracted by the prospect of plunder.

Th ere can be no question that the internal crisis of the Tang empire

aided the movement towards Vietnamese self-rule. In 756 the Chinese capital fell to the rebellious general An Lushan and imperial troops were

recalled to deal with the disturbance. Th e Tang fi ght back was a slow and

humiliating one for Emperor Su Zong, who needed the aid of the Turkish cavalry to regain his position. But even this assistance was not enough to preserve the capital from the Tibetans who looted its treasures in 763. It was fortunate for China that Tibet was soon wracked by internal troubles of its own, when a dispute between its warlike king and the great Buddhist monasteries left the latter dominant in Tibetan society.

Th e Tang empire, though now much reduced, continued for another

century, but interest in such a remote protectorate as Annam waned over the years. Not only was there another major uprising over taxation in

791, but even more the Yunan-based state of Nanzhou invaded the Red river valley. A chronicler expressed Chinese frustration when he wrote that “in Annam were treacherous people who often rebelled”, preventing the collection of taxes and complicating the task of dealing with foreign

incursion. Th e situation became critical in 862, when Nanzhou launched

an invasion aimed at total conquest. Only a determined counter-attack dislodged the invaders, who then shifted their attention to other parts of the Chinese empire.

In document CAPÍTULO II MARCO TEÓRICO (página 44-48)

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